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The telescreen received and transmittedsimultaneous'. Any sound that Winston made,
above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he
remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be
seen as well as heard There was of course no way ofknowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. . . You had to live--did live, from habit that became
instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized.
George Orwell, 1984.**
It's hard to argue with. . . tapes-It 's too bad we couldn't have tapes at evey trial
Watergate Juror ***
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of electronic surveillance has long posed a classic con-
frontation between privacy interests and the need for effective law en-
forcement. Thus, while it has been suggested that Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968' was enacted "[t]o
guard against the realization of Orwellian fears and conform to the con-
stitutional standards for electronic surveillance, ' 2 the statute can better
be characterized as a conscious compromise forged by Congress between
competing privacy and law enforcement concerns. The comprehensive
provisions of Title III authorize the use of electronic surveillance-wire-
taps and bugs3-as a law enforcement investigative technique, subject,
** G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949). Congress considered and rejected the
proposition that electronic surveillance would necessarily lead to "excessive invasions of pri-
vacy and a Big Brother Society." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2238. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
*** Ithaca Journal, Jan. 2, 1975, at 2, col. 2, quoted in NAT'L COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SUR-
VEILLANCE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 198 (1976) (con-
curring opinion of Commissioner Blakey). Consider also the following remarks attributed to
a juror in the racketeering trial of Anthony Scotto, a Vice President of the International
Longshoreman's Association, that "in the end it was the 'hard evidence'-especially the pros-
ecution tape recordings--that persuaded the jury to find the waterfront labor leader
guilty. . . ." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1979, at 27, col. 5. The juror stated, "The tapes were
crucial.... They had the hardest evidence and while we didn't make our decision based
solely on the tapes, I'd say that, until we heard them again, quite a few people were unde-
cided. In that sense, they were a turnaround." Id. col. 6. See infia note 1008. Similarly,
Melvin Weinberg, the FBI's operative in the controversial Abscam investigation, has been
quoted as saying, "we showed what was really going on. The tapes are the record. Nobody
can change that." R. GREENE, THE STINGMAN 287 (1981).
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). Title III, the federal statute regulating the use of elec-
tronic surveillance does not cover so-called "consensual" electronic surveillance in which one
party, usually a police officer or cooperating citizen, consents to the eavesdropping. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (c)-(d) (1976). See NAT'L COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRE-
TAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 10- 11, 115-17 [hereinafter cited as NWC Report].
See infira notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
2 United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1976).
3 "Wiretapping generally refers to the interception (and recording) of a communication
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
however, to compliance with a series of stringent statutory requirements
and prior judicial approval.4 As such, Title III was the culmination of a
forty year debate concerning the utility and constitutionality of elec-
tronic surveillance. The Supreme Court had resolved the constitutional
merits of this debate a year earlier with its decisions in Berger v. New
York 5 and Katz v. United States.6 Ironically, although both Berger and
Katz suppressed the eavesdropping evidence under consideration, the
two cases, taken together, provided for the first time a definitive
blueprint for constitutionalizing the law of electronic surveillance. 7 It
was this blueprint which served as the foundation for Title III.
Nevertheless, because of the conflict between law enforcement and
privacy interests, the enactment of federal electronic surveillance legisla-
tion was not without controversy. 8 Because of this controversy, and be-
cause of virtually unanimous concern with the potential abuses posed by
electronic surveillance, the statute was drafted so that its requirements
and protections exceeded constitutional requisites.9 By imposing these
measures, Congress hoped to realize the enormous potential of eaves-
dropping as a mode of organized crime control while simultaneously
minimizing improper usage to invade privacy rights.10 These safe-
guards, together with the expectation that compliance would be moni-
tored closely by the courts,"I served to alleviate the fear of many that
Title III was synonymous with the arrival of Big Brother. Although the
statute was still criticized by some as unconstitutional, 2 it received im-
mediate and widespread judicial approval.'3
transmitted over a wire from a telephone, without the consent of any of the participants. Bug-
ging generally refers to the interception (and recording) of a communication transmitted
orally without the consent of any of the participants." NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at xiii n.*
(emphasis in original). These terms are also defined in the federal electronic surveillance
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2) (1976).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2519 (1976).
5 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
6 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 116 (1967) (White, J., dissenting); see also infira
notes 109-78 & 220-25 and accompanying text.
8 See infia notes 179-215 and accompanying text.
9 See infia notes 219-71 and accompanying text.
10 See infia notes 184-219 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
12 See infla notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
13 Nine circuits have held that Title III is constitutional under the fourth amendment:
United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 526-31 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975);
United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 467-68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974);
United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 771-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 978-81 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975);
United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 493-501 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
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Since that time, electronic surveillance as a law enforcement tech-
nique has substantially devolved from constitutional controversy to con-
ventional wisdom. Title III has served as the basis for legislation in most
of the twenty-eight states that presently permit court authorized elec-
tronic surveillance. 14 In contrast to the four decades preceding Title III,
electronic surveillance, as a broad proposition, engendered almost no
debate in the 1970's insofar as criminal law enforcement was concerned.
For example, legal commentaries concerning the subject tended to ad-
dress the merits of isolated statutory issues rather than the constitution-
ality of the premise that electronic surveillance is a permissible
investigative device.15 Similarly, when the body established by Title III
to evaluate the statute's effectiveness, the National Wiretapping Com-
mission, issued its comprehensive 1976 report, few paid any attention.'6
Society's acquiescence in the use of electronic surveillance is diffi-
cult to explain. It may reflect an overall satisfaction with the utilitarian
compromise between crime control and privacy rights that Title III
(1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1302-04 (8th Cir. 19 72), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1974); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 683-87 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934
(1972).
'4 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to -3014 (1978 & Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 16-15-101 to -104 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a to -41s (West Supp. 1982);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to -3010 (1977);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 803-41 to -50 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to -6709 (Supp.
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1301 to 1312
(West 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -412 (1980); MASS. GEN.
LAWs ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.23 (West Supp. 1982);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1976 & Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179.410-.515
(1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to -A:11 (1974 & Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 30-12-1 to -11 (1978);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.721-.739 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 23A-35A-1 to -21 (Supp.
1982); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-
23a-1 to - 1 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 19.2-61 to -70 (1975 & Supp. 1982); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 968.27-.33 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 885.365 (West 1971) (suppres-
sion provision).
15 Compare King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments and
Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 240 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Electronic Surveillance and
Constitutional Rights]; and King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional
Consideration, 66 DICK. L. REV. 17 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
/ancel; and Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping.: The Politics of "Law and Order,"
67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969); and Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The
Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969); with Cranwell, Judicial Fine-tuning of Elec-
tronic Surveillance, 6 SETON HALL 225 (1975); and Decker & Handler, Electronic Surveillance:
Standards, Restrictions, and Remedies, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 60 (1975); and Pulaski, Authorizing
Wiretap Applications Under Title III- Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
750 (1975).
16 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1976, § 1, at 20.
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sought to achieve, but it also might be attributable to fatigue after years
of debate. Quite possibly, it may stem from law enforcement's relative
reluctance to use eavesdropping devices, as-a few spectacular cases
notwithstanding---electronic surveillance has been remarkably underutil-
iked, and certainly has not achieved the ambitious goals its proponents
had in mind.1 7
Ironically, paralleling the recent acceptance of electronic surveil-
lance, the statute itself has quietly undergone a judicial reformation that
has altered both its original legislative design and underlying constitu-
tional framework. Thus, although it has been suggested that the
"[c]ourts have rejected requests to rewrite Title III by making flexible
interpretations which would have excused law enforcement errors,
rather than demanding strict compliance with Title III's specific provi-
sions,""' precisely this development has occurred. Since 1969, the
Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions involving Title III which,
taken together, reflect a trend that is certainly indicative of an unantici-
pated approach to Title III statutory interpretation. In addition, these
decisions have raised the spectre that a comprehensive legislative pack-
age, which the courts have found to be facially valid, may be unconsti-
tutional as applied. 19
The Supreme Court has not addressed Title III since 1979. It is
now time to give renewed attention to this area. Hence, the purpose of
this Article is to analyze the Court's Title III decisions and evaluate
their impact upon the jurisprudence of court authorized electronic sur-
veillance. Moreover, rather than limiting its scope to a purely legal
analysis of these issues, the Article will also examine whether the statute
has been implemented by law enforcement officials in a manner consis-
tent with congressional intentions. The Article consists of six major sec-
tions. Section II will review the controversial constitutional and
statutory origins of Title III. As such, Section II will serve as a predicate
for Section III, an analysis of Title III's legislative design. Section IV
will examine the Supreme Court's implementation of constitutional doc-
trine and legislative design in a series of major Title III cases. The im-
pact of these decisions will often be apparent from the discussion of each
case, but Section V will further explore their aftereffects throughout the
judiciary. Section VI will briefly address the legislative response to these
decisions. Finally, within this context, Section VII will comment upon
17 See infia notes 940-1017 and accompanying text.
18 J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 50 (1977).
19 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
infra note 667. But see Cranwell, supra note 15, at 267 (maintaining that courts have meticu-
lously enforced the statute).
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the extent to which present methods of executive enforcement have im-
pacted upon privacy and organized crime.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF TITLE III
A. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: OLMSTEAD AND
ITS EARLY PROGENY
Electronic surveillance is hardly novel to modern law enforcement.
In fact, with the onset of relatively sophisticated comunications systems
during the mid-1800's, electronic surveillance was used successfully as
an intelligence technique in the Civil War, as well as for other, more
mundane, industrial and political espionage of the nineteenth century.20
While some states placed restrictions on electronic eavesdropping, the
question of its constitutionality as a law enforcement tool was not con-
sidered by the Supreme Court until the 1928 landmark decision of Olm-
stead v. United States.2 '
The Olmstead case involved a bootlegging conspiracy which was
considered to be of "amazing magnitude. '22 Since electronic eavesdrop-
ping traditionally has been considered a critical investigative technique
against organized crime, it was by no means ironic that Olmstead served
as the Supreme Court's initial vehicle for developing the constitutional
doctrine of electronic surveillance. 23 Indeed, this factor may have pro-
vided some subtle motivation for the narrow mode of analysis that Chief
Justice Taft adopted in rejecting the fourth amendment argument ad-
vanced by the Olmstead defendants.
Specifically, the defense maintained that the government's use of
evidence, obtained during a five month warrantless wiretapping opera-
tion involving eight telephones, constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 24 As electronic
surveillance obviously involves an intangible seizure of a kind unknown
when the fourth amendment was written, Olmstead posed the Court with
a model constitutional problem: are modern issues of constitutional sig-
nificance to be decided solely by reference to the literal words of the
Constitution, as those words were understood by the Founding Fa-
thers?25 When Chief Justice Taft resolved this question affirmatively,
20 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1967); NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-
34.
21 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22 Id. at 455.
23 Se infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
24 277 U.S. at 456-57.
25 In his classic work on the fourth amendment, Professor Taylor articulated this issue as
follows:
Does the Constitution speak as of yesterday, today, or tomorrow? By what temporal
1983]
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rejection of the defendants' fourth amendment claim ineluctably fol-
lowed.26 Reasoning that the historical purpose of the fourth amend-
ment was to protect against trespassory general searches for tangible
items, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the amendment simply was in-
applicable to this case as neither a technical trespass nor the seizure of
tangible items was involved.27
Justice Holmes dissented, excoriating the government for obtaining
its evidence by blatantly violating applicable state legislation prohibit-
ing wiretapping,28 but it was Justice Brandeis' historic dissent which
provided the direct counterpoint to the majority's analysis. Justice
Brandeis recognized that wiretapping potentially involves a far greater
intrusion than ordinary searches, and that the Chief Justice's trespass-
tangibles analysis offered no protection against wiretapping or other
kinds of sophisticated searches that might be subsequently invented.29
Accordingly, quoting former Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Bran-
deis sought to remind the Court "that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding," and, as such, it must be adaptable to modern problems if it
is to retain its value.30 The fourth amendment was to be interpreted in
standards are its words to be measured? Does the Constitution mean what it was meant
to mean, or what it has come to mean, or what it ought to mean? Are these alternatives
mutually exclusive, or may they be used in combination or according to circumstances?
These are among the questions which closely hedge the path to constitutional decision.
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATON 5-6 (1969).
26 277 U.S. at 463-66.
27 Id. The Court also rejected petitioner's fifth amendment argument since there had
been "no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many tele-
phones." Id. at 462.
28 Justice Holmes made the following argument regarding electronic surveillance:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evi-
dence should be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not itself foster
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be ob-
tained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime I do not see why it may not
as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to
protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in fu-
ture it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
29 Specifically, Justice Brandeis raised the following concerns:
Moreover, "in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the Govern-
ment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret draw-
ers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences
may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it
be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that, historically, the
Court always had interpreted the Constitution flexibly to accommodate changing conditions:
Since. . . [1819], this Court has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress,
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light of its underlying principles. Significantly, for Justice Brandeis, the
primary underlying principle was "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'3'
Hence, any unwarranted intrusion upon this right of privacy was to be
"deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. '32
Despite its modern appeal, Justice Brandeis' argument succumbed
to a five to four majority. Fourteen years later, similar pleas by Justice
Murphy were rejected in Coldman v. United States,33 a case in which fed-
eral agents had eavesdropped by placing a detectaphone against an of-
fice partition wall.34 Justice Murphy did not suggest that such
electronic surveillance was unconstitutional per se; rather, he argued
that, as modem citizens are subject to a "greatly expanded . . . range
and character" of potential government intrusions, a realistic view of the
fourth amendment's "historic purpose" and of its "modern social and
legal implications" demands that there be compliance with its warrant
clause requirements.3 5 This willingness to concede that a warrant could
be drafted that would be capable of effectively regulating electronic sur-
veillance techniques may have represented a partial retreat from Bran-
deis' dissent in Olmstead.36 The majority was unmoved, however. In a
five to three decision, the use of electronic surveillance was approved
because evidence obtained by detectaphone did not involve a technical
trespass.37
The inherent anomaly in a constitutional doctrine that offers sub-
under various clauses of. . . [the Constitution], over objects of which the Fathers could
not have dreamed. We have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of
Government, like those embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting modern condi-
tions by regulations which a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Clauses guaranteeing to the individual
protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to
a changing world. It was with reference to such a clause that this Court said in Weems v.
United States: "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily con-
fined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into exist-
ence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."
Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32 Id. Note, however, that it is by no means certain that Justices Holmes and Brandeis
were opposed to electronic surveillance per se. Had state law not been violated and a warrant
obtained, they may have been inclined to sustain such searches. Compare NWC REPORTSup ra
note 1, at 203 n.99 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Blakey), with Kamisar, The Wiretap-
ping-Eavesdropping Problem: A ftofessorls View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 897 n.38 (1960).
33 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
34 Id. at 134-35.
35 Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justices Stone and Frankfurter, citing the Olrstead
dissents, also argued that the trespass doctrine should be overruled. Id. at 136.
36 But see spra note 32.
37 316 U.S. at 134-35.
1983]
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
stantial protection to tangible items but does nothing to secure the pri-
vacy of thoughts disclosed in confidence38 has fueled sharp criticism of
the Olnstead doctrine.39 Professor Carr's treatise on electronic surveil-
lance expresses the basis for this criticism most succinctly:
As long as the trespass doctrine remained the decisional benchmark,
consideration of basic privacy interests was disregarded. Under this doc-
trine, the privacy of the spoken word depended solely upon the officer's
selection of the right equipment and location for overhearing the conversa-
tion. The only virtue of the trespass rule was its predictability: unlike
most search and seizure decisions, these cases established a line which was
as clear constitutionally as it was physically.40
Even predictability, however, was not always a simple matter. In On
Lee v. United States '4 in which an informant wired for sound had trans-
mitted his conversation with On Lee to a federal officer located beyond
defendant's premises, the Court was faced with the neoteric argument
that the informant's unauthorized transmission constituted a "trespass
ab initio ,"42 thereby vitiating the original consent for his initial entry.
Ironically, the Court responded that "it is doubtful that the niceties of
tort law initiated almost two and a half centuries ago. . . are of much
aid in determining rights under the Fourth Amendment,"4 3 and then
proceeded to affirm petitioner's conviction because there had been no
trespass.44 Although dissents called for a more modern and realistic
fourth amendment analysis, 45 Olnstead was to withstand these demands
for more than another decade. Meanwhile, defendants sought partial
refuge in the unanticipated protection offered by the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934.46
B. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934: STATUTORY
PRECURSOR TO TITLE III
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead suggested that an alterna-
tive was available to those who were dissatisfied with the Court's literal-
istic handling of the fourth amendment: "Congress may of course
protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when inter-
cepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct leg-
38 See id. at 141 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
39 See, e.g., Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Infor-
mation Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (1979); Westin, The Wiretapping Problem: An
Analsis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 173 (1952).
40 J. CARR, supra note 18, at 13-14.
41 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
42 Id. at 752.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 752-53.
45 Justices Douglas, Burton, and Frankfurter dissented on this basis. 343 U.S. at 758-67.
46 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
[Vol. 74
1983] ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
islation . -47 Indeed, that is exactly what many lawmakers
attempted by introducing an array of proposed bills that would have
legislatively overruled Olmtead.48 Significantly, however, no compre-
hensive measure was passed.
The legal community thus never anticipated the Supreme Court's
decision in Nardone v. United States (Nardone1),49 which held that section
605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 precluded the admissi-
bility of wiretap evidence. Although the Act had basically been passed
for the limited purpose of defining the jurisdictional scope of the newly
established Federal Communications Commission,50 the Court con-
cluded that the express language of section 605, providing, in relevant
part, that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge [its]. . .contents. . ,, directly ap-
47 277 U.S. at 465-66.
48 S. 1396, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); H.R. 9893, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); H.R. 5305,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); H.R. 23, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. 6061, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.
(1931); H.R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929); H.R. 4139, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929). See
Gasque, Wiretapping.- A History of Federal Legislation and Supreme Court Decisions, 15 S.C.L. REV.
593, 595 (1963). Note, however, that an appropriations bill was passed which provided that
none of its funds could be used to effect wiretapping for National Prohibition Act prosecu-
tions. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 514, 534 n.134 (1947).
49 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
50 See, e.g., Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEo.
L.J. 418, 421-22 (1958); Gasque, supra note 48, at 598. The legislative history to § 605 no-
where suggests that Congress was addressing the wiretapping problem. See S. REP. No. 781,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
51 At the time of the enactment, the full text of § 605 provided as follows:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in trans-
mitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or pub-
lish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except
through authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person other than the
addressee, his agent or attorney, or to a person employed or authorized to forward such
communication to its destination, or to proper accounting or distributing officers of the
various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, or to the
master of a ship under whom he is serving, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority; and no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, con-
tents, substance, purport, teict, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; and no
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or
foreign communications by wire or radio and use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto; and no
person having received such intercepted communication or having become acquainted
with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or use
the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to the receiving,
divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication broadcast, or
transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public, or relating to ships in
distress.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946) (emphasis added). After the passage of Title III, the language relied
upon in Nardone I was modified by amendment. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
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plied to prohibit wiretapping.52 In dissent, Justice Sutherland argued
that the statute's use of the word "person" obviously did not include law
enforcement officers. 53 The Court, having previously embraced literal-
ism in Olmstead to prevent a conceptual expansion of the fourth amend-
ment, now relied upon literalism to effect a dynamic enlargement of a
narrow legislative provision. Moreover, in a second Nardone appeal
(Nardone II), 54 when the Government sought to circumvent the impact
of Nardone I by introducing derivative wiretap evidence, the Court ex-
plicitly transformed the significance of its earlier pronouncement:
That decision was not the product of a merely meticulous reading of tech-
nical language. It was the translation into practicality of broad considera-
tions of morality and public well-being. This Court found that the
logically relevant proof which Congress had outlawed, it outlawed because
"inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
liberty.[sic1 ' '55
Nardone II then held that, for the statutory preclusion to be effective,
derivative wiretap evidence must be subject to suppression as "a fruit of
the poisonous tree."'56
Like Olmstead, both Nardone cases were widely criticized. 57 Primary
concentration, however, was placed on Nardone I, since the derivative
fruits analysis of Nardone II was seemingly a logical consequence of its
predecessor. Since there was neither any reference to wiretapping in the
statute nor any support for the decision in the law's legislative history,
Nardone I was broadly perceived as "judicial legislation" by a reconsti-
tuted Supreme Court.58 Nevertheless, congressional efforts to nullify its
impact failed.59
By indirectly resurrecting the fourth amendment via the literal lan-
guage of the Federal Communications Act, the Supreme Court uncon-
sciously provided wiretap victims with potentially more protections than
were available under the Constitution. For example, section 605 ap-
peared to provide a broader suppression sanction than did the constitu-
tional exclusionary rule; it was available in all state and federal court
proceedings and applied even if a private party had done the wiretap-
ping.60 Nor was section 605 seemingly restricted by the standing rule
52 302 U.S. at 381-82.
53 Id. at 385 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
54 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
55 Id. at 340 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. at 383).
56 Id. at 341. Given the initial illegality, the case was then remanded for a determination
of whether, in fact, the pertinent evidence had been derived from an unlawful wiretap or was
sufficiently attenuated as to have been cleansed of the taint. Id. at 341-43.
57 See, e.g., NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 35; Westin, supa note 39, at 175.
58 See, e.g., Westin, supra note 39, at 175.
59 Gasque, supra note 48, at 599-600; Westin, supra note 39, at 175 n.54.
60 Kamisar, supra note 32, at 907-09, 921-25. The exclusionary rule is inapplicable to
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that limited application of the constitutional exclusionary remedy to ac-
tual victims of fourth amendment violations; 6 1 under the Act's terms,
anyone could object to the introduction of evidence that stemmed from
wiretapping.
Not all of this potential was realized, however, for in a series of
restrictive decisions the Supreme Court soon took away much of what it
had given.6 2 Possibly realizing the irony of its misadventure, the Court
imposed a fourth amendment standing limitation upon the statute,63
declared the law inapplicable to state court proceedings,64 and nar-
rowed the scope of the critical term "intercept. ' 65 Nevertheless, while
limiting the impact of Nardone, these changes did little to provide the
law of electronic surveillance with a sense of doctrinal consistency. For
civil libertarians, however, even the confusion of section 605's wiretap-
ping protection was preferable to no protection at all. Meanwhile, fed-
eral law still offered no sanctuary against the potentially greater
intrusions posed by a nontrespassory bug. It was within this context
that the Supreme Court slowly began to reconsider the 0/istead
doctrine.
C. THE REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
. Preliminagy Modifications
In 1954, two years after On Lee, the Supreme Court in Irvine v. Cali-
fornia66 gave the first intimation, albeit a subtle one, that electronic sur-
veillance would eventually be considered from a new perspective. In
Irvine, the Court declared for the first time that evidence obtained by
means of a surreptitious bug violated the fourth amendment.67 Since
evidence obtained as a result of a private illegal search. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,
475 (1921). Set, e.g., W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.6 (1978). Prior to the 1960's, the remedy was deemed inapplicable to state
litigation, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961), or to cases in which evidence seized by
state officers was being introduced in federal court, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208-
14 (1960).
61 Kamisar, supra note 32, at 924-25. Federal courts historically have denied standing to
utilize the suppression sanction to persons not victimized by alleged constitutional violations.
See e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). For a discussion of basic stand-
ing principles, see infia notes 346-55 and accompanying text.
62 Kamisar, supra note 32, at 908-09; see Westin, supra note 39, at 179-80.
63 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942).
64 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 201-04 (1952). Immediately prior to the passage of
Title III, Schwartz was overruled in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 383-87 (1968).
65 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. at 133-34 (eavesdropping from an adjacent room
to one party's end of telephone conversation does not constitute interception).
66 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
67 Id. at 132-33. Irvine did not suppress the tainted evidence because the exclusionary rule
was not then binding upon the states. Id. at 132-38. The scope of the exclusionary principle
was subsequently expanded in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961).
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the police had blatantly violated the Olstead doctrine by trespassing
both when they installed the bug and later when they repositioned it,
the Court's conclusion was hardly surprising. Nevertheless, Irinze was
significant both because of the tone of Justice Jackson's majority opinion
condemning the police and because of his explicit acknowledgment that
electronic eavesdropping devices had become "frightening instruments
of surveillance and ivasion ofpriva."68 Moreover, implicit to IrvL'ne was
the recognition that intangible conversations were both subject to
seizure and deserving of fourth amendment protection.69
Similar values were expressed eight years later in Silverman v. United
States,70 when the Court ruled unconstitutional a surveillance practice
that involved inserting a "so-called 'spike-mike'" into a partition wall
adjacent to the target premises. 71 Justice Stewart's majority opinion
emphasized the Court's concern with the danger posed by burgeoning
scientific advances, 72 and implied that safeguarding intangible conver-
sations was a legitimate fourth amendment exercise. 73 Although, nar-
rowly read, Silverman was decided on the basis of an actual physical
intrusion having occurred, Justice Stewart clearly transcended Olnstead
by declining "to consider whether. . . there [had been] a technical tres-
pass under . . . local property law";74 fourth amendment liberties were
no longer to be evaluated "in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real
property law."'75 Instead, they were to be measured by their "very core,"
which, to Justice Stewart, meant "the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
68 347 U.S. at 132 (emphasis added). Specifically, Justice Jackson rebuked law enforce-
ment in the following terms:
Each of these repeated entries of petitioner's home without a search warrant or
other process was a trespass, and probably a burglary, for which any unofficial person
should be, and probably would be, severely punished. Science has perfected amplifying
and recording devices to become frightening instruments of surveillance and invasion of
privacy, whether by the policeman, the blackmailer, or the busybody. That officers of
the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device, even in a bedroom, and
listen to the conversation of the occupants for over a month would be almost incredible if
it were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more
flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the. . .Fourth Amendment.
Id.
69 Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296, 307 (1968). See
also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 460-61 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); T. TAY-
LOR, supra note 25, at 73; Semerjian, Proposals on Wiretapping in Light of Recent Senate Hearings,
45 B.U.L. REv. 216, 224 n.51 (1965).
70 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
71 Id. at 506, 511-12.
72 Id. at 508-09. For a discussion of electronic surveillance technology during more primi-
tive times, see Westin, supra note 39, at 197-98.
73 365 U.S. at 511. Silverman was later interpreted to have extended fourth amendment
protection to intangibles. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).
74 365 U.S. at 511.




While Justice Stewart's words were clearly indicative of a new di-
rection, perhaps the most significant development towards O/mstead's de-
mise was Lopez v. United States.77 Curiously, the majority opinion in
Lopez did not appear to signify any unusual breakthrough. Citing On
Lee, Justice Harlan rejected an argument that an IRS agent's feigned
acquiescence in a bribery scheme precluded his testimony concerning an
incriminating conversation made in the defendant's office. 78 In effect,
by engaging in the conversation, Lopez had assumed the risk of its dis-
closure by the agent. 79 Once this testimony was deemed admissible,
logic arguably compelled that a tape recording of the conversation was
likewise admissible; after all, the Constitution conferred no "right to rely
on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's cred-
ibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not suscep-
tible of impeachment."80
Lopez' far reaching implications concerning nonconsensual elec-
tronic surveillance, however, evolved from Justice Brennan's dissent.
Joined by Justices Goldberg and Douglas, the Brennan opinion ex-
pressed both an awareness of prior electronic surveillance misconduct
and a profound sensitivity to the potential for further technological
abuse posed by sophisticated microphone devices.81 Justice Brennan re-
76 Id. Silverman suggested that the Court's focus should be on whether the government
had impermissibly intruded upon a constitutionally protected area, id. at 512, rather than on
trespass considerations. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (citing Silverman, per
curiam reversal even though listening device had only been attached to wall with a thumb-
tack); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-45 (1962) (focusing on whether jail is a constitu-
tionally protected area rather than deciding case on basis of no trespass). In Katz v. United
States, 388 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the Court repudiated the "constitutionally protected area"
test; nevertheless, when originally implied by Silverman, this standard was a vast improvement
over Onrstead.
77 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
78 Id. at 437-38.
79 Id. at 439.
80 Id.
81 In this respect, Justice Brennan made the following observations:
Not only has the problem grown enormously in recent years ... but its true dimensions
have only recently become apparent from empirical studies not available when Olmstead,
Goldman, and On Lee were decided. The comprehensive study by Samuel Dash and his
associates as well as a number of legislative inquiries reveals these truly terrifying facts:
(1) Electronic eavesdropping by means of concealed microphones and recording devices
of various kinds has become as large a problem as wiretapping, and is pervasively em-
ployed by private detectives, police, labor spies, employers and others for a variety of
purposes, some downright disreputable. (2) These devices go far beyond simply "bug-
ging" and permit a degree of invasion of privacy that can only be described as frighten-
ing. (3) Far from providing unimpeachable evidence, the devices lend themselves to
diabolical fakery.
Id. at 466-68 (citations omitted). The following observations, made by Samuel Dash, were
stressed by Justice Brennan:
Dash suggests that a parabolic microphone (which concentrates sound much as a curved
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garded the absence of meaningful protection against bugging devices an
mirror focuses light) might pick up a conversation at a distance of 100 feet . . . Such a
microphone can be made virtually impossible to detect, . . . but even the ordinary con-
cealed microphone in the home may be impossible to detect, at least without a mine
detector. . . . Such a device, if it exists, is not readily obtainable; but the parabolic
microphone and a variety of other such devices are. Thus a current advertisement in a
national magazine for "The Snooper" describes this device as follows: "This is literally
an electronic marvel that's a direct result of the space age. Incredible as it may seem, it
does amplify sound 1,000,000 times. Sensitive 18" disk reflector will pick up normal
conversations at a distance (500 ft.) where you can't even see lips moving. Just think of
the ways you can use this. Portable; complete with tripod and stethescopic earphones.
The best part-a regular tape recorder can be plugged into the back to take everything
down. Have fun." The advertised price is S18.85.
Id. at 468 n. 16. See S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 305-79
(1959) [hereinafter cited as THE EAVESDROPPERS].
The accuracy of these claims, however, is not undisputed. STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, general commentary 85 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS]. The American Bar Association's standards on electronic surveil-
lance, for example, suggested that eavesdropping does not lend itself to alteration of tapes. Id.
at 45. Moreover, the ABA report noted that practical and scientific limitations tend to dimin-
ish the potential for abuse:
Less widespread publicity has been given, however, to the physical limitations in the
existing devices or to the inherent investigative limitations on the use of these techniques.
Telephone cable pairs must be located to wiretap. A plant must be established to listen
or to record near the tap, or lines must be run to another location or another means of
transmission set up, often a considerable distance away. Bugs must be installed or set up.
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to install them where a surreptitious entry is re-
quired. Long range interception devices are often too large or too bulky to employ dis-
creetly or quickly. Often one or more additional entries or at least a period of time is
required to adjust installed equipment. Power sources must be found. Static and room
noise interfere with reception often making use unproductive. Wireless transmission can
be intercepted and the device discovered. It may, in addition, be electronically jammed.
Wired equipment can be visually discovered. More often than not, the device, for one
reason or another, sometimes technical and sometimes human, will not work. All of this
is not to say that these devices cannot be profitably employed. If the past is any guide to
the future, many of these physical limitations, moreover, will be overcome with "pa-
tience and ingenuity." It is to say, however, that the present situation, journalistic sensa-
tionalism to the contrary notwithstanding, cannot be fairly compared to anything out of
George Orwell's 1984.
While further technological and scientific development will probably overcome
most of the existing physical limitations on the techniques themselves, the inherent inves-
tigative limitations on them stand on a different footing. Contrary to popular miscon-
ception, they are not a "lazy" way to conduct an investigation. Monitoring surveillance
equipment in certain situations requires an inordinate amount of time, hours and hours
spent without a word overheard, simply because no one is present and speaking. While
automatic recording equipment is available, key devices still require human monitor.
Seldom is it possible for him to be alone. Others have to be available to act immediately
on intercepted information. It may be necessary, for example, to place in motion a phys-
ical tail or to place a key meeting under physical surveillance, the location of which has
just become known. This may require the constant attention of several men and cars to
be tied up. All of this takes precious manpower, yet most of the time of the men is spent
waiting. Only an important investigation can warrant the use of police personnel, equip-
ment and other resources in this fashion. Idle curiosity, of course, never will warrant
such use. Analysis of the product, too, is painstaking. Voices and overheard names must
be identified, and this demands time and talent. Meaning sometimes must be derived
from the partial interception of a series of conversations when only one or two take place
within the range of the device. Usually, the level of pre-surveillance information is such
that the expected information, when it is intercepted, is intelligible, but this, in itself,
normally means that extensive investigations must proceed [sic] the use of these tech-
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"intolerable anomaly" in view of the relative safeguards available
against the less serious intrusions posed by conventional searches.82
Moreover, he maintained that the doctrinal underpinnings of Olmstead
and On Lee had been swept away by Irvine and Silverman, thereby enti-
tling one to protection under a revitalized fourth amendment against
the surreptitious tape recording of his conversations with a federal
agent.83. This conclusion was grounded on the view that the fourth
amendment's true purpose was to preserve for each individual a com-
prehensive right of privacy. 84
The immediate significance of Justice Brennan's position, however,
lay not in these arguments, but in his suggestion that the consequences
of their acceptance were not necessarily that drastic. 85 Specifically, Jus-
tice Brennan observed that the Court's historic reluctance to nullify Oln-
stead reflected a "pervasive fear" that applying fourth amendment
protection to electronic surveillance would eliminate an important in-
vestigative tool, since an electronic search arguably could never be rea-
sonable under the amendment.86 While not conceding the point,87
niques. This, too, limits their use. Often, however, unexpected information is inter-
cepted. Many times before it is fully understood, it is too late to take preventive action.
The notion that the use of these techniques is thus a "short cut" designed to save "shoe
leather" is mistaken.
Thus, even if there were no legal restraints on the use of these techniques, they could
nevertheless be used profitably in only a limited number of investigative situations.
Id. at 45-47. The ABA Standards later served as a basis for Title III. See infia note 232.
Similarly, in 1976 the National Wiretapping Commission issued a study which found that the
technological capacity of most available eavesdropping devices has been overstated. The
Commission made the following observation:
The use of laser beams to retrieve audio from vibrating windowpanes, although
highly publicized, was not found to exist outside the experimental laboratory. This tech-
nology offers no substantive threat at the present time because of the high cost of special
equipment, restrictive physical considerations, and skill required for successful operation.
Van Dewerker, State of the Art of Electronic Surveillance, in COMMISSION STUDIES, SUPPORTING
MATERIALS FOR THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FED-
ERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 141,
152 (1976) (emphasis added). The study concluded that laser technology was not cost-effi-
cient. Id. at 182. Likewise, the study reported that the effectiveness of parabolic microphones
is limited by ambient noises and wind. Moreover, as a practical matter, their use is limited
because their large size prevents easy concealment. Id. at 171. While noting that future tech-
nological developments would, in theory, facilitate investigations using electronic surveillance
by reducing the size of both transmitters and receivers, the report indicated that, absent cor-
responding progress in the development of battery technology, the expanded use of
microcomputer processor techniques would have limited impact. Id. at 154. This Article will
return to the question of abuse and technology. See infra notes 941-73 and accompanying text.
82 373 U.S. at 471.
83 Id. at 460-61, 469-71.
84 Id. at 455-57, 469-71.
85 Westin, Science, Trivay, and Freedom." Issues and Proosas For the 1970s, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 1003, 1245 (1966).
86 373 U.S. at 463.
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Justice Brennan sought to assure his brethren that such concerns were
unnecessarily rigid:
[I]t is premature to conclude that no warrant for an electronic search can
possibly be devised. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not
inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment. It is at least clear that "the procedure of antecedent justification
before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment,". . . could
be made a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance. And there have
been numerous suggestions of ways in which electronic searches could be
made to comply with the other requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
This is not to say that a warrant that will pass muster can actually be
devised. It is not the business of this Court to pass upon hypothetical ques-
tions, and the question of the constitutionality of warrants for electronic
surveillance is at this stage purely hypothetical. But it is important that
the question is still an open one. Until the Court holds inadmissible the
fruits of an electronic search made, as in the instant case, with no attempt
whatever to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
there will be no incentive to seek an imaginative solution whereby the
rights of individual liberty and the needs of law enforcement are fairly
accommodated.8 8
Although the search warrant alternative had been suggested previ-
ously,8 9 the force of Justice Brennan's words provided the predicate for a
more flexible approach to the electronic surveillance question.9° Elec-
tronic surveillance was no longer an all or nothing proposition. Instead,
it was-at least potentially-a matter that could be appropriately regu-
lated under the fourth amendment's warrant clause. Significantly, Jus-
tice Brennan's willingness to effect a possible compromise was entirely
consistent with the Warren Court's overall approach to constitutional
adjudication. For, notwithstanding its civil libertarian image, the Court
understood that constitutional principles could not be pronounced in a
vacuum. Hence, unless tempered by pragmatic concerns, the perceived
social costs occasioned by new fourth amendment concepts ultimately
87 On the contrary, Justice Brennan suggested that, before electronic surveillance could
be regarded as constitutionally reasonable, certain difficulties would have to be resolved:
For one thing, electronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate, so that compli-
ance with the requirement of particularity in the Fourth Amendment would be difficult;
for another, words which are the objects of an electronic seizure, are ordinarily mere
evidence and not the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, and so they are impermissible
objects of lawful searches under any circumstances; . . . finally, the usefulness of elec-
tronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.
Id.
88 Id. at 464-65.
89 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (using
an electronic device for the purpose of intercepting communications is a search that should be
made, if at all, only on a warrant issued by a magistrate); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 140 n.7 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that use of detectophones should be
subject to search warrant process).
90 Westin, supra note 85, at 1245-46; see, .g., NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
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would frustrate their effective implementation. 9 1
An opportunity to test the Brennan suggestion was presented by
Osbom v. United States,92 in which the FBI had obtained a search warrant
authorizing an informant to tape record his conversation with Jimmy
Hoffa's lawyer (who wanted to bribe a juror). Significantly, although
the case could have been decided by a per curiam citation to On Lee and
Lopez, 93 the Court instead chose to reason that, since a search warrant
had been obtained, the circumstances of this case came within the scope
of Justice Brennan's position in Lopez. Consequently, the issue became
"not the permissibility of 'indiscriminate use of [electronic] devices in
law enforcement,' but the permissibility of using such a device under the
most precise and discriminate circumstances, circumstances which fully
met the 'requirement of particularity' which the dissenting opinion in
Lopez found necessary." 94 Framed in this manner, admissibility of the
tape recorded conversation easily followed.
Thus, Osbom demonstrated the fourth amendment's potential flex-
ibility. Even so, a major hurdle known as the "mere evidence" rule had
to be overcome before electronic surveillance could fit neatly within
91 This aspect of the Warren Court's judicial philosophy was made manifest by Professor
Francis A. Allen:
The heart of the problem for judicial activism in the criminal area is not simply that
of effecting an expansion of doctrine relating to the rights and immunities of persons
against whom the state proceeds. The problem also encompasses the question of how,
given the limitations of judicial remedies and devices, judicial power may be effectively
exerted to achieve the desired objectives. Stated more graphically: how can a court,
however exalted its authority, that stands at the apex of a complex judicial structure
exercise its powers so as to achieve a genuine impact on the day-by-day behavior of
police, prosecutory, judicial, and correctional officials throughout a nation of two hun-
dred million inhabitants? Anyone who studies carefully the judicial expressions of the
Warren Court in the criminal cases comes to the realization that this concern with imple-
mentation is never far below the surface. One is unlikely to understand the phenomenon
of the Warren Court until he perceives that the persistent motive of the Court is not only
to declare the rights of persons confronting state power in the criminal arena, but also to
enlarge the exercise of its judicial authority in such fashion as most likely to render those
declarations effective. This is surely not to say that concern with remedies and imple-
mentation is peculiar to fourteenth amendment law relating to criminal justice or even
to constitutional adjudication generally. Such concerns impinge upon and condition
judicial lawmaking whenever it occurs. Such problems assumed particularly large pro-
portions for the Court, however, as it considered its role in the criminal cases during the
early years of the 1960's and before.
Allen, The Judicial (Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL.
L.F. 518, 526 (footnotes omitted). Professor Allen later illustrated this observation by refer-
ence to the Court's tendency to deny many of its decisions' retrospective application. Hence,
prospectivity served as "a device that encourages the making of new law by reducing some of
the social costs." Id. at 529-30.
92 385 U.S. 323 (1966). At the time, Jimmy Hoffa, president of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, was on trial for rigging a jury to escape a prior prosecution. See Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294-95 (1966).
93 See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. at 327; tee also stupra notes 41-45 & 77-80 and
accompanying text.
94 385 U.S. at 329.
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traditional search warrant analysis. Early search warrant law was
based, at least in part, upon property concepts. Government could law-
fully seize only those items to which it could assert a property interest
superior to that of the person being searched.95 Since no one has the
right to possess stolen property, contraband, or instrumentalities of
crime, search warrants could be issued for these items. Conversely, how-
ever, all other items, "mere evidence" of criminality, were not subject to
search and seizure by warrant. 9 6 Although there was no support for a
"mere evidence" limitation in any fourth amendment language, it some-
what anomalously became a part of nineteenth century constitutional
doctrine.9 7
Often criticized as a rule without a modern reason, 98 its conse-
quences were nonetheless potentially severe, for no evidence -however
relevant-not fitting into one of the designated categories could be ob-
tained by a search warrant. 99 Moreover, this limitation on the objects
subject to seizure also tended to limit the scope of the search itself. oo To
escape this harsh result, courts often categorized virtually any type of
evidentiary item as an instrumentality of crime.1 0 ' For electronic sur-
veillance, however, strict application of the mere evidence rule would
have precluded the search warrant alternative, since it was evident that
most electronically seized conversations could only be classified as evi-
95 If the government's possessory claim to the seized property was not better than the
search victim's, the seizure was considered an unlawful trespass. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A
No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474, 475-76 (1961); see N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION 133-34 (1937); Mickenburg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From
Property to Piay and Back, 16 N.E.L. REv. 197, 199-201 (1981). Note, Evidentiay Searches: The
Rule and the Reason, 54 GEO. LJ. 593, 600-06 (1966).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); see also Recent Decisions, 34 BROOKLYN L. REv. 287, 309-10
(1968).
97 For a critical analysis of the mere evidence rule and a description of its anomalous
constitutional roots, see T. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 52-64.
98 See, e.g., Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in Search of a
Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 319, 330 (1953).
99 See Kaplan, supra note 95, at 477-78. The rule, however, placed no similar limitation
on searches incident to arrest. T. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 5 7-58. Professor Taylor believed
that this lack of uniformity demonstrated the rule's irrationality. Id.
100 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309, 320-21 (1967).
101 See,e.g., Kamisar,supra note 32, at 916-17. United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1958), provides a classic illustration of how courts circumvented the limitations of the "mere
evidence" rule by broadly construing the definition of "instrumentality." In Guido, the court
upheld the seizure of the defendant's shoes for the purpose of matching them with a heel
impression taken from the scene of the bank robbery by characterizing the shoes as instru-
mentalities. Id. at 3-4. The court reasoned that, when fleeing, a barefoot robber would have
attracted more public attention than a robber wearing shoes; therefore, the shoes were, in
part, the instrumentalities of the crime.
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dence of crime. 102
In Warden v. Hayden,103 however, the mere evidence rule was re-
moved from our constitutional fabric. Recognizing the doctrine's histor-
ical roots, the Court announced that "[t]he premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited . . .. [T]he principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and [we] have
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on prop-
erty concepts."'' 4 The Court then concluded that privacy considera-
tions were adequately protected by the probable cause and particularity
limitations of the search warrant requirement. 0 5 Ironically, Hayden's
emphasis on the privacy considerations underlying the fourth amend-
ment thereby reduced protections for search victims, a development that
would be of particular import in the context of electronic surveillance.
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis was entirely appropriate: if the tres-
pass doctrine was soon to be discarded as outdated, there was likewise
no constitutional reason to retain the anachronistic iere evidence rule.
It is not without significance that Hayden was authored by Justice
Brennan, who, in fact, had previously recognized the rule's potential
constraint on electronic surveillance.t6 While there has been suggestion
that Justice Brennan "did not foresee the extent to which abandonment
... of the mere evidence rule would dismantle protection of pri-
vacy,"10 7 it is clear that, at least to some degree, Hayden was written with
electronic surveillance in mind. This was apparent from the fact that
the case was argued only a day before Berger v. New York,108 the first of
two cases that the Supreme Court would use to reconstitutionalize the
law of electronic surveillance.
2. Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States
Berger v. New York offered the Supreme Court an appropriate setting
for a major electronic surveillance decision. Berger had been a principal
in a sophisticated conspiracy to corrupt the New York State Liquor Au-
102 See, e.g. , Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157,
163 (1954); Note, On Applying the "Mere Evidence" Rule to Govemment Eavesdropping, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1110, 1123-29 (1967). This, in fact, was one of the concerns mentioned by Justice
Brennan in his Lopez dissent. See supra note 87. Some commentators, however, believed that,
given the need for electronic surveillance, the rule would eventually succumb to modern real-
ity. See T. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 71; Kamisar, supra note 32, at 915-16.
103 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
104 Id. at 304.
105 Id. at 309-10.
106 See supra note 87.
107 Hufstedler, supra note 39, at 1500; see general, Spritzer, supra note 15, at 175-76.
108 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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thority. He and his associates had been investigated successfully
through a series of bugs that were issued under a New York statute pro-
viding for court authorized electronic surveillance. 0 9 In all likelihood,
the case could not have been effectively prosecuted without electronic
surveillance.'1 0 Moreover, while Berger was pending, the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force on Organized Crime, issued a report which noted the importance
of political corruption to organized crime."1 ' A majority of the Presi-
109 The details of this case are well documented in the American Bar Association's study
on electronic surveillance. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 58-70.
The New York Law provided:
An ex parte order for eavesdropping as defined in subdivisions one and two of section
seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may be issued by any justice of the supreme
court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions of the county of New
York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of an
officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state or of any political
subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may
be thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communica-
tions, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose
thereof, and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the
particular telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection with the issuance
of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and any other
witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable grounds
for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective for the time speci-
fied therein but not for a period of more than two months unless extended or renewed by
the justice or judge who signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that
such an extension or renewal is in the public interest. Any such order together with the
papers upon which the application was based, shall be delivered to and retained by the
applicant as authority for the eavesdropping authorized therein. A true copy of such
order shall at all times be retained in his possession by the judge or justice issuing the
same, and, in the event of the denial of an application for such an order, a true copy of
the papers upon which the application was based shall in like manner be retained by the
judge or justice denying the same.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney 1958) (repealed 1968).
110 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81.
11 1 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE RE-
PORT]. The term "organized crime" is an elusive concept. For a comparative analysis of this
term, see Blakey & Goldsmith, Cn'minal Redistribution of Stolen Property. The Need for Law Refonn,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1538 n.154 (1976); see also NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 189-92
(concurring opinion of Commissioner Blakey). Historically, the term has often been used to
refer to La Cosa Nostra, but Title III's drafters did not view the concept in this limited
manner. COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAM-
BLING IN AMERICA, 181-82 (1976) (Final Report) (available from the GPO, stock no. 052-003-
00243-3) [hereinafter cited as GAMBLING IN AMERICA] (statement by Senator John J. McClel-
lan, principal Title III sponsor, that the term "organized crime" was not used in such a "cir-
cumscribed fashion" in any legislation with which he had been involved). See S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, repn'ztedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2157-58
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. But see general' TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at
10-15. Nevertheless, for purposes of this study, the National Wiretapping Commission's per-
spective will be used as a frame of reference:
Organized crime is a term which can be and often is used to describe. . . different
criminal organizations. They are distinguished from each other by the extent to which
La Cosa Nostra members are involved exclusively, indirectly, or not at all. But they are
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dent's Commission, based upon this report's analysis emphasizing the
critical role of electronic surveillance in penetrating complex criminal
conspiracies, had recommended that "Congress should enact legislation
dealing specifically with wiretapping and bugging."112 Significantly,
the Commission was aware of both the threat to privacy posed by elec-
tronic surveillance and of the pending Berger decision; as such, it recom-
mended that the proposed legislation be carefully circumscribed in a
manner consistent with the Supreme Court's resolution of Berger.,l3
Defendant Berger's argument on appeal was that the New York
statute authorizing the issuance of eavesdropping warrants was uncon-
stitutional. While his position was based principally upon fourth
amendment grounds,114 the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus
curiae, raised first and fifth amendment arguments against the constitu-
tionality of electronic surveillance.'l 5 Hence, electronic eavesdropping
was under broadside attack.
In a six to three decision authored by Justice Clark, Berger's convic-
tion was reversed. As in other recent decisions, the Court recognized the
technological potential of electronic surveillance," l6 but, now an effort
finally was made to define what legal limitations could be imposed upon
the use of such devices by law enforcement. Unfortunately, Justice
Clark's approach to this task was somewhat imprecise. Although he
both announced that the fourth amendment's "basic purpose. . . is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary intru-
also distinguished from other groups, also sometimes called Organized Crime, by their
hierarchical structure and the long-term nature of their ongoing enterprises. They are,
or are intended to be, in business permanently.
NWC REPORT, supra note I, at 139; see NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, ORGANIZED CRIME: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME 7-8 (1976).
112 THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
CRIME COMMISSION]; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 91-95.
113 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 201-03.
114 Berger argued that the New York statute established "a system of surveillance which
involves trespassory intrusions into private, constitutionally protect premises, [and] authorizes
'general searches' for 'mere evidence.'" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 43-4 (1967).
115 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 15-19, 23-30, Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967). There was substantial support for the proposition that warrantless electronic
surveillance infringed upon first and fifth amendment protections. See King, Electronic Surveil-
lance and Constitutional Rights, supra note 15, at 265; King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance,
supra note 15, at 28, 38; Westin, supra note 85, at 1027, 1038, 1044-45, 1248. This proposition,
however, was rejected by the American Bar Association, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at
87-89, and by the Task Force Report prepared for the President's Crime Commission. See
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 96-98. Professor G. Robert Blakey, the principal
draftsman of Title III, was the Reporter for the ABA Standards and, as a consultant to the
President's Commission, authored a paper addressing electronic surveillance for the Task
Force Report.
116 387 U.S. at 46-47, 62.
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sion by governmental officials" and definitively stated that its protec-
tions were no longer limited to tangibles, 1 7 he addressed the
constitutionality of New York's statute without formally advising
whether the trespass doctrine still retained any vitality.1 18
Justice Clark approached the state statute without regard to either
its interpretation by New York courts or its particular application in this
case.1 9 This was a marked departure from traditional Supreme Court
procedure, which usually seeks to avoid deciding unnecessary constitu-
tional questions by first focusing on the statute's actual application. 120
Nevertheless, Justice Clark, analyzing the statute facially, noted that,
while it properly required that search warrants be issued only by "a
neutral and detached authority,"' 2 1 the law was still deficient in four
critical respects: (1) eavesdropping warrants could be issued short of
probable cause for the commission of a specific offense and without a
particular description of the "property," or, in this context, the conver-
sations to be seized. 122 Consequently, the probable cause shortcoming
was unconstitutional because it allowed premature state intrusions, and
the particularity omission was improper because it gave the monitoring
officer "a roving commission to 'seize' any and all conversations."' 23
(2) the availability of an initial two month surveillance period under the
statute might avoid the need for prompt execution and potentially con-
stituted "the equivalent of a series of. . .[dragnet] searches and seizures
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause"; 12 4 (3) by omitting a
termination requirement, the law potentially allowed intrusions to con-
tinue even after the desired conversations had been obtained; 125 and
117 Id. at 53 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
118 In other words, had the Berger eavesdrop been accomplished without a trespass, would
the fourth amendment still have been triggered? See T. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 104-05;
Scott, Wiretapping and Organized Crime, 14 How. L.J. 1, 12 (1968). Justice Douglas, however,
stated that Olmstead had been overruled sub silentio. 388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring).
This question would not be addressed until Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See
infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text. Even Katz, however, would not definitively dis-
pose of the Olmstead doctrine. See infia note 154 and accompanying text.
119 388 U.S. at 54-60.
120 The approach taken in Berger has been regarded as highly unusual. See United States v.
Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 528-31 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); Scoular, Wire-
tapping and Eavesdropping. Constitutional Developments From Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LouIs U.L.J.
513, 532 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 188 (1967).
121 388 U.S. at 54.
122 Id. at 58-59.
123 Id. at 59.
124 Id. The bracketed insertion of the word "dragnet" reflects the Supreme Court's con-
cern with the potentially unlimited range of electronic surveillance: "During such a long and
continuous. . . period the conversations of any and all persons coming into the area covered
by the device will be seized indiscriminately and without regard to their connection with the
crime under investigation." Id.
125 Id. at 59-60.
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(4) unlike conventional search warrant procedures, the statute permitted
electronic searches without prior notice or a showing of exigency excus-
ing such notice.1 26 Thus, the statute was essentially held unconstitu-
tional because it neither required probable cause nor properly limited
the nature, scope, or duration of the electronic search. While indicating
that the Constitution was not inflexible to law enforcement needs,' 27
Justice Clark expressed mixed views concerning the indispensability of
electronic surveillance 28 and concluded that, "[i]n any event, we cannot
forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law
enforcement." 12 9
Justices Black, Harlan, and White filed dissenting opinions. All
three, joined by Justice Stewart, believed that the New York statute, as
interpreted by the New York courts, was fully constitutional (though
they differed on the extent to which it had been constitutionally applied
in this case).' 30 New York courts, they maintained, had read a probable
cause requirement into the statute.' 3 ' Justices Black and White further
argued that the majority's other concerns were not reflected in the
fourth amendment. 13 2 Indeed, Justices Black and Stewart suggested
that the state law actually exceeded fourth amendment requirements,133
and charged that "from the deficiencies the Court finds in the New York
statute, it seems that the Court would be compelled to strike down a
state statute which merely tracked verbatim the language of the Fourth
Amendment itself."' 34 All three dissenting opinions challenged Justice
126 Id. at 60.
127 Id. at 63. But see infra note 129.
128 Id. at 60-62. Justice Clark was the father of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark, the
first holder of that office ever to oppose electronic surveillance. Attorney General Clark be-
lieved such eavesdropping to be morally wrong and investigatively unproductive. See infra
note 195-96 & 952 and accompanying text. The morality of electronic surveillance is a matter
of personal choice, but, at least insofar as the effectiveness of electronic surveillance is con-
cerned, Attorney General Clark's views were strongly criticized by the National Wiretapping
Commission. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 134, 188 n.6 (concurring opinion of Commis-
sioner Blakey).
129 388 U.S. at 62. Justice Clark further stated that, if a warrant could not "be drawn so as
to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements. . . .then the 'fruits' of eavesdropping de-
vices are barred under the Amendment." Id. at 63. Justice Clark, however, never examined
whether the warrants used in this case complied with fourth amendment requirements. See
supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
130 Although the case was decided by a six to three vote, Justice Stewart concurred only in
the result. He thought the statute was constitutional, but believed that New York officials
had not applied it properly. 388 U.S. at 68-70. Justice Harlan argued that the statute had
been applied improperly with regard to one of the surveillance orders, but that it otherwise
was correctly implemented. Id. at 104-06. Justices White and Black would have ruled that
the statute had been constitutionally enforced. Id. at 81-87, 118.
131 Id. at 68, 84, 92-93;,see id. at 110.
132 Id. at 85, 111.
133 Id. at 68, 83.
134 Id. at 85. Justice Black, it should be noted, was still inclined to interpret the fourth
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Clark's ambivalent view towards the need for electronic surveillance,
and complained that the decision would seriously thwart pending legis-
lation in this area. 13 5 Justice Black, in particular, thought that an insu-
perable obstacle had been imposed against the passage of such
legislation.136
Despite these concerns, the majority's decision more realistically
seemed to reflect disapproval of the New York statute as a potential
model for statutory reform, than opposition to electronic surveillance
per se; indeed, this may explain the Court's decision to approach the
statute facially instead of as applied. 137 Significantly, there was much in
Berger that was positive in tone. The Court had acknowledged the
fourth amendment's flexibility for law enforcement purposes, 38 and
had cited Osbom as an affirmative example of an eavesdropping warrant
that fully complied with all fourth amendment requirements:
The invasion [in Osborn] was lawful because there was sufficient proof to
obtain a search warrant to make the search for the limited purpose out-
lined in the order of the judges. Through these "precise and discriminate"
procedures the order authorizing the use of the electronic device afforded
similar protections to those that are present in the use of conventional war-
amendment literally. Therefore, he maintained, the Olmstead doctrine was still good law. Id.
at 74-81.
135 Id. at 71-73, 95, 112-18. Justice White's criticism was the most severe:
[T]he Court ignores or discounts the need for wiretapping authority and incredibly sug-
gests that there has been no breakdown of federal law enforcement despite the unavaila-
bility of a federal statute legalizing electronic surveillance. The Court thereby impliedly
disagrees with the carefully documented reports of the Crime Commission which, con-
trary to the Court's intimations, underline the serious proportions of professional crimi-
nal activity in this country, the failure of current national and state efforts to eliminate it,
and the need for a statute permitting carefully controlled official use of electronic surveil-
lance, particularly in dealing with organized crime and official corruption. . . . How
the Court can feel itself so much better qualified than the Commission, which spent
months on its study, to assess the needs of law enforcement is beyond my comprehension.
Id. at 113-14.
136 Id. at 71, 87; see, e.g., Kitch, Katz v. UnitedStates: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968
Sup. CT. REV. 133, 141-42 (1968).
137 This suggestion was made to the Senate when the significance of Berger was being con-
sidered in connection with pending electronic surveillance legislation:
[Hiad they sustained Berger, the likelihood is that the New York statute would have
become the model and would have been copied and enacted by other States and the
National Congress. I think that there were some members of the Supreme Court who
did not want to see the New York statute drafted as it was to become that model. So
they went to the face of the statute itself and struck it down, and struck it down in such a
way that they could write, in effect, an advisory opinion to the Congress and the States
on the kind of statute they would like to see. Now, the only way they could do that
would be to go to the face of the statute.
Controlling Crime Through More Efective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 957 (1967) (state-
ment of Professor G. Robert B!akey) [hereinafter cited as Controlling Crime Hearings]. Had the
statute been analyzed as applied, declaring eavesdropping unconstitutional would have been
appreciably more difficult.
138 388 U.S. at 63.
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rants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence. Among other safe-
guards, the order described the type of conversation sought with
particularity, thus indicating the specific objective of the Government in
entering the constitutionally protected areas and the limitations placed
upon the officer executing the warrant. Under it the officer could not
search unauthorized areas; likewise, once the property sought, and for
which the order was issued, was found the officer could not use the order as
a passkey to further search. In addition, the order authorized one limited
intrusion rather than a series or a continuous surveillance. And, we note
that a new order was issued when the officer sought to resume the search
and probable cause was shown for the succeeding one. Moreover, the or-
der was executed by the officer with dispatch, not over a prolonged and
extended period. In this manner no greater invasion of privacy was per-
mitted than was necessary under the circumstances. Finally the officer was
required to and did make a return on the order showing how it was exe-
cuted and what was seized. Through these strict precautions the danger of
an unlawful search and seizure was minimized.
13 9
Since the Osborn warrant had been issued without any statutory authori-
zation, the dissenting opinions properly criticized the majority for fail-
ing to consider either the New York courts' interpretation of the statute
or whether the various warrants involved in Berger actually met consti-
tutional standards. 140 Nevertheless, the majority's willingness to cite Os-
born extensively was perceived by Congress as a signal that
appropriately tailored electronic surveillance legislation would be re-
ceived favorably.14 '
No doubt sensing this, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion argued
that electronic surveillance was also unconstitutional under the fourth
and fifth amendments. 42 The fifth amendment arguably was infringed
by the involuntary nature of electronic surveillance, 143 and the fourth
amendment by virtue of both the mere evidence rule'44 and the inevita-
bly broad scope that was said to inhere to all electronic surveillance:
"[t]he traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device constitutes
a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its scope-without re-
gard to the participants or the nature of the conversations. It intrudes
upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the
most intimate of conversations."' 14 5
Although Justice Douglas' concern over the potential scope of elec-
139 Id. at 57.
140 Id. at 68, 81-83, 90-94, 108. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eaves-
dropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 189, 201 (1968).
141 See Controlling Crime Hearings,supra note 137, at 933-37 (statement of Professor G. Robert
Blakey); Scott, supra note 118, at 13-15 (article by member of Congress).
142 388 U.S. at 64-67.
143 Id. at 67; see supra note 115.
144 388 U.S. at 64-67.
145 Id. at 65.
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tronic surveillance was quite legitimate, 146 the mere evidence objection
had been settled by Hayden, ' 7 and the fifth amendment claim received
no acknowledgment from the Court.1 48  Likewise, the ACLU's first
amendment argument was answered with silence.149 Congress was soon
apprised that these omissions suggested that the Court did not consider
these claims to be serious constitutional barriers. 5 0 Nevertheless, any
remaining doubts concerning the import of Berger were resolved by Katz
v. United States. 151
Petitioner Katz' conviction had been partly based upon evidence
that was obtained when the police bugged his end of conversations that
had occurred in a telephone booth.152 The electronic surveillance, how-
ever, had been effected without trespass. Thus, since Katz' argument
was that this surveillance, albeit without trespass, was an impermissible
intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area,"' 53 these circumstances
were ideally suited for directly confronting Olmstead. Ironically, in re-
versing Katz' conviction and establishing new constituitonal guidelines
for this area, Justice Stewart's opinion for a seven to one majority never
146 Justice Douglas cited numerous cases of obvious eavesdropping abuse:
Thus, in the Coplon case wiretaps of the defendant's home and office telephone recorded
conversations between the defendant and her mother, a quarrel between a husband and
wife who had no connection with the case, and conferences between the defendant and
her attorney concerning the preparation of briefs, testimony of government witnesses,
selection of jurors and trial strategy .... It is also reported that the FBI incidentally
learned about an affair, totally unrelated to espionage, between the defendant and a
Justice Department attorney .... While tapping one telephone, police recorded con-
versations involving, at the other end, The Julliard School of Music, Brooklyn Law
School, Consolidated Radio Artists, Western Union, Mercantile Commercial Bank, sev-
eral restaurants, a real estate company, a drug store, many attorneys, an importer, a dry
cleaning establishment, a number of taverns, a garage, and the Prudential Insurance
Company. These cases are but a few of many demonstrating the sweeping nature of
electronic surveillance as we know it today.
Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted). The danger of indiscriminate eavesdropping has been a ma-
jor source of concern since Olmstead. 277 U.S. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799, 804-07 (1954);
Katzenbach, An Approach to the Problems of Wiretapping, 32 F.R.D. 107, 108 (1963); Semerjian,
supra note 69, at 227.
147 The Court disposed of the mere evidence issue by a brief citation to Hayden. 388 U.S. at
44 n.2; see supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
148 The Court said that its resolution of the case made consideration of this issue unneces-
sary. 388 U.S. at 44. Nevertheless, given the broad advisory tone of Justice Clark's opinion,
this omission was noteworthy. The fifth amendment claim had previously been rejected in
Olmstead, 277 U.S at 464, and the Court did nothing to revive it.
149 Only Justice Harlan, in dissent, even bothered to mention this point. 388 U.S. at 97
n.4. He, of course, rejected it.
150 Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 137, at 933-37 (statement of Professor G. Robert
Blakey).
151 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
152 Id. at 348.
153 Id. at 349-50.
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formally repudiated the trespass doctrine. 154 Even so, this clearly was
the sub silentio effect of the decision.- 55
Although declining to find that the fourth amendment could "be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,"' 56 Justice
Stewart's opinion firmly eschewed a mechanistic approach towards
resolving whether governmental action had improperly intruded upon
privacy concerns. Hence, the Court expressly avoided relying upon pe-
titioner's proposed term- "constitutionally protected area"-as provid-
ing a "talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem."' 57
Moreover, Justice Stewart asserted that focusing on this term improp-
erly "deflects attention from the problem presented by [the] case," since
the Court's recent decisions had shown that property concepts were no
longer controlling in fourth amendment litigation: 58 "Once this much
is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects people-and not simply areas-against unreasonable searches
and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure."1 59
Instead, the Kaz Court chose to focus upon whether the govern-
mental intrusion infringed upon petitioner's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 16° If so, a search and seizure had occurred for fourth amend-
154 While the Court did state that the occurrence of a trespass should not be determinative
in fourth amendment analysis, see infra text accompanying note 159, Justice Stewart merely
meant by this that the OhCitead doctrine was not controlling. Id. at 353. This point later
became an issue when defendants sought to argue that court authorized buggings, effected by
trespassory covert entries, were unconstitutional. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
246-48 (1979); Note, Breaking and Entering into Private Premises to Eect Electronic Surveillance, 39
MD. L. REv. 754, 777-78 (1980).
155 See 389 U.S. at 362 n.* (Harlan, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 350.
157 Id. at 351 n.9.
158 Id. at 351.
159 Id. at 353.
160 This term has become basic to fourth amendment litigation. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). In this respect, most
jurists and courts have relied upon Justice Harlan's interpretation of its requirements:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here,
the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activi-
ties, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected"
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand,
conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expec-
tation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 383-85 (1974).
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ment purposes and prior judicial sanction normally would be a prereq-
uisite to constitutional approval. 161 On this basis, the Court found that
Katz' fourth amendment rights had been violated.1 62 Justice Stewart
acknowledged that the surveilling officers, in fact, may have conducted
a narrowly limited search:, it reportedly was based upon probable cause
and confined to relevant conversations involving Katz, precisely the
type of circumscribed search for which prior judicial approval would
have been available under Osborn.163 Nevertheless, reasoning that a citi-
zen's fourth amendment rights should not be dependent exclusively
upon an officer's exercise of discretion, 64 Justice Stewart ruled that the
self-restraint exercised in this case was not sufficient to save the search:
[T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before com-
mencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for de-
tached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during
the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in ad-
vance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search
had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all
that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably ex-
pected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.' 65
Accordingly, Katz' conviction was reversed.
Katz was misperceived initially by some criminal elements, who
were apparently relieved to learn that electronic surveillance had finally
come within the fourth amendment's protections. 166 Similarly, civil lib-
ertarians, whose interests in privacy were more pristine,16 7 may have
read the opinion optimistically, 168 especially since the Court's reason-
161 389 U.S. at 353. The Court did not discuss the ramification of its decision upon tradi-
tional exceptions to the warrant requirement, but it did intimate that there would be no
emergency exception for electronic surveillance. Id. at 357-58. For a more detailed discussion
of this matter, see infra notes 292-302 and accompanying text.
162 389 U.S. at 359.
163 Id. at 354-56.
164 Id. at 356-57.
165 Id.
166 One prominent defense attorney told the National Wiretapping Commission that, im-
mediately after Katz, many professional gamblers called his office to celebrate the Supreme
Court's decision to bring electronic surveillance within the fourth amendment. The attorney,
however, realized that Katz would soon serve as the predicate for a federal eavesdropping
statute. 1 NAT'L WIRETAPPING COMM'N, COMMISSION HEARINGS, SUPPORTING MATERIAL
FOR THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 638 (1976)
(statement of James Jay Hogan) [hereinafter cited as NWC HEARINGS].
167 For example, some civil libertarians persuasively argued that widespread eavesdrop-
ping inevitably would impact upon both the criminal and nonaniminal elements of society. See
Greenawalt, supra note 140, at 220-21; Westin, supra note 85, at 1045.
168 See Spritzer, supra note 15, at 172.
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able expectation of privacy test seemed to have been derived from ear-
lier liberal commentaries which had proposed this very standard in the
electronic surveillance context.1 69 The impact of this standard, how-
ever, also seemed to free law enforcement from the constraints of the
trespass rule.'70 Further, the Court by no means had ruled electronic
surveillance unconstitutional. Rather, by citing Osbom and the agents'
narrowly limited search as models of propriety, the Court clearly was
stating that, reasonable expectations of privacy notwithstanding, elec-
tronic surveillance was permissible constitutionally so long as prior judi-
cial approval had been obtained.' 71 Indeed, even Justice Black,
although dissenting in Katz, acknowledged that Justice Stewart's opin-
ion both had removed the "insuperable obstacles" erected by Berger and
had provided constitutional guidelines for electronic surveillance
legislation.1 72
Katz was subjected to skeptical criticism. 173 How, for example,
might a conversation be particularized sufficiently before its occurrence
and simultaneous seizure? t 74 Nevertheless, an American Bar Associa-
tion study concluded that "[t]he overriding significance of Berger and
Katz lies in their rejection of all arguments that would reject outright
the use of [electronic surveillance] ...-175 Moreover, in keeping with
other aspects of its judicial activism, the Warren Court had used these
cases as a means for providing explicit guidelines for statutory reform. 176
169 See Kamisar, tupra note 32, at 925; Semerjian, supra note 69, at 226; Westin, supra note
85, at 1225.
170 Although the Court did not explicitly state that electronic surveillance occasioning
trespassory covert entries could ever be constitutional, that was a fair inference from Justice
Stewart's opinion. See supra text accompanying note 159.
171 See geneiall.y Spritzer, supra note 15, at 172-76.
172 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black, however, never explained how
Katz removed the "insuperable obstacles" previously erected by Berger. In Berger, he was
especially concerned about whether future conversations could ever be adequately particular-
ized. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 85-89. Katz, however, did nothing to change this
requirement. Possibly, Justice Black may have been placated by the Court's willingness to
handle the notice question more flexibly. 389 U.S. at 355 n. 16. It should be noted, however,
that Katz left open the question of whether enabling legislation for electronic surveillance was
even necessary. See Greenawalt, supra note 140, at 201-02; Scoular, supra note 120, at 537-38.
173 See Kitch, supra note 136; Schwartz, Electronic Eavesdropping--What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 83 (1968); Solomon, The Short Happy Life ofBerger o. New York, 45
CHI.-]KENT L. REv. 123 (1968).
174 See infra notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
175 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 15 n.9.
176 See text accompanying note 224. In this respect, Professor Allen's comments seem ap-
plicable by analogy:
Perhaps the most interesting influence of the exigencies of judicial supervision in
criminal cases on the kinds ofjudicial lawmaking in which the Court engaged is revealed
in the tendency of the Court to turn to broad, legislative-like directives, sometimes called
"flat" or "per se" rules. Such a rule is one in which a given fact, circumstances, or a
limited set of facts is taken as the requisite ground for reversal in a criminal case or the
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The electronic surveillance controversy thus effectively had been shifted
from a constitutional issue to a legislative question.1 77 Consequently,
Congress expedited its consideration of pending electronic surveillance
proposals. Within seven months of Katz, Title III was enacted into
law. 178
III. LEGISLATIVE DESIGN
A. THE CONTEXT OF REFORM
By 1968, the inadequacy of existing electronic surveillance legisla-
tion had long been an issue in American law. Certainly, few were
pleased with the operation of the Federal Communications Act in this
area. 179 Aside from the multiplicity of issues raised by various Supreme
Court decisions, defense lawyers and civil libertarians complained that
the statute often had been flouted openly by the Justice Department's
barring of evidence from court. These rules avoid or lessen the occasions that require
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" presented by the record and the con-
comitant determination whether, on balance, the defendant received a fair trial in the
particular case. The principal advantages of per se rules to a Court embracing broad
supervision of the criminal justice function were thought to be two. First, such rules give
relatively certain guidance to the lower courts, and thus avoid the confusions and uncer-
tainties associated with precedents that weigh a multitude of factors, some of which may
be unique to the particular case at hand. Second, such rules are applicable to a great
mass of cases at the trial court levels without direct involvement of the Supreme Court,
thereby minimizing the consequences of the Court's lack of time and resources to adjudi-
cate more than the smallest fraction of criminal cases presenting constitutional issues.
Allen, supra note 91 at 532 (footnotes omitted). Although the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy standard requires application on a case by case basis, the promulgation of specific
standards for reform provided a convenient means for reviewing electronic surveillance cases
that were, in fact, subject to fourth amendment protections under the Katz test. Professor
Allen, however, might be more inclined to characterize Berger and Katz as cases that were
more indicative of the Warren Court's "loss of impetus" during its closing days:
Perhaps the late history of the Warren Court suggests that something inherent in
the judicial process or the traditions of court adjudication renders it difficult for a court
to formulate and to adhere to broad categorical rules that demand the judge to ignore
apparently substantial social costs in the form of frustrations of law enforcement in the
particular cases under scrutiny. Assurances that the categorical rules do by and large
constitute a proper restraint on police activity may often appear remote, speculative, and
insufficient to justify the losses sustained in the concrete case.
But surely the most fundamental reasons for the Court's loss of impetus lies in the
social and political context of the Court in the late 1960's. That period was a time of
social upheaval, violence in the ghettos, and disorder on the campuses. Fears of the
breakdown of the public order were widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order
were [sic] politically exploited. In the presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering
problems of crime in the United States were represented simply as a war between the
"peace forces" and the "criminal forces."
Allen, supra note 91, at 538-39 (footnotes omitted).
177 Id. at 538-40; see Controlling Crzme Hearings,supra note 137, at 978 (statement of Professor
G. Robert Blakey).
t78 Katz was decided on December 18, 1967. 387 U.S. 347 (1967). Title III was passed on
June 19, 1968. Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2519 (1976)).
179 For a discussion of this provision, see supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
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interpretation that section 605 was not triggered until there had been an
actual divulgence of wiretap evidence beyond the Justice Department
bureaucracy. I8 0 Although no longer its policy, the Department had
maintained until recently that it could wiretap for "strategic intelli-
gence" purposes so long as the results were not divulged in court.' 8 ' For
its part, however, the Justice Department had been frustrated by the
inadmissibility of such strategic intelligence. 182 Such conflicts had
prompted both periodic calls for reform by legal commentators and con-
siderable legislative debate.18 3 Nevertheless, prior to 1968, none of these
proposals became law.
In 1967, however, the President's Crime Commission found that
"[t]he present status of the law with respect to wiretapping and bugging
is intolerable."' I8 4 Significantly, the focus of the controversy had
changed considerably since 1940. Wiretapping during World War II
was used primarily for counterespionage. 85 Since subsequent debate
during the Red Scare era had centered around the need for electronic
surveillance to combat saboteurs and subversives, electronic surveillance
proponents occasionally resorted to polemical assaults by characterizing
some of their opponents as protectors of spies and enemies of liberty. ' 8 6
180 Wiretapping, Eavesdropping and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiiag, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1037-38 (1959)
(letter from Attorney General William P. Rogers); To Authorize Wiretapping: Hearings on HR.
2266 and HR. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18-19 (1941) (letter from Attorney General Robert Jackson). Accordingly, the Justice
Department's view was that wiretaps were not illegal per se. This unduly narrow interpreta-
tion overlooks § 605's prohibition against any use of wiretap information, see supra note 51,
and has consequently been widely criticized. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 32, at 929 ("tor-
tured rationalization"); Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REy. 855, 859-60 (1960) (mere "use" of intercepted information a crime);
Note, Congressional Wiretapping Policy Overdue, 2 STAN. L. REV. 744, 748-58 (1950) (Justice
Department intellectually dishonest).
181 See, e.g., supra note 180. "Strategic intelligence" may be defined as intelligence aimed
primarily at obtaining long term information about the operations of the surveillance target
and his associates. In contrast, tactical intelligence is oriented towards obtaining evidence to
convict the target and his associates for crimes related to the immediate investigation in pro-
gress. See generally NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39-40; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
111, at 92.
182 Westin, supra note 85, at 1223.
183 See Donnelly, supra note 146, at 799-804; Westin, supra note 85, at 1223-24; Note, supra
note 180, at 748-51. For example, one article observed that "[a]fter 1940, the attempts at
wiretaping legislation have been legion." Semerjian, supra note 146, at 233 n.93; see Schwartz,
supra note 15, at 455 n.l; Westin, supra note 39, at 177; Donnelly, supra note 146, at 804.
184 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 203.
185 See, e.g., Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans in 3 FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITrEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIvITIES, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 279-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT].
186 See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 201-03 (1954);
see generaly Rogers, The Case For Wiretapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954). Perhaps such attacks
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Subsequently, however, claims of both remarkable technological ad-
vances and patterns of abuse were made with increasing frequency by
non-ideologues. 8 7 Not all of the claims were valid, 18 8 and not all in-
volved law enforcement; private eavesdropping was also in vogue. 189
Regardless, by the 1960's it had become apparent that, even discounting
some of these claims, the privacy rights of thousands of Americans had
been unlawfully violated.' 9 0 Accordingly, most of the debate now cen-
tered upon whether electronic surveillance should be outlawed com-
pletely or subjected to stringent statutory controls requiring prior court
approval. 191
Electronic surveillance proponents argued that wiretapping and
bugs were essential prosecutorial tools in the effort against organized
crime. Since today's sophisticated criminals were taking advantage of
modern technology-including communications facilities-to effect
their crimes, law enforcement had to be given the means to respond in
kind. 192 In fact, this has long been a traditional justification for elec-
tronic surveillance. 93 Eavesdropping opponents, however, always were
would have occurred more frequently if Senator Joseph McCarthy, ironically, had not been
opposed to electronic surveillance. See Donnelly, supra note 146, at 804 n.28 (suggesting that
Senator Joseph McCarthy appeared to ascribe to the views expressed by Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead v. United States).
187 See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 92; THE EAVES-
DROPPERS, supra note 81, at 305-79; A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 65-132, 365-99
(1967); see also supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
188 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81 at 46-47, 85-93; Brown, The Great Wretapping Debate
and the Crisis in Law Enforcement, 6 N.Y.L.F. 265, 270-71 (1960); Hennings, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 813, 825 (1960); Silver, The Wire-
tapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 835, 837 (1960); see also
supra note 81, infra notes 941 & 944 and accompanying text.
189 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
190 Id. See Invasions of Privay, Government Agencies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
191 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
192 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 22.
For example, one law enforcement official made the following observation:
The underworld of today would rate Jesse James as a small-fry amateur. Crime has
become big business, with campaigns planned and organized like operations in a legiti-
mate business, with a structure of chief executives, fiscal departments, legal departments,
public relations and the rest. Advantage has been taken of the most modem methods in
business organization, swift communications, swift transportation. Advantage has also
been taken of lagging organization of government. Law enforcement systems operating
along lines good enough for 1851 or 1901 are too slow for the swifter pace of the time we
are living in.
Silver, supra note 188, at 848 (quoting former Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, before
the American Bar Association on September 19, 1951).
'93 See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 385-87 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
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skeptical of this assertion,194 and their arguments only recently had been
reinforced by Attorney General Ramsey Clark's public position that
electronic eavesdropping was "neither effective nor highly produc-
tive."' 195 This statement, however, the first of its kind by an Attorney
General, 196  was contradicted squarely by the President's Crime
Commission. 19
7
As originally empanelled, the Commission did not intend to ex-
amine organized crime, but former ABA President Lewis Powell insisted
that any national crime study could not ignore this problem. 198 The
Commission's task force assigned to this matter noted that traditional
evidence gathering techniques are relatively ineffectual in organized
crime cases: "[T]he American system was not designed with Cosa Nos-
tra-type criminal organizations in mind, and it has been notably unsuc-
cessful to date in preventing such organizations from preying on
society."' 199 Organized crime was found to have a structure and code of
conduct that precluded ordinary penetration efforts: "High-ranking or-
ganized crime figures are protected by layers of insulation from direct
194 For example, Justice Frankfurter felt that electronic surveillance was not necessary to
effective law enforcement:
My deepest feeling against giving legal sanction to such "dirty business" is that it
makes for lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts a premium on force and fraud, not
on imagination and enterprise and professional training. The third degree, search with-
out warrant, wiretapping and the like, were not tolerated in what was probably the most
successful administration in our time of the busiest United States Attorney's office. This
experience under Henry L. Stimson in the Southern District of New York, compared
with happenings elsewhere, doubtless planted in me a deep conviction that these short-
cuts in the detection and prosecution of crime are as self-defeating as they are immoral.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly,
other scholars have echoed Justice Frankfurter's remarks:
[I]t is impossible to conclude that the record shows a "need" for wiretapping. In this
context, "need" must be defined as a situation in which effective law enforcement in an
appreciable number of cases would be impossible without it. It would appear from the
testimony of certain witnesses that there was some confusion between the concept of
"need" for wiretapping because of an intolerable situation without it, and the idea of
"need" for wiretapping because of an easier situation with it. In this regard, there has
not even been a comparative study made to determine whether it is true that law en-
forcement is easier in areas where wiretapping is practiced. In fact, all indications are to
the contrary.
Semerjian, supra note 69, at 231 (footnotes omitted); see Schwartz, supra note 15, at 505;
Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 159-61 (1954);
see also infia note 759 and accompanying text.
195 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 188 n.6 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Blakey);
see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2163.
196 For a detailed history of the Justice Department's use of electronic surveillance, see
CHURCH COMMrITTEE REPORT, supra note 185, at 273-345.
197 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 17-19, 91-100; see also supra notes 111-13
and accompanying text.
198 Controlling Cime Hearings,supra note 137, at 982-83 (citing N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1966, at
1, col. 7).
199 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 7.
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participation in criminal acts, and a rigid code of discipline inhibits the
development of informants against them. 20 0 Moreover, organized crime
often deals in so-called "victimless crimes" where few, if any, have in-
centive to testify; in other cases, intimidation tactics are often effective
deterrents. 2 0 1 Organized criminals, however, must communicate to
achieve their goals, especially when the criminal enterprise is engaged in
diverse activities involving numerous members in multiple areas.20 2
Consequently, the Commission observed that electronic surveillance
provided a means to exploit this vulnerability. 20 3 In particular, elec-
tronic surveillance was perceived as a way to obtain important strategic
intelligence against organized crime.20 4 This was considered critical be-
cause, unlike ordinary street crime which often involves investigating a
known crime for an unknown criminal, organized crime often involves
latent, long term criminal activity which cannot be investigated on a
purely reactive basis. Rather, long term proactive investigations that
aggressively seek out the criminal activity are indispensable to successful
organized crime control. 20 5 Thus, as organized crime police work often
requires targeting a known criminal until evidence of a previously un-
known crime is detected, electronic surveillance is ideally suited to this
type of investigative mode.20 6 To illustrate the potential utility of elec-
tronic surveillance, the Commission provided several examples of suc-
cessful New York organized crime prosecutions that purportedly could
not have been made without electronic surveillance. 20 7 Indeed, the
Commission observed that only in New York, where electronic surveil-
lance had been used for more than two decades, "have law enforcement
officials achieved some level of success in bringing prosecutions against
organized crime. '20 8 It was these findings, together with a concern for
controlling abuses, which prompted a majority of the Commission's
members to recommend the adoption of legislation authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance under a system of strict controls. 20 9
The Commission's recommendation for eavesdropping legislation
was somewhat of an embarassment to the Johnson Administration,
which had established the study group but had opposed electronic sur-
200 Id. at 201.
201 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I 11, at 14. See id. at 92-95.
202 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 201.
203 Id.
204 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 92.
205 Id. G. BLAKEY, R. GOLDSTOCK & C. RoGovIN, RACKETS BUREAUS: INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME xiii-xiv (1978) [hereinafter cited as RACKETS
BUREAUS].
206 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 92; see NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-5 1.
207 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 91-95.
208 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 201.
209 See supra notes I 1-12 and accompanying text.
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veillance. 210 Nevertheless, the drafters of Title III relied heavily upon
the Commission's analysis in determining that such legislation was nec-
essary for modern law enforcement.211 The legislative history noted that
crime was a "national catastrophe" and that organized crime, in partic-
ular, had a pervasive influence upon American society which previous
law enforcement efforts had been unable to control. 2 12 Although con-
cern was also expressed over the widespread abuses made possible by
scientific advances in electronic surveillance,2 13 the drafters rejected ar-
guments that authorized electronic surveillance, under a system of strict
controls, would promote further abuse by law enforcement. 2 14 Rather,
Congress suggested that police misconduct had been responsible for few
unlawful invasions of privacy, and implicitly concluded that providing
the police with a carefully controlled, lawful means for conducting elec-
tronic surveillance would remove the incentive for abuse.2 15
It has been suggested that Title III was the product of a hysterical
Congress responding to conservative political pressure exerted during a
national climate of fear.2 16 No doubt the debate over electronic surveil-
lance was at times emotional, and it is probably true that the assassina-
tions of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy contributed
somewhat to Title III's expedited approval. 2 17 Overall, however, the
measure appears to have been a bipartisan effort designed to accommo-
date the demands of modern society's conflicting needs for privacy and
law enforcement. 2 18 This conclusion seems apparent from the "scrupu-
210 See supra note 198 and accompanying text; see also Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note
137, at 983 (citing N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1967, at 1, col.1).
211 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2157-61, 2264; see generally Scott, supra note
18. While such views were by no means unanimous, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
111, at 2224-25, 2232-33, nevertheless, some liberals reluctantly supported Title III for this
very reason. See id. at 2245-47.
212 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, sura note 111, at 2117, 2119-20, 2160.
213 Id. at 2154.
214 Id. at 2159-60. For a summary of the argument that court authorized eavesdropping
would result in increased law enforcement abuse, see Dash, Remarks, 32 F.R.D. 114, 115-19
(1962); Schwartz, supra note 15, at 478-80; Westin, supra note 39, at 195-96.
215 Anti Crime Program: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciagy, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1381-82 (statement of Professor G. Robert Blakey); PRESIDENT'S CRIME
COMMISSION, supra note 112, at 203; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2159; ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 84-85; Kamisar, supra note 32, at 901-06. In this respect, it has
been suggested that the critical question is whether a court authorized system would lead to
increased abuse, rather than whether less abuse can be expected. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 98.
216 H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS AND FOOLING PEOPLE 11-13 (1977); Harris, Annals of Legis-
lation, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 68, 172-76; see E. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON
TRIAL 38-40 (1974).
217 See 114 CONG. REC. 16297-98 (1968) (statement of Rep. Pollock); E. LAPIDUS, supra
note 216, at 40; Harris, supra note 216, at 172.
218 For example, the bill was supported by Senators Bayh, Brook, Percy, Muskie, Ervin
and Tydings. It was also endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which
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lous" manner in which Congress sought to implement and actually ex-
ceed the Berger and Katz guidelines.2 1 9
B. THE MECHANICS OF REFORM
The process of designing warrant procedures for electronic eaves-
dropping was an intricate one. Many legal scholars believed that any
analogy to a conventional search warrant was inherently flawed.220 In-
deed, Justice Douglas dissenting in Osborn had made this very argument:
The objects to be "seized" cannot be particularly described; all the sus-
pect's conversations are intercepted. The search is not confined to a partic-
ular time, but may go on for weeks or months. The citizen is completely
unaware of the invasion of his privacy. The invasion of privacy is not
limited to him, but extends to his friends and acquaintances-to anyone
who happens to talk on the telephone with the suspect or who happens to
come within the range of the electronic device. Their words are also inter-
cepted; their privacy is also shattered. Such devices lay down a dragnet
which indiscriminately sweeps in all conversations within it scope, without
regard to the nature of the conversations, or the participants. A warrant
authorizing such devices is no different from the general warrants the
Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. 22'
These were very real concerns. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had
relied upon the search warrant analogy in giving electronic surveillance
constitutional approval.2 22 Consequently, the challenge facing Congress
was the design of a statute that conformed to Berger, Katz, and other
Supreme Court decisions in a manner which also addressed the concerns
raised by Justice Douglas. The resulting legislative history cited
Supreme Court decisions "66 times in 20 pages of technical commentary
... . Berger and Katz themselves [were] cited and relied upon 16
times. ' ' 23 Indeed, in an effort to ensure compliance, Congress prepared
a checklist of Berger and Katz requirements:
(1) Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.
(2) Particularity in describing the crime that has been, is being, or is about
to be committed.
(3) Particularity in describing the type of conversation sought.
(4) Limitations on the officer executing the eavesdrop order which (a) pre-
was then chaired by Chief Justice Earl Warren. TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME; ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: Two VIEWS 2-3 (G.
Blakey ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: Two VIEWS]. See H.R.
Doc. No. 194, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1967) (The Judicial Conference of the United States).
219 See in.fra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
220 See, e.g., Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wiretapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799,
804-05 (1954); Westin, supra note 39, at 188.
221 385 U.S. 323, 353 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
222 See supra notes 92-94, 118-26 & 160-65 and accompanying text.
223 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 189 n.7 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Blakey).
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vent his searching unauthorized areas, and (b) prevent further searching
once the property sought is found.
(5) Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order.
(6) Dispatch in executing the eavesdrop order.
(7) Requirement that the executing officer make a return on the eaves-
drop order showing what was seized.
(8) A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of
not giving prior notice.
2 24
Congress, however, did not rely exclusively upon this checklist.
Years of debate had produced many proposals of both constitutional
and nonconstitutional dimension that offered additional ways both to
limit the availability of electronic surveillance and control against
abuse.225 These proposals, together with the Supreme Court's guide-
lines, served as the foundation for Title III.
C. TITLE III STANDARDS
I Prohibitions and Sanctions
The structure of Title III is comprehensive. It was designed to pro-
vide a framework for regulating all so-called nonconsensua122 6 electronic
surveillance except national security eavesdropping; 227 states were free
to adopt laws of their own, but compliance with federal statutory stan-
dards was deemed essential.228 From a philosophical as well as prag-
matic perspective, Title III is restrictive in tone: all electronic
surveillance is prohibited, except as specifically provided therein. Thus,
"Title III takes the form of a series of limitations and prohibitions on
lawful eavesdropping: the 'do's' are largely the residue of multitudinous
224 LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2161-62.
225 For example, the following were among the early proposals that were eventually incor-
porated into Title Il1: (1) limitation of electronic surveillance to certain specified crimes; (2)
requiring preapplication approval by a senior executive official; (3) mandating exhaustion of
investigative alternatives; (4) imposing a post-interception notice obligation; (5) ensuring
political accountability by requiring that public reports be filed; (6) suppression of evidence
for noncompliance; and (7) civil and criminal penalties for statutory violations. See T. TAY-
LOR, supra note 25, at 89-90; Semerjian, supra note 69, at 242-44; Gasque, supra note 48, at
609-13; Westin, supra note 39, at 200-08; Westin, supra note 85, at 1224-28.
226 Electronic surveillance is considered nonconsensual when none of the overheard parties
have consented to the interception. Somewhat anomalously, eavesdropping is considered
consensual so long as any one of the intercepted parties had consented. See supra note 1.
227 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(3) (1970), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2511(0 (Supp. III 1979); LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2153; see Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b), 82 Stat.
211 (1968) (congressional statement of findings). Congress later enacted the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-11 (Supp. III 1979)), to address the question of domestic security surveillance. This
enactment was done in response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See inf/a notes 392-402 and accompanying text.
228 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976); LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2156, 2187.
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'don't's'. 2 29 Criminal penalties and civil remedies are available against
anyone who willfully intercepts, uses, or discloses information in viola-
tion of the statute.2 30 Disclosure of evidence derived from electronic sur-
veillance is prohibited unless the evidence was obtained by "means
authorized by this chapter," 23' a prohibition primarily enforced through
a broad statutory exclusionary rule that transcends its constitutional
counterpart by being applicable to all governmental judicial, quasi-judi-
cial, and administrative proceedings.2 32 Hence, the rule was designed to
have a powerful deterrent effect against abuse.23 3
229 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2153, 2180; NWC REPORT, Supra note 1, at 4;
see United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 192 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1971). This approach is in
sharp contrast to one which authorizes all eavesdropping except as specifically prohibited. See
generally Warren, Telephone- Tapping in the United Kingdom: Is Big Brother Watching You?, 14
BRACTON L.J. 7, 7-10 (1981).
230 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(a), 2520 (1976).
231 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1976).
232 Title III's exclusionary remedy provides as follows:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents
of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976). While the reach of the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule may have
been somewhat uncertain in 1968, it is nevertheless clear that Title III's drafters believed that
they were extending the scope of this principle:
The standard goes, however, beyond existing law in some respects. Unlawful wire-
tap evidence is presently suppressible in federal . ..but not state .. . criminal tri-
als. . . . [Ilt is not clear that unlawful wiretap evidence would be suppressible in a
private civil trial. . . . Generally, the suppression rule has been held not to apply in
civil litigation. . . or to the actions of private parties. . . . Recent comprehensive legis-
lation in Illinois. . .and New York . ..on the other hand, has extended the suppres-
sion rule to all illegally obtained evidence secured by electronic surveillance techniques
by private or law enforcement officials. The standard thus reflects this legislation and
seeks to deter both unlawful law enforcement and private use by extending the suppres-
sion rule to both criminal and civil litigation.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 115-16 (citations omitted). The Reporter of the ABA
Standards was Professor G. Robert Blakey, principal draftsman of Title III. These standards
were relied upon extensively in codifying the federal statute. Telephone interview with Pro-
fessor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School (Sept. 22, 1982). See J. CARR, supra note
18, at 150-51; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 456. See generaly United States v. Dorfman, 690
F.2d 1217, 1227 (7th Cir. 1982).
Title III's legislative history states that there was no intention "generally to press the
scope of the suppression rule beyond present search and seizure law." LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 111, at 2185. Professor Blakey, however, indicates that this language was
merely intended to ensure the retention of certain common law exceptions to the suppression
principle, such as attenuation and use for impeachment. Telephone interview with Professor
G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School (Sept. 22, 1982);cf. Sabbath v. United States, 391
U.S. 585, 589-91 (1968) (recognizing common law exception to statutory announcement re-
quirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 arrest rule).
233 It has been noted that the exclusionary evidence rule, as applied to the conduct of
searches generally, does not work to prevent unlawful searches since police officers, act-
ing on the spot, are not always conscious of the future problems of the prosecutor at trial.
This is not necessarily so with respect to electronic surveillance procedures, however,
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2. Prerequisites to Lawul Surveillance
Compliance with Title III involves conforming to three categories
of requirements: jurisdictional, documentary, and executional.
a. Jurisdictional requirements
Title III imposes three jurisdictional prerequisites for a valid eaves-
dropping order: (1) the application must be for surveillance pertaining
to a crime designated by the statute;23 4 (2) it must initially have been
authorized by a designated executive official;23 5 and (3) it must be filed
before a judge of competent jurisdiction. 23 6 Each of these requirements
is designed to limit the use of electronic surveillance. For example, fed-
eral applications may be authorized only by the Attorney General or a
specially designated Assistant Attorney General, 237 a restriction in-
tended to ensure that a high level of discretion is exercised by a politi-
cally accountable, senior executive official before a court application is
even undertaken. 238 The designated crime limitation is designed to re-
strict electronic surveillance to major crimes which are either "intrinsi-
cally serious or . . . characteristic of the operations of organized
crime.1 23 9 Finally, the statute defines judges of competent jurisdiction
to include only federal district and appellate judges and their state
counterparts. 24° In contrast to the relatively permissive practices associ-
ated with conventional search warrants, this "is intended to guarantee
responsible judicial participation in the decision to use these tech-
niques. ' '24 1 None of these requirements are constitutionally mandated.
They all, however, are "central" to the statutory scheme.242
where the prosecutor is, under the statute, brought into the electronic surveillance inves-
tigation from the outset. Since a proper Title III search is so carefully guided to securing
the best evidence for conviction, and provides for prosecutorial and judicial guidance
throughout the course of the search, the exclusionary evidence rule has special impact
with respect to these searches.
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 12; see J. CARR, supra note 18, at 354-55.
234 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l) (1976).
235 Id.
236 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9) (a), 2518(l) (1976).
237 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). In states authorizing electronic surveillance, Title III re-
quires wiretaps to be initially authorized by the "principal prosecuting attorney of any state
or political subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976). Congress recognized that this
would not foster the same centralization achieved federally, but the realities of state law en-
forcement systems precluded any other approach. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1 11,
at 2187.
238 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2185. Accordingly, "[s]hould abuses occur,
the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person." Id.
239 Id. at 2186.
240 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9) (1976).
241 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2179.





Except for emergency situations recognized by Title 111,243 no
eavesdropping order may be issued without a properly authorized appli-
cation.244 The eavesdropping application must be in writing and under
oath.245 In essence, it must provide a "full and complete" statement
establishing probable cause for each of the following elements: person,
designated crime, conversation, communication facility, and time pe-
riod. In other words, there must be probable cause to believe that a
particular person involved in a designated crime will have discussion
pertinent to that crime using a particular phone (or at a particular
place) during a specified time period.2 46 Title III's legislative history
indicates that, together, these requirements "are intended to meet the
test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used
only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances, which fully
comply with the requirements of particularity. ' 247 Furthermore, to dis-
courage both routine use of electronic surveillance and the possibility of
abuse for individual harassment, the application must detail whether
investigative alternatives reasonably have been exhausted and provide
"a full and complete statement" concerning any previous surveillance
requests involving persons or facilities named in the application. 24
Once these requirements are satisfactorily met, the judge may issue
an eavesdropping order. 249 The order itself must designate the person-
nel authorized to conduct the surveillance, 250 identify both the person (if
known) and place targeted for interception, 25' provide "a particular
description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and
a statement of the particular offense to which it relates," 2 52 and specify
the period of surveillance. 253 Each order must contain directives man-
dating prompt execution, minimization of the interception of irrelevant
conversations, and termination upon attainment of the surveillance ob-
jective or passage of the authorized time period (not to exceed 30 days)
whichever comes first.2 5 4 Applications for extensions may be filed.
243 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976); see infra notes 292-302.
244 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
245 Id.
246 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1976).
247 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2191.
248 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (e) (1976); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, 2190-91;
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: Two VIEWS, supra note 218, at 29-31, 33.
249 This decision is discretionary. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
250 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d) (1976).
251 Id. § 2518(4)(a), (b).
252 Id. § 2518(4)(c).
253 Id. § 2518(4)(e).
254 Id. § 2518(5).
[Vol. 74
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Each such application, however, must comply anew with all statutory
requirements, and, if granted, be met with a corresponding extension
order.255
c. Executional requirements
Surveillance may only be conducted by properly authorized per-
sonnel,256 and must be done in a manner that minimizes the intercep-
tion of irrelevant conversations; 25 7 subject to legitimate "plain view"
exceptions, officers, in effect, must "spot monitor" whenever a communi-
cation seems nonpertinent to the crime specified in the order.258 To the
extent possible, however, all monitored conversations (or portions there
of) should be recorded.259 This recordation requirement is intended to
ensure the availability at trial of the most reliable evidence of the con-
versations; subject to technical difficulties, a tape recording of the con-
versation will be more reliable and more credible than an agent's
recollection. 260 The statute requires that the recording be made in a
way that reduces the possibility of alteration;261 as a further precaution,
immediately upon expiration of the authorized surveillance period, all
tape recordings must be sealed under judicial supervision.262 Next,
within flexible time limits, the statute requires post-interception inven-
tory notice to be given to all persons who were named in the application
or order; such notice to other overheard parties is left to the judge's dis-
cretion.263 Potential victims of unlawful surveillance thus may be en-
couraged to file civil suits.2 64 Finally, the statute directs both the
authorizing executive official and the approving judge to provide the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts with a comprehensive
summary of each surveillance case. 265 These reports serve as the basis
for a detailed compilation that is presented to Congress annually,
thereby furnishing a means for public evaluation of the court order
255 Id. § 2518(1)(f), (4); see infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
256 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(7), 2518(1)(a), (4)(d) (1976).
257 Id. § 2518(5).
258 Id. § 2518(5), 2517(5). To "spot monitor" means that the surveilling agent temporarily
terminates interception, subject to periodic checks to ensure that the conversation has not
taken a pertinent turn. See, e.g., Note, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimi-
zation, Amendment, Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 92, 121 (1975).
259 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9)(a) (1976).
260 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I 11, at 2193; see alo supra note 80 and accompa-
nying text.
261 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976).
262 Id.
263 Id. § 2518(8)(d).
264 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2194.




3. Judicial Supervision and Stict Enforcement
Basic to Title III is the concept of judicial supervision. The super-
vising judge is responsible for ensuring compliance with a complex array
of constitutional and statutory requirements. Additionally, the judge is
given discretion to "deny the application altogether, or grant it as suita-
bly modified," 267 notwithstanding technical compliance with all legal
requirements. For example, he may consider electronic surveillance un-
wise on policy grounds. Furthermore, should the application be
granted, his order may be conditioned upon the delivery of periodic pro-
gress reports to ensure that continued surveillance is appropriate, 268
and, at any time, he may direct that monitoring be discontinued. 269
The legislative record also demonstrates that Congress intended the
statute to be enforced with meticulous care.2 70 Title III's sponsors clearly
recognized that society's right to privacy would depend, in large part,
upon this system of statutory controls and that these controls, in turn,
were dependent upon proper judicial implementation. For this reason,
the sponsors repeatedly sought to reassure the public that the law would
be enforced strictly "by a scrupulous system of impartial court author-
ized supervision. ' ' 27' Civil libertarians, however, were not persuaded.
They still believed the statute to be unconstitutional.
4. The Critical Response
This Article, of course, is ultimately concerned with the enforce-
ment of Title III. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the major issues
raised by its application, the original facial attacks on the statute must
be put into perspective. Criticism of Title III was multifaceted. The
law was perceived by some as "an invitation to widespread eavesdrop-
ping. ' ' 272 Critics, claiming that too much electronic surveillance was not
subject to the warrant requirement, urged that national security surveil-
266 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2196.
267 Id. at 2191. Section 2518(3) states in pertinent part: "Upon such application the judge
may enter an ex parte order. . . authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral com-
munications. ... 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976) (emphasis added). See NWC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 76-77; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 146.
268 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976).
269 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I 11, at 2193; see supra note 267.
270 Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, § 801(b), (d), 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (congressional statement
of findings).
271 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2274 (statements of Sen. Dirksen, Sen.
Hruska, Sen. Scott and Sen. Thurmond).
272 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 509. Since Professor Schwartz has been one of Title III's




lances, consensual monitorings, and emergency eavesdroppings should
also require prior judicial authorization.2 73 Moreover, too much surveil-
lance purportedly was permitted under the court order system; in this
respect, opponents contended that the range of designated offenses was
far too broad274 and that the standards for authorizing surveillance and
controlling its scope were too flexible.275 Nor did the statute contain
any direct controls against "judge shopping," so that any judges who
chose to enforce the law strictly would, in all likelihood, be avoided.27 6
Title III's inventory notice provision was also criticized, as it failed to
guarantee notice for all overheard parties.2 77 Finally, it was argued that
the need for electronic surveillance had not been demonstrated; organ-
ized crime investigations could be effective without it.278
Not all these arguments, however, were of constitutional signifi-
cance. For example, the range of designated offenses, while admittedly
very broad, was essentially a matter of legislative choice rather than a
constitutional requirement. 279 Similarly, the Constitution normally does
not require strict controls against judge shopping.2 0 Finally, the ques-
tion of need was also a matter of legislative wisdom; at the very least,
there was certainly a rational basis to support Congress' findings of ne-
cessity.28 ' Moreover, Title III provided for the establishment of a Na-
tional Wiretapping Commission-six years hence-to reassess the
question of need as well as the statute's overall operation. 28 2
Regarding the scope of Title III's search warrant exceptions, some
basis for constitutional concern existed. The widely criticized national
273 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 496; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2236
(statement of Sen. Hart); Linzer, Federal Procedure for Court Ordered Electronic Surveillance: Does it
Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz?, 60 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203, 206-07 (1969). See
generally E. LAPIDUS, supra note 216, at 92-105.
274 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2235, 2242 (statements of Sen. Hart and Sen.
Fong); E. LAPIDUS, supra note 216, at 73-76; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 481-82.
275 See infra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.
276 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 483-84; see E. LAPIDUS, supra 216, at 72.
277 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 485; see E. LAPIDUS, supra note 216, at 73.
278 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2224, 2232 (statements of Sen. Long and Sen.
Hart); see Semerjian, supra note 68, at 231.
279 See generaly Wiretapping, Attorney General's Program, 1962: Hearings on S.2813 and S 1495
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 22-23 (1962) (statement of
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy). Attorney General Kennedy stated that specific
enumeration of particular offenses ensures that a definitive line is indicated, but he also ac-
knowledged that the decision as to which crimes were to be included was somewhat arbitrary.
280 The availability of subsequent judicial review under circumstances in which the choice
of judge cannot be influenced is an adequate response to this claim. ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 81, at 136-37.
281 See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
282 Commission Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 804, 82 Stat. 223 (1968), amended by,
Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (1971), Pub. L. No. 93-609, 88 Stat. 1972 (1974), and Pub.
L. No. 94-176, 89 Stat. 1031 (1975); see also NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 230-31.
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security exemption, however, was ambigous in impact. Arguably, the
applicable clause merely stated that such surveillances were not regu-
lated by Title 111.283 If so, no constitutional problem was raised-at
least by Title III-since the validity of any warrantless national security
surveillance would then have to stand on its own. Admittedly, most
critics maintained that Title III affirmatively authorized such eaves-
dropping, and was therefore unconstitutional, 284 but the matter still was
subject to potentially differing judicial interpretation. 28 5
There was no doubt, however, that the statute did allow warrant-
less consensual electronic surveillance (which occurs when one party to
the conversation, usually a police officer or cooperating citizen, permits
the monitoring).286 Such surveillance was far more frequent than non-
consensual eavesdropping. 28 7 Critics argued that, despite On Lee and
Lopez, Osborn's emphasis on prior judicial authorization in a consensual
monitoring case now mandated prior warrants for all consensual elec-
tronic surveillance. 288 In support of this argument, they pointed to the
emphasis which Katz and Berger had placed on the Osborn case. Never-
theless, sound tactical reasons existed for authorizing such surveillance
without prior judicial authorization. Consensual electronic surveillance
often was used to protect informants and undercover police officers in
cases in which there was no probable cause; indeed, such surveillance
was often crucial towards corroborating the reliability of an informant
or developing probable cause.289 Thus, a prior search warrant based
283 At the time, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) was the applicable clause. For the full text of
§ 2511(3), see injra text accompanying note 400. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111,
at 2182-83. The provision has since been amended in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), and the passage of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. See supra note 227 and infra notes 392-412 and
accompanying text.
284 See Linzer, supra note 273, at 213-14; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 491-93.
285 See infra notes 392-412.
286 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)-(d) (1976); see supra note 1.
287 Greenawalt, supra note 140, at 211-12; see NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 114; see infa
note 947.
288 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 140, at 201-02; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 495-96.
289 For example, the National Wiretapping Commission made the following observations
in this respect:
In consensual surveillance, the consenting party is often an informant of somewhat
dubious character. Quite often the informant's consent to interception is obtained to
establish his veracity and credibility, which might otherwise be impossible. Wiring the
informant is thus related to establishing sufficient probable cause, once his credibility is
established, for a surveillance order or an arrest or search warrant. As one prosecutor
stated, this is frequently the "first step" in an investigation. Also, when informants' con-
versations are overheard or recorded, they themselves are kept honest, later impeach-
ment becomes impossible, and informants' covers can be preserved. Furthermore, by
recording an informant's conversation, the government obtains a form of insurance
against later recantation.
As a result of consensual surveillance, officers generally believe, the best possible
evidence is acquired, and no better means of corroborating an informant's information
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upon probable cause frequently would not be obtainable for such sur-
veillance. 29 Moreover, from a constitutional standpoint, On Lee and
Lopez had not been overruled. Indeed, there was no reason to question
the continued validity of the proposition, established in Lopez, that once
someone assumes the risk of disclosure by another party to a conversa-
tion, he has no constitutional right "to rely upon possible flaws in the
agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being
beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of
impeachment." 2
9 1
Title III's treatment of warrantless emergency surveillances, how-
ever, was somewhat supsect. The provision authorized such searches in
national security situations or cases involving "conspiratorial activities
characteristic of organized crime," provided that all stattitory require-
ments could have been met but for prevailing time constraints. 292 Fur-
thermore, within forty-eight hours of interception, an application must
be filed seeking retroactive approval for the surveillance. 293 This provi-
sion, however, was considered ambiguous and unnecessarily broad.294
Moreover, it was maintained that it was not very difficult to find a judge
or a witness' testimony is available. This is particularly important in corruption cases
and similar situations involving the word of one person against another.
Furthermore, wiring a person who is alleging official impropriety can benefit the
official involved. Not infrequently, persons making such charges withdraw them when
asked to be wired. In such circumstances, the official is protected, and it has been sug-
gested that elimination of consensual surveillance would adversely affect innocent people
and potential defendants as much as it would harm law enforcement.
Another very important use of consensual surveillance is to protect the agent or
informant. Particularly in narcotics cases, where acts of violence against agents have
increased substantially in recent years, wiring the officer can add a measure of protection
not otherwise available. On the other hand, if the officer is discovered wearing the de-
vice, he is likely to be more endangered. When such danger is anticipated, bugging the
room or area where the conversation will take place is a better solution.
Consensual surveillance gives officers mobility and flexibility. Not only can imme-
diate protective action be taken if the officer is assaulted, but raids and related activities
can be more efficiently coordinated. Finally, consensual surveillance can also play an
important part in gathering intelligence.
Ifconsensual surveillance were to be used to obtain probable cause for a surveillance
order or an arrest or search warrant, as is often the case, a warrant procedure, if it had a
probable cause requirement, would be impossible to obtain. It would require officers to
have probable cause to use a device for obtaining probable cause. In other situations,
such as drug transactions, two meetings instead of one would be required: the first to
acquire probable cause, the second to record the conversation.
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 113-14, 117 (footnotes omitted).
290 Id.
291 Lopez v. United States, 377 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1963); see supra note 77. In 1971, the
Supreme Court definitively decided that consensual electronic surveillance is not governed by
the fourth amendment. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-54 (1971).
292 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (1976).
293 Id.
294 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 486-90; see E. LAPIDUS, supra note 216, at 6, 93-95, 141.
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who would approve an emergency interception. 295 Critics also observed
that should the police initiate such surveillance and fail to obtain perti-
nent information, the courts and overheard parties would never know
eavesdropping had occurred if no retroactive application were ever
filed.2 9 6 Finally, from a constitutional perspective, the Supreme Court
had suggested in Katz that electronic surveillance without prior judicial
approval could not be justified on traditional emergency search
grounds.29 7
There was considerable validity to these arguments. Although in
some respects the emergency exception is actually too narrow,298 overall
it is, in fact, unnecessarily flexible. Its scope is ambiguous, 299 and there
is no reason not to require prior oral approval from an emergency judge
before permitting such searches. 3 o The Supreme Court's statements in
Katz are also troublesome; but since warrantless emergency searches are
an established part of our constitutional doctrine, 30 1 the Katz Court may
295 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 487-88.
296 Id. at 487; cf. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-18
(1972).
297 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
298 For, example, a glaring omission is the provision's failure to authorize emergency
searches in life endangering situations not involving organized crime or national security in-
terests. A Justice Department spokesman has acknowledged that this omission occasionally
has effected somewhat strained statutory interpretations:
I know that the Attorney General has approved emergency wiretaps without court order
followed 48 hours later by a court order in situations concerning hostages or other grave
danger.
I think that has been true of Attorneys General for a period of time. They have
done it with some stretching, both of conscience and of statutory language. It has
seemed entirely clear to them and to me that Congress did not intend in Title III to
preclude the temporary placing of an electronic monitoring device or of a wiretap in a
situation where a bank robber was holding five people hostage or a kidnaper was taking
a kidnap victim away in a car.
Wiretap Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminaljustice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judicia, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Philip B.
Heymann); see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDMENTS TO THE OMNIBUS CRIME
CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-10
(1982).
299 For example, the terms "organized crime" and "national security" are not statutorily
defined. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976). For a discussion of the term "organized crime," see
supra note 111.
30o This is the procedure employed in New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 156A- 13 (West
1971). At the very least, investigators should be required to notify a judge that emergency
surveillance is being conducted. See NWC REPORT, supra note I, at 18 (recommending statu-
tory amendment requiring oral notification of judges). This notification would eliminate the
concern raised earlier. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (recognizing propriety of
emergency searches). For a detailed discussion of this principle, see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note
60, § 6.5, (b), (d), at 437-50, 455-58 (1978). For an excellent case demonstrating this principle
in application, see People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 736-41,497 P.2d 1121, 1138-41, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 402-05 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973) (emergency search to uncover possi-
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have been stating its position only in terms of there being "little likeli-
hood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situ-
ation so fraught with urgency. '30 2 Presumably, the statutory provision
was inserted to address this remote possibility, with the constitutionality
of its application left to case by case determination. In any event, the
availability of emergency searches certainly does not invalidate the en-
tire statute.
Regarding the actual authorization and surveillance process, Title
III opponents were somewhat concerned that the exhaustion require-
ment would be blithely ignored.30 3 The main focus of their criticism,
however, centered around the statute's particularity standards, as well
as the potential scope and duration of the resulting surveillance. In a
conventional search warrant, particularity serves to limit the scope of
both the search and the resulting seizure. 30 4 These same purposes are
served in an electronic search; if the surveilling officer understands the
precise conversation which is the subject of his search, he will know to
terminate interception (and commence spot monitoring) when nonper-
tinent conversations occur. Critics maintained, however, that particu-
larizing an anticipated conversation is almost always an inherently
impossible task.30 5 The Supreme Court's reliance upon Osbom was said
to be distinguishable because Osbom involved a one shot, consensual
monitoring which easily lends itself to particularization as the under-
cover agent can plan the conversation before it occurs.30 6 Thus, it was
argued, unless electronic surveillance is limited to situations in which
ble widespread conspiracy to assassinate political leaders). Hence, specific statutory authori-
zation for such searches was not constitutionally required.
302 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 358 n.21. More specifically, the Court's statement
suggesting that "electronic surveillance, without prior authorization [cannot] be justified on
grounds of 'hot pursuit,' " id. at 358, appears to have been qualified by the accompanying
footnote commentary:
Although "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of
others," . . . there seems litle likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic
possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.
Id. at 358 n.21 (citation omitted).
303 For example, Professor Schwartz was extremely skeptical of this provision:
Finally, the requirement set forth in section 2518(l)(c), that reasons must be given
as to why measures other than eavesdropping are not used, is likely to be of little or no
significance if any relationship to organized crime is alleged; and this seems to be the
only requirement specially imposed for wiretapping and bugging.
Schwartz, supra note 15, at 486.
304 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, §§ 4.5, 4.6, at 72, 95. This is accomplished because the
warrant's specification of what may be seized necessarily determines the permissible scope of
the resulting search. Thus, for example, under a warrant for stolen televisions, agents would
not be permitted to examine the contents of desk drawers.
305 See, e.g., E. LAPIDus, supra note 216, at 194; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 457-73.
306 Dash, supra note 69, at 311, 313; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 459.
1983]
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
particularity similar to Osborn can be attained, there has not been com-
pliance with the Berger and Katz standards. 30 7
Moreover, once permitted, electronic surveillance was said to sweep
too broadly.30 8 In Berger, Justice Douglas had warned of the indiscrimi-
nate nature of electronic surveillance. 30 9 Critics contended that Title III
does not adequately cure this problem: "Nothing can be done to cap-
ture only the conversations authorized in the tapping order. ' 310 Irrele-
vant and, indeed, often privileged conversations inevitably will be
overheard and recorded. 3 11 Frequently, these conversations would in-
volve innocent parties for whom the statute does not automatically pro-
vide inventory notice.3 12 Further, the length of such surveillance was
purported to be unlimited, directly in violation of Berger. In effect, such
surveillance was said to constitute an endless series of intrusions pursu-
ant to a single showing of probable cause. 3 13
These criticisms, however, usually either stemmed from a miscon-
struction of applicable statutory provisions or sought to impose an un-
duly rigid constitutional perspective upon Title III. Surely it was
inconsistent to demand a liberal interpretation of the fourth amendment
to effect the demise of Olmstead-so that modern privacy rights are pro-
tected-and then to insist upon a narrow reading when the needs of
modern law enforcement are considered. 3 14 Civil liberties ought not
necessarily "call for inherently inefficient police work. '3 15 Title III is a
modern statute designed to address a modern problem,31 6 and the Con-
307 Dash, supra note 69, at 311, 313; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 459.
308 LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2229-31 (statement of Sen. Hart); Schwartz,
supra note 15, at 457-64.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
310 LEGMSLTiVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2229 (statement of Sen. Hart).
311 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 466.
312 See supra notes 145, 264 & 277 and accompanying text.
313 Linzer, supra note 273, at 211-12; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 461-62.
314 Professor Kamisar's observations are directly pertinent here:
Nor does the wording of the amendment bother me very much. The amendment
does call for a warrant "particularly describing" the "things to be seized." However, if to
rule that conversations are not "papers" or "effects" or capable of being "seized" is to
read the fourth amendment "with the literalness of a country parson interpreting the
first chapter of Genesis," to contend on the other hand that such conversations are not
only constitutionaly protected, but incapable of being "particularly described" in ad-
vance, and therefore beyond the reach of any court order, is not to display much more
sophistication. Surely wiretapping opponents do not have to be reminded that "it is a
Constitution we are expounding."
Kamisar, supra note 32, at 912-13 (footnotes omitted).
315 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 205-06 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Blakey).
316 The basis for this observation was summarized in Title III's legislative history:
We inherited from England a medieval system, devised originally for a stable, homoge-
nous, primarily agrarian community. In our formative years, we had no professional
police force. Today, however, we are a mobile, modern, heterogenous, urban industrial
community. Our Nation, moreover, is no longer small. Our traditional methods in the
administration of justice, too, were fashioned in response to the problems of our Nation
[Vol. 74
1983] ELECTRONIC SUR VEILLANCE
stitution should be interpreted accordingly. Indeed, such flexibility
seems to be what Justice Brennan envisioned when he wrote his historic
dissent in Lopez.31 7
Of greater significance, however, Title III as drafted effectively
meets those problems which might otherwise make electronic surveil-
lance indiscriminate and inordinately prolonged. By initially imposing
a probable cause requirement as to person, designated crime, communi-
cation facility, particular conversations, and time period,318 the statute
provides an initial framework for defining the permissible scope and du-
ration of surveillance. The order may authorize surveillance for as
much as thirty days, but only if there is probable cause to believe that
relevant conversations will be overheard during this time period.319 The
statute further provides that surveillance must terminate earlier if the
as they were in its formative years. In years past it was not possible to investigate crime
aided by science. Today it is not only possible but necessary, in the development of
evidence, to subject it to analysis by the hands of those trained in the scientific disci-
plines. Even so, scientific "crime detection, popular fiction to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, at present is a limited tool". . . . In our formative years, offenses usually occurred
between neighbors. No specialized law enforcement force was thought necessary to bring
such crimes into the system ofjustice. Ignored entirely in the development of our system
ofjustice, therefore, was the possibility of the growth of a phenomenon such as modern
organized crime with its attendant corruption of our political and law enforcement
processes.
We have always had forms of organized crime and corruption. But there has grown
up in our society today highly organized, structured and formalized groups of criminal
cartels, whose existence transcends the crime known yesterday, for which our criminal
laws and procedures were primarily designed. The "American system was not designed
with (organized crime) . . . in mind." [sic] the President's Crime Commission noted in
its report "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" (1967), "and it has been notably
unsuccessful to date in preventing such organizations from preying on society." These
hard-core groups have become more than just loose associations of criminals. They have
developed into corporations of corruption, indeed quasi-governments within our society,
presenting a unique challenge to the administration of justice.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2157 (citation omitted); see supra notes 192 & 199-
204 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. Significantly, Justice Brennan then re-
marked that "[t]he Constitution would be an utterly impractical instrument of contemporary
government if it were deemed to reach only problems familiar to the technology of the eight-
eenth century. . . ." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
318 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
319 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(d) (1976). The legislative history indicates that surveillance is not
to be open-ended:
Subparagraph (d) requires a statement of the period of time during which the inter-
ceptions are to be made. This provision must be read in light of paragraphs (4)(e), (5),
and (6). . . . Together they require that the duration of an interception not be longer
than is necessary under the facts of the particular case. This is a command of the Consti-
tution according to Berger v. New York . . . and Katz v. United States. . . . Where it is
necessary to obtain coverage to [sic] only one meeting, the order should not authorize
additional surveillance. Compare Osborn v. United States. . . . Where a course of conduct
embracing multiple parties and extending over a period of time is involved, the order
may properly authorize proportionately longer surveillance, but in no event for longer
than 30 days, unless extensions are granted. . . . What is important is that the facts in
the application on a case-by-case basis justify the period of time of the surveillance.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2190.
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
investigative objective which originally led to the application has been
met.320 During all such surveillance, the monitors may only listen to
those conversations relevant to the particularized description contained
in the order.32 I Thus, at least theoretically, Title III eliminates open-
ended surveillance for purely strategic intelligence purposes. 32 2 For this
preclusion to be legally meaningful, however, the particularity of con-
versation requirement must be constitutionally adequate.
At least facially, particularity of conversation in the order is ade-
quately assured by three required components: (1) the identification, if
known, of the person(s) to be overheard; (2) a particular description of
the type of communication to be intercepted; and (3) specification of the
offense(s) to which it relates.323 This standard requires more than
merely specifying, for example, "telephonic communications pertinent
to the crime of [designated]. 32 4 The crime itself must be particularized
in a manner relating to the predicate facts establishing probable cause
for the person(s) named in the order.325 For example, if the underlying
facts establish probable cause to believe that Citizen K would be using
the telephone to commit extortion against Victim A, a satisfactory cor-
responding description in the order would be "telephonic communica-
tions of Citizen K involving his extortion of Victim A ." In contrast, an
unduly open-ended description, given our hypothetical probable cause predi-
care, would be "telephonic communications involving the crime of extor-
320 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976); see supra note 319. Although Title III does not explicitly
require the investigative objective to be stated, such a condition is implicit to § 2518, as well
as to other statutory provisions. See infra notes 597, 614, 750-51 & 787 and accompanying
text. Termination, of course, is subject to the development of a new objective based upon
newly acquired information. See infia notes 1009-10 and accompanying text.
321 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
322 Ironically, Title III therefore prohibits the open-ended type of surveillance which was
originally recommended in the 1967 President's Commission Task Force Report and its ac-
companying model statute. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 92, 101; see NWC RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 63, 126. In contrast, other countries tend to use electronic surveillance
primarily for strategic intelligence purposes. Cooper, Comparative Law Aspects of Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance, in COMMISSION STUDIES: SUPPORTING MATERIALS FOR THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION STUDIES]. Professor Schwartz has suggested that the statute's limitation on
such intelligence gathering is inconsistent with its drafters' goal of providing a means to com-
bat organized crime on a long term basis. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 471. As such, he main-
tained Title III's prohibitions frequently would be "flout[ed]." Id. This criticism, however,
overlooks the fact that strategic intelligence is often legitimately overheard during the course
of tactical surveillance. See infra notes 329-30, 335-37, 840 & 1009-15 and accompanying text.
323 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(i), (1)(b)(iv), 4(a), 4(c) (1976).
324 Likewise, merely characterizing the communication as "oral" or "wire" would not com-
ply with § 2518(l)(b)(iii) or § 2518(4)(c) because other sections of the statute more directly
require a specification in such terms. See § 2518(l)(b)(ii), (4)(b) (1976). Moreover, such an
approach would be baldly unconstitutional, as unlimited surveillance thereby would occur.
325 C. supra note 319.
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tion." This obviously would be invalid because it permits the monitors
to listen to extortion-related conversations of persons other than Citizen
K and involving victims other than Victim A. If the original probable
cause predicate were actually broader, however, so that Victim B was
included also, the sample satisfactory description would expand accord-
ingly. Similarly, if the underlying probable cause predicate established
a widespread extortion scheme involving Citizen K and multiple vic-
tims, some known and some unknown, the corresponding description
would likewise expand as follows: "telephonic communications of Citi-
zen K involving his extortion of Victim A, Victim B, and others as yet
unknown." Admittedly, the scope of permissible seizure now has been
enlarged drastically, but the expansion is supported by the probable
cause predicate. Although the description itself essentially describes a
broad category of communications, descriptions of this kind are rou-
tinely accepted in searches for documentary evidence where, by anal-
ogy, the precise written contents of the item sought rarely can be
described in advance.3 26 Thus, the standard sanctioned by Title III is
contitutionally sound.
Nor does Title III permit continuous, long term, indiscriminate
seizures. Surveillance authorities are required to minimize the intercep-
tion of conversations that are not relevant to the scope of the order;32 7
failure to minimize is punishable by suppression.328 Admittedly, the
seizure of some irrelevant conversations (or portions thereof) is inevita-
ble, but this should not automatically make the surveillance unreasona-
ble for fourth amendment purposes. Title III's drafters properly
reasoned that, even in a conventional search, law enforcement officers
often see many items that are irrelevant to the objective of the war-
326 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 89-9 1;see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-
81 (1976); United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1980) (warrant for "books,
records, chemical equipment, and personal papers relating to the manufacture and distribu-
tion of methamphetamine"); United States v. Vargas, 621 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.) (warrant
for "quantity of cocaine, its containers and documentary evidence relating to the smuggling
of said cocaine from Lima, Peru to the United States"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980);
United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617, 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1960), reo'don other grounds, 365 U.S.
312 (1961) (search warrants authorizing seizure of books, memoranda, tickets, pads, tablets
and papers recording receipt of funds described the articles to be seized with sufficient partic-
ularity to comply with fourth amendment restraints); United States v. Wuageneux, 683 F.2d
1343, 1349-51 (1982) (warrant for eleven categories of business records); United States v.
Auterbridge, 375 F. Supp. 418, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (approving generic descriptions in war-
rant for documents); Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime tosecutions:
An Overview andAnabusis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 651, 692 (1977); Project,
White-Collar Crime: SecondAnnual Surny of Law, 19 AM. (RIM. L. REV. 173, 200 (1981) (fourth
amendment particularity requirements as applied to grand jury subpoenas necessitates only
description in terms of categories).
327 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
328 Id. § 2515.
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rant.329 This analogy, albeit somewhat imperfect because electronic sur-
veillance results in a simultaneous search and seizure,330 nevertheless
demonstrates that the incremental loss of privacy is not drastic. True,
the possibility that privileged communications occasionally might be
overheard is troublesome, but the only effective alternative-prohibiting
any monitoring involving privileged parties-poses far more serious con-
cerns by potentially creating a sanctuary for criminal conversations. 3 31
To the extent that privileged conversations of criminal defendants are
overheard, the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
provides an adequate suppression remedy. 332 In other situations, how-
ever, the question of extending protection is essentially a matter of legis-
lative policy.
Concededly, surveillance may be long term, since periodic exten-
sions are available potentially every thirty days. Contrary to some criti-
cal interpretations, 3 33 however, the statute does not authorize automatic
extensions; each extension requires a showing of renewed compliance
with all original authorization requirements, and is further subject to
the judge's discretionary termination authority. 334 Moreover, once
probable cause for continued surveillance has been firmly established,
the subject's privacy concerns, which society was willing to recognize
before surveillance began, are no longer paramount. 335 At times, admit-
329 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 90; TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 11, at 96-97;
see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11 (c)-(e). Indeed, conventional searches may actually be
more intrusive than a purely audio electronic search. Similarly, the use of undercover agents
may occasion greater intrusions than electronic surveillance into a subject's everyday life.
330 Note, however, that police officers executing search warrants may have occasion to
photograph aspects of the premises searched. Although, in a sense, the photographed objects
have been simultaneously searched and seized, this procedure is not considered unconstitu-
tional per se.
331 Reported cases have frequently demonstrated that the creation of sanctuaries is a valid
concern. See United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
Loften, 507 F. Supp. 108, 111-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400,
406-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
332 Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556 (1977) (presence of informant during
defendant's meetings with counsel not a basis for suppression only because no information
was disclosed to prosecution).
333 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 461-63.
334 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e), (5) (1976); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2190-
91; NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 97-98.
335 Assuming that the investigative objective has not yet been achieved, the following ob-
servation should be dispositive:
No arbitrary time limit should be placed on how long the device is allowed to operate. If
it is productive it should be allowed to remain in operation. Indeed, this situation offers
the clearest situation where the balance should be struck for justice. When you are cer-
tain, not just probably sure, that evidence can be obtained, there should be no reluctance
to authorize the use of the equipment. For in this situation the danger of an invasion of
innocent privacy is not present. No one should have a right to commit a crime in private
if there is virtually no danger of innocent privacy being invaded.
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tedly, these extensions may be used for crimes other than those which
originally prompted the surveillance,33 6 but use of this information is
subject to conformance with statutory and constitutional "plain view"
requirements.3 3 7 Thus, electronic surveillance properly may serve a
strategic intelligence purpose within the framework of Title III's overall
prohibition against indiscriminate eavesdropping.
Finally, the fact that only "named" individuals are guaranteed stat-
utory notice is not constitutionally objectionable. The notice question is
not a simple matter. Specifically, Congress realized that at times notice
of interception might be a source of considerable distress. For example,
eavesdropping targets could be embarrassed if their innocent conversa-
tions resulted in disclosure of the surveillance to uninvolved parties.3 38
The possibility also existed that notice mailed to one's home or business
could cause domestic or professional discomfiture respectively.3 3 9 Ac-
cordingly, Congress decided to give notice to those most obviously af-
fected by the investigation; others would receive it upon a proper
exercise of judicial discretion.3 4°
This review, albeit brief, demonstrates the facial validity of Title
III, and explains why the law received immediate and widespread con-
stitutional approval. In fact, the combination of constitutional and stat-
utory protections provided in Title III compares favorably with
electronic surveillance laws internationally.3 4' The real question today,
therefore, is not Title III's facial validity, but the manner in which it has
been applied. Congress intended that the statute be strictly enforced
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 102.
Nevertheless, a majority of the National Wiretapping Commission recommended that
the extension provision be amended:
In lieu of an arbitrary limitation on the number of extensions of an electronic sur-
veillance authorization, Section 2518 should be amended to require, as a prerequisite to
an extension, a showing of some special reason to continue the electronic surveillance,
such as the receipt of information indicating (1) the existence of other offenses or poten-
tial offenses in addition to the subjects of the current authorization, or (2) that other
parties to the offense are still to be uncovered, or (3) that suspects intend to communicate
concerning the offense under investigation at a time within the period of the requested
extension.
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. It is difficult to discern, however, in what way this propo-
sal differs from current Title III requirements. Moreover, the breadth of proviso three of the
Commission's recommendation entirely vitiates the effort to effect a change of existing law.
Rather than reform this aspect of Title III, the present provision should be strictly enforced.
336 It is not uncommon, for example, that electronic surveillance uncovers evidence of
other crimes. See infra note 840 and accompanying text.
337 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1976); see infia notes 596-603 & 839-53 and accompanying text.
338 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 101.
339 Id.
340 See 114 CONG. REc. 14, 485-86 (1968) (statement of Sen. Hart); id. at 14, 476 (state-
ment of Sen. Long).
341 See COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322 at 62-64; Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany,
29 AM. J. COMP. L. 607, 643-45 (1981); Warren, supra note 229, at 7-10.
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under careful judicial supervision. 342 Indeed, given the many questions
raised about its facial validity, the law's ultimate constitutionality was
said by some to depend upon such enforcement. 343 Yet, ironically, the
Supreme Court, which originally took the initiative in advising Congress
as to the drafting of electronic surveillance legislation, has since failed to
enforce Title III in a consistently scrupulous manner.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEMISE OF STRICT
ENFORCEMENT
Since Title III was enacted, the Supreme Court has had numerous
opportunities to interpret critical statutory provisions. From the begin-
ning, however, the Court often failed to give Title III issues careful con-
sideration. Important matters were decided without adequate briefing,
and statutory language was often either ignored or misinterpreted. Not
every case was wrongly decided-but many were-and almost all
seemed to emphasize pragmatic considerations rather than the need for
careful analysis of legislative design. While the Court periodically pro-
claimed that Title III had to be strictly enforced by the government, its
own decisions established a pattern which suggested the contrary. This
development can best be understood by reviewing the Court's major Ti-
tle III cases in approximate chronological sequence and underscoring,
when appropriate, the interrelationships between these decisions.
A. ALDERMAN V UNITED STATES
Alderman v. United States344 was not a Title III case-the electronic
surveillance at issue occurred before the statute's passage. 345 Neverthe-
less, the Alderman Court referred to Title III for analogical purposes in a
manner which had an immediate and profound impact upon subse-
quent litigation.
Although Alderman was principally concerned with the problem of
what standards and procedures were to be followed by district courts in
determining whether evidence was the product of heretofore established
illegal electronic surveillance, a threshold matter for consideration was
the question of petitioners' standing to raise a fourth amendment
claim. 34 6 The fourth amendment standing doctrine, of course, was de-
342 See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
343 J. CARR, supra note 18, at 49-50. See generaly Linzer, supra note 273, at 209.
344 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
345 Id. at 167-70.
346 Id. This issue essentially involved the extent to which illegally obtained electronic sur-
veillance materials had to be disclosed for taint determination purposes. Rejecting the gov-
ernment's argument for in camera inspection, the Court required full disclosure of all illegally
obtained conversations that petitioners had standing to challenge. 394 U.S. at 180-85.
[Vol. 74
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
veloped by the Supreme Court in an effort to limit the potentially broad
impact of the exclusionary rule.347 Under this limitation, no suppression
claim is to be considered unless the moving party was actually a victim
of the allegedly unlawful search and seizure; vicarious assertions of con-
stitutional rights are thereby precluded.3 48 Since the doctrine obviously
limits the scope of suppression, it often has been criticized as being in-
consistent with the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose.349 Petitioners
here asked the Court to abandon the limitation so that illegally obtained
evidence would be inadmissible regardless of whether the defendants'
constitutional rights had actually been abridged. 350 In an opinion by
Justice White, the Court questioned whether the marginal increase in
deterrence would be worth the loss of otherwise valid prosecutions, and
instead chose to reaffirm the standing doctrine. 351 In so doing, Justice
White cited the controlling force of several recent precedents. 352 Had he
gone no further, the opinion-at least under stare decisis-would have
been analytically unobjectionable. Justice White stated, however, that
Congress or state legislatures had the authority to remove standing bar-
riers, and that Congress had decided to retain existing doctrine in Title
111. 353 Since Title III standing was not at issue in Alderman, the question
was never even briefed.3 54 Nevertheless, notwithstanding express statu-
tory language to the contrary, Justice White's dicta soon was treated as
dispositive of this issue in Title III cases.3 55
Unfortunately, no member of the Court expressly questioned Jus-
tice White's Title III analysis. In this respect, only Justice Fortas, dis-
senting from the majority's overall standing conclusion, came close to
347 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); Goldstein v. United States,
316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). For a thorough discussion of standing, see 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note
60, § 11.3.
348 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 11.3, at 544, 599.
349 See Allen, The Wo//Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
REv. 1, 22 (1950); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 433
(1974); Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 S. CAL. L. REv. 359, 368-69 (1941); Tray-
nor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE LJ. 319, 335; White & Greenspan,
Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 346-48 (1970).
350 394 U.S. at 171.
351 Id. at 171-75.
352 Id.
353 Justice White stated:
In its recent wiretapping and eavesdropping legislation, Congress has provided only
that an "aggrieved person" may move to suppress the contents of a wire or oral commu-
nication intercepted in violation of the Act. . . . The Act's legislative history indicates
that "aggrieved person," the limiting phrase currently found in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
41(e), should be construed in accordance with existent standing rules.
Id. at 175 n.9 (citations omitted).
354 Brief for Petitioners; Brief for United States, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1968).
355 See infia note 366 and accompanying text and note 723 and accompanying text.
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addressing the point.356 While fundamentally opposed to any standing
limitations, 35 7 Justice Fortas argued that the majority should at least
recognize that the standing doctrine had been liberalized by recent
Supreme Court decisions to include anyone against whom the search
had been directed.3 58 This expansion effected so-called target standing,
which Justice Fortas further implied, governed Title 111.359 Thus, he ar-
gued that under current standing law, either the victim of an unlawful
search or the investigatory target of the police action had standing to
seek suppression. 360
The source of Justice Fortas' contention was the Supreme Court's
1960 decision in Jones v. United States.3 6 1 In fact,Jones did involve a sig-
nificant expansion of standing principles, holding inter alia that persons
charged with possessory crimes had automatic standing as to the items
allegedly possessed and "that anyone legitimately on the premises where
a search occurs may challenge its legality. '362 Justice Fortas main-
356 394 U.S. at 208 n.10 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Fortas concurred with aspects of the Court's decision regarding the disclosure issue. Id. at
201, 209-11; see supra note 346. Justice Douglas concurred with Justice Fortas' standing anal-
ysis. 394 U.S. at 187.
357 Id. at 204-07.
358 Id. at 207 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)).
359 See id. at 208 & n. 10. Justice Fortas, however, failed to recognize that this principle had
been expressly incorporated into Title III. See infia note 366 and accompanying text.
360 Id. at 208-09.
361 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
362 Id. at 267; see id. at 261-67. At the time, automatic standing was considered important
in possessory crimes because defendants who asserted possession were potentially vulnerable
to substantive use of their testimony at trial. Id. at 263. In later years, after the Court had
held that admissions at pretrial hearings could not be admitted on the question of guilt, the
automatic standing concept was eliminated. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89-90
(1980).
The "legitimately on the premises" aspect of Jones effected an expansion of the tradi-
tional standing rule which conferred the right to seek suppression upon persons who "had a
substantial possessory interest in the premises searched." 362 U.S. at 261. This principle had
often been a basis for standing in cases not involving a possessory interest in the property
seized. Jones, however, effectively removed the need for any property interest in the premises
searched. Instead, all that was required was a legitimate presence on the premises. This
aspect of Jones, however, was subsequently discarded when the Supreme Court held that a
reasonable expectation of privacy was necessary for standing to be attained. Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1978). Indeed, Rakas was another example of the Court using the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard to effect reduced constitutional protections. See
also supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
Significantly, the Rakas holding in effect adopted the views expressed by Justice Harlan
in his partial dissent from Alderman. Justice Harlan agreed that the standing doctrine should
be retained, but differed from that aspect of the majority's opinion which had held that
standing should be granted to property owners automatically. Specifically, Justice Harlan
reasoned that, since a property owner does not necessarily have a privacy interest in all con-
versations occuring on his premises, conferral of standing should be reconsidered in light of
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard. United States v. Alderman, 394 U.S. at
188-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, for example, standing
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tained, however, that the following language in Jones had effected an
even greater expansion by creating target standing:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure" one must have been a victim of a search and seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice
only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else ....
Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to
challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evi-
dence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish,
that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.3 63
According to Justice Fortas, the target of a search is "surely 'the victim
of an invasion of privacy' and a 'person aggrieved,' even though it is not
his property that was searched or seized." 364
In fact, the Fortas interpretation ofJones later was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois.365 Nevertheless, there is considerable
support for the proposition that Title III draftsmen, having originally
read Jones in a like manner, incorporated target standing into the stat-
ute. Certainly, the statutory language is consistent with this interpre-
tion. Section 2510(11) of Title III authorizes any "aggrieved person" to
file a suppression motion, and defines this term as "a person who was a
party to any intercepted wire or oral conversation or a person against
whom the interception was directed. '366 Indeed, this language would proba-
bly be dispositive were it not for a confusing reference in the legislative
history. The Senate Report accompanying Title III says that this defini-
tion "is intended to reflect existing law" and then cites four supporting
precedents: 3 67 Jones v. United States,368 Goldstein v. United States,369 Wong
Sun v. United States,370 and United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi.3 7 Two
of these decisions, Wong Sun and Goldstein, directly enforced traditional
standing limitations,372 whileJones and Mancusi were ambiguous in this
should not necessarily be recognized for situations in which a nontrespassory bug has inter-
cepted conversations to which the property owner is not a party. Id. at 189.
363 394 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261) (emphasis added
by Justice Fortas).
364 Id. at 208-09 (footnote omitted).
365 439 U.S. 128, 136 (1978).
366 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1976) (emphasis added).
367 LEGMIIAiv HIsTORY, supra note 111, at 2179-80 (citations omitted).
368 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
369 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
370 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
371 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967), afd sub nom. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
372 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 491-92; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. at
121-22.
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regard.3 73
Nevertheless, though not widely recognized,3 74 by 1968 the.Jones
dicta suggestive of target standing had gained some support; standing
was being conferred on targets "against whom [searches had been] di-
rected." 375 Indeed, the DeForte case, decided when Title III was under
active consideration, citedJones in emphasizing this concept. 376 There-
fore, the drafters' intent to retain "existing law" may have very well
included target standing. Admittedly, the reference to Goldstein and
Wong Sun is puzzling, but since section 2510(11) is phrased in the dis-
junctive,377 these cases may only have referred to the section's first clause
which relates to overheard parties who clearly would have been victim-
ized by unlawful surveillance, and, therefore, would have been granted
standing under the traditional rule.
Other aspects of the legislative history also suggest that target
standing was intended,3 78 but, more fundamentally, from a policy
373 See generally United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1973); 3 W. LAFAVE, Supra
note 60, § 11.3(n), at 598.
374 Most commentators have not read jones to have provided target standing. See Amster-
dam, supra note 349, at 360-61; White & Greenspan, supra note 349, at 339.
375 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n. 11 (1968); see United States v. Moster-
son, 383 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Caffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625, 628-629 (2d
Cir. 1965); Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1961); Binkiewicz v. United States,
281 F. Supp. 233 (D. Mass. 1968); United States v. Brown, 274 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Significantly, Bumper, which
strongly implied target standing, was decided just three weeks before the passage of Title III.
376 The court remarked:
While the state insists that the search and seizure were conducted against Local 266, we
would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that the action by the state officials was
actually "directed" at DeForte. The allegedly improper activities which the state was
attempting to curtail could be halted only by prosecuting DeForte and his fellow union
officials. Little would have been gained by prosecuting or fining the union alone, or even
driving it to extinction, for the guiding culprits would have remained free to conduct
their illegal activities through a different proscenium. (Indeed, the union was not even
indicted.) That the state recognized this actuality is clearly evidenced by its placing of
"monitors" on the local's telephone in order to overhear conversations of the appellant
and other individuals operating behind the union facade. In these circumstances we
would be myopic not to recognize that appellant was "a victim of a search or seizure, one
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice
only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure di-
rected at someone else."
United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d at 902-03 (quoting Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. at 261). The court held, however, that DeForte had also had his own privacy rights
invaded. M. at 903. DeForte was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court on this latter
basis, 392 U.S. 364, 367-70 (1968). At the time Title III was under consideration, however,
the appellate opinion had not been reviewed by the Supreme Court.
377 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
378 For example, Title III was derived, at least in part, from model acts prepared by Profes-
sor G. Robert Blakey for the ABA, for the President's Crime Commission Task Force on
Organized Crime, and for a Notre Dame law review article. Telephone interview with Pro-
fessor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School (Sept. 21, 1982). See LEGISL.TIVE His-
TORY, supra note 111, at 2274, 2284. Both the Task Force and the Notre Dame proposals use
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standpoint this interpretation is the only one that would have made
sense to Title III legislators. Target standing is the only standing limita-
tion exactly coterminous with the exclusionary rule's deterrence func-
tion. Total abolition of standing restrictions would impose a
disproportionate penalty upon law enforcement for a single violation
and would potentially create insuperable taint problems.37 9 However,
the Alderman rule clearly does not deter sufficiently; rather, there is a
direct incentive to sacrifice the case against a minor criminal-by violat-
ing his rights-in the hopes of developing a successful prosecution
against a major offender.38 0 Skeptics have suggested that this argument
assumes an undue awareness of standing concepts by the police. 381 Cer-
tainly, however, in the context of electronic surveillance, there is a so-
phisticated understanding of this doctrine, since electronic surveillance
under Title III requires prosecutorial approval.38 2 Indeed, most organ-
standing language virtually identical to that of Title III. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 111, at 112; Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 657, 664 (1968). The Task Force statute, however, cites only to Jones, TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 104 n.392, whereas the statute in the law review article
citesJones and the other three cases listed in Title III's legislative history. Blakey & Hancock,
supra, at 664 n.14. Accordingly, since the language in both bills is virtually identical, the
cases cited in addition to jones probably serve no independent purpose. Moreover, both the
ABA and Notre Dame drafts refer to the present "liberal" federal standing rule as drawing
the appropriate line between providing too little deterrence and too much. ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 81, at 117; Blakey & Hancock, supra, at 664 n.14. Accordingly, the refer-
ence must be to target standing, since there is nothing otherwise "liberal" about the federal
rule as applied to the electronic surveillance context, and only target standing is precisely
coterminous with deterrence principles. Significantly, Professor Blakey today acknowledges
that he had target standing in mind when Title III was drafted. Telephone interview with
Professor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School (Sept. 21, 1982).
379 Concerning this, the ABA draft made the following observation:
Most criminal investigations are one shot affairs. They do not immediately relate to
other investigations, and they deal with a limited group of suspects. Investigations in the
area of organized crime, however, continue over long periods of time and generally in-
volve many of the same or closely related individuals. Existing and proposed systems of
intelligence sharing thus must not unnecessarily run the risk of inadvertent wholesale
pollution .... Particular care must be taken in applying the suppression rule in this
area to avoid having the price paid for deterrence disproportionate to its benefit. Never-
theless, the rule embodied in the standard is not intended to be a shield for unlawful
activity. The phraseology reflects the present liberal federal rule.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 117 (citation omitted); see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 111, at 104. Under Title III, undue taint problems would not be caused by target stand-
ing because the target either will be identified in the order, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1976), or
will be apparent, at least in terms of category, from the investigation's objectives. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (e) (1976); see also supra note 320.
380 See, e.g., White & Greenspan, supra note 349, at 351. It is questionable whether Title
III's civil and criminal penalties independently serve as effective deterrents.
381 See 3 W. LAFAVE,supra note 60, § 11.3, at 600-01.
382 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). Significantly, Justice Fortas observed in Alderman that elec-
tronic surveillance "is usually the product of calculated official decision rather than the error
of an individual agent of the state." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 203; see also supra
note 234.
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ized crime investigations involving electronic eavesdropping are di-
rected by experienced attorneys well aware of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 383 Since Title III is drafted in a manner which permits
sophisticated "up-the-ladder" type prosecutions against organized crime
defendants, 384 it is thus especially appropriate for the statute to contain
target standing protection against potential abuses by government
lawyers.
This interpretation also harmonizes with the statute's emphasis on
deterrence in its unusually broad suppression provision. 385 Quite
clearly, a narrow view of standing is incompatible with this expansive
remedy. Target standing is also more consistent with the historical de-
velopment of Title III. The federal statute is essentially an amalgam of
Senate Bill 675, which preceded Berger, and Senate Bill 2050, which was
introduced just two weeks after Berger.38 6 Senate Bill 675 contained a
suppression sanction without any standing limitation, but it had to be re-
vised in order to comply with the Berger guidelines;38 7 Senate Bill 2050
was the preliminary revision. Yet, Senate Bill 2050, which purported to
provide extra protections by complying with Berger, contained standing
language almost identical to Title III's section 2510(11).388 Did Congress
expand the legislative protections, and yet, by imposing a rigid standing
requirement, cynically remove the means of policing compliance? The
express language of section 2510(11) and its underlying legislative his-
tory, at the very least, suggest not.
The fact that target standing was later rejected by the Supreme
Court in Rakas, of course, is not decisive, as the only relevant inquiry is
what Title III's drafters thought they were doing in 1968 by providing a
standing limitation which was "intended to reflect existing law. '38 9
Subsequent changes in constitutional law would not change the statute's
meaning retroactively. While arguments contrary to target standing
383 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 46-47; cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
730 (1980) (IRS acting consciously with knowledge of standing rules). See generaly RACKETS
BUREAUS, supra note 205, at 31-32.
384 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-51; J. CARR, supra note 18, § 1.01, at 5. See
generally NWC REPORT, supra, at 135-37.
385 Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b), 82 Stat. 211 (1968); see NWC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 11-12; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2156, 2185; see also supra note 233
and accompanying text.
386 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2284.
387 Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 137, at 76. Nor did earlier bills contain standing
limitations. Criminal Laws and Procedures." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (§ 8g of Senate Bill 2189)
[hereinafter cited as Criminal Law Hearings]; Donnelly, Electronic Eavesdropping, 38 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 667, 688 (1963).
388 Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 137, § 2510(4), at 1002.
389 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2180 (citations omitted).
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can be marshalled,390 the obvious point is that this question was never
briefed, and Justice White's seemingly conclusive dicta precluded the
issue from ever developing. A generation of cases has since cited Alder-
man as having shaped the contours of Title III standing doctrine. 39'
B. UNITED STATES V UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
United States v. United States District Court3 92 gave the Supreme Court
its first opportunity to interpret the scope of Title III. At issue was a
"delicate question"393 that Katz had specifically declined to reach3 94 and
which Title III had treated only obliquely:3 95 "the President's power
. . . to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters
without prior judicial approval. '"396 Procedurally, District Court arose
when the federal government sought a writ of mandamus to set aside a
district court ruling which had held unconstitutional a warrantless na-
tional security surveillance of an American citizen. 397 The Supreme
Court correctly rejected the government's argument that such eaves-
dropping was both authorized by statute and constitutionally permissi-
ble.398 The significance of District Court for purposes of this Article,
however, lay in the mode of analysis which was adopted to resolve the
statutory issue; it was a mode of analysis which would differ sharply
from the Court's perspective in later years.
Most commentators agreed with the government's argument in Dis-
390 For example, most commentators did not interpret Jones to have established target
standing. See supra note 374 and materials cited therein. In addition, the legislative history
failed to cite United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951), a case that was strongly sugges-
tive of target standing, notwithstanding Rakas' subsequent holding to the contrary. 439 U.S.
at 135-36. Finally, Professor Carr notes that a sample surveillance situation discussed by
Senator Hart in the legislative history indicates that target standing had been rejected by
Title I1. J. CARR, supra note 18, § 6.02, at 334. Close examination of Senator Hart's com-
ments, however, suggest that the example he used did not involve target standing, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2225, and that he may only have been complaining about
difficulties he perceived to be associated with establishing such standing. Id. at 2234.
391 See infra note 723 and accompanying text. Two states, however, have adopted broader
provisions which confer standing upon persons either named in surveillance orders or having
an interest in the premises. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41a(10) (West Supp. 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(6) (West 1970).
392 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
393 Id. at 299.
394 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
395 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 12 (1971 Supplement).
396 407 U.S. at 299.
397 Id. at 301. Since the case did not involve a Title III wiretap, the government could not
rely upon the interlocutory appeal provision contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b) (1976). At
the time, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 did not give the prosecution the right to an interlocutory appeal in
criminal cases. This was accomplished by subsequent amendment. Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1880 (1971).
398 407 U.S. at 306, 316-17.
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trict Court that section 2511(3) of Title III was a congressional affirmance
of the President's constitutional authority to conduct warrantless domes-
tic security surveillance.399 In relevant part, section 2511(3) provided as
follows:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary. . . to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States . . . . Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such meas-
ures as he deems necessar to protect the United States agazst the overthrow of the
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or
oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exer-
cise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hear-
ing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and
shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement
that power.4 0°
This language was positive in tone, and it was supported by a legislative
record which, while not specifically authorizing warrantless domestic se-
curity eavesdropping, was similarly expansive in effect. 4°"
399 See J. CARR, supra note 18, § 3.06 at 102-03; Linzer, supra note 273, at 207 n.52;
Schwartz, supra note 15, at 491-92. For this reason, however, the commentators believed the
provision to be unconstitutional.
400 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (emphasis added), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2) (0 (1982).
401 In pertinent part, the legislative history provided as follows:
Paragraph (3) is intended to reflect a distinction between the administration of do-
mestic criminal legislation not constituting a danger to the structure or existence of the
Government and the conduct of foreign affairs. It makes it clear that nothing in the
proposed chapter or other act amended by the proposed legislation is intended to limit
the power of the President to obtain information by whatever means to protect the
United States from the acts of a foreign power including actual or potential attack or
foreign intelligence activities, or any other danger to the structure or existence of the
Government. Where foreign affairs and internal security are involved, the proposed sys-
tem of court ordered electronic surveillance envisioned for the administration of domes-
tic criminal legislation is not intended necessarily to be applicable. The two areas may,
however, overlap. Even though their activities take place within the United States, the
domestic Communist party and its front groups remain instruments of the foreign policy
of a foreign power. . . . Consequently, they fall within the field of foreign affairs and
outside the scope of the proposed chapter. Yet, their activities may involve violation of
domestic criminal legislation. . . . These provisions of the proposed chapter regarding
national and internal security thus provide that the contents of any wire or oral commu-
nication intercepted by the authority of the President may be received into evidence in
any judicial trial or administrative hearing. Otherwise, individuals seeking the over-
throw of the Government, including agents of foreign powers and those who cooperate
with them, could not be held legally accountable when evidence of their unlawful activ-
ity was uncovered incident to the exercise of this power by the President. The only
limitations recognized on this use is that the interceptions be deemed reasonable based
on an ad hoc judgment taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances of the
individual case, which is but the test of the Constitution itself. . . . The possibility that
ajudicial authorization for the interception could or could not have been obtained under
the proposed chapter would be only one factor in such a judgment. No preference
should be given to either alternative, since this would tend to limit the very power that
this provision recognizes is not to be deemed disturbed.
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The Supreme Court, however, viewed section 2511(3) as "essen-
tially neutral" regarding the President's authority to sanction such
eavesdropping;40 2 as interpreted, rather than conferring any power, this
provision "simply left presidential powers where [Congress had] found
them. '40 3 In context, this analysis was based largely upon the exhaus-
tive nature of Title III. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell, who had
played an instrumental role with President Johnson's Crime Commis-
sion,40 4 observed that "[t]he Act represents a comprehensive attempt by
Congress to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the
privacy of individual thought and expression." 40 5 As such, Justice Pow-
ell noted that section 2511(1) "broadly prohibits the use of electronic
surveillance '[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chap-
ter,"' 40 6 and that four specific exceptions were listed in section 2511(2),
each of which contained the same introductory clause: "'It shall not be
unlawful . . . to intercept' the particular type of communication de-
scribed. '40 7 By comparison, the introductory clause to section 2511(3),
quoted above, seemed to be more of a disclaimer than a declaration of
legality.40 8
While this analysis, standing alone, may not have been compelling,
Justice Powell then reviewed the requirements of Title III, and reasoned
that section 2511(3) must be viewed in the context of a comprehensive
statutory design:
In view of these and other interrelated provisions delineating permissi-
ble interceptions of particular criminal activity upon carefull4y specified condi-
tions, it would have been incongruous for Congress to have legislated with
respect to the important and complex area of national security in a single
brief and nebulous paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitiv-
ity of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care Congress exer-
cised in drafting other sections of the Act. We therefore think the
conclusion inescapable that Congress only intended to make clear that the
Act simply did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances.
409
Section 2511(3) thus merely sought to ensure the admissibility of
LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2182-83 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, Professor G. Robert Blakey, principal draftsman of Title III, states that
both the statute and its legislative history were intended to reflect the adoption of a neutral
stance on this issue. Telephone interview with Professor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law
School (Jan. 30, 1983); see also Criminal Law Hearings, supra note 387, at 11-12.
402 407 U.S. at 303.
403 Id.
404 See supra text accompanying note 198.
405 407 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
406 Id. at 303-04.
407 Id. at 304.
408 Furthermore, the national security provision was in a separate section from the four
specified exceptions.
409 407 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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any evidence obtained from domestic security surveillance, provided
that the procedures employed were constitutional. 4 10  Justice Powell
then proceeded to conclude that warrantless security surveillance
against American subjects was, in fact, unconstitutional, and denied the
government's request for mandamus. 4 11
Other Supreme Court decisions would acknowledge the compre-
hensive nature of Title 111.412 Within seven years, however, Title III's
exhaustive legislative design would no longer serve as a determinative
basis for analysis.
C. GELBARD V UNITED STAYES
A week after District Court, the Supreme Court issued its five to four
decision in Ge/bardv. United States.4 13 At stake was the appropriate scope
of section 2515, Title III's suppression sanction. The petitioners in
Gelbard were immunized grand jury witnesses who had been adjudicated
410 Justice Powell also cited legislative history. Id. at 306-08. Note that the ABA Stan-
dards, §§ 3.1, 3.2 commentary at 120-21 (Approved Draft 1968), from which Title III was
partially derived, did not originally authorize warrantless domestic security surveillance. Id.
at 120-21.
411 This conclusion was based upon a balancing of fourth amendment values and a close
reading of the warrant clause. 407 U.S. at 314-21. The opinion was limited to domestic
aspects of national security, and did not address surveillance of foreign powers or their agents.
Id. at 321-22. The Court, however, did suggest that the Constitution's warrant requirements
may be more flexible for domestic security surveillance than ordinary criminal surveillance.
Id. at 322-23.
Another aspect of District Court is worthy of note. Having decided that the surveillance
was illegal, Justice Powell held that Alderman required that illegally obtained conversations be
made available to the defense for taint determination purposes. 407 U.S. at 324. This direc-
tive, however, ignored language in Title III which provided that disclosure was to be a matter
ofjudicial discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), (10)(a)(iii) (1976). Alderman had not considered
this provision because the illegality at issue had antedated Title III. Nor had the Alderman
Court articulated whether disclosure was constitutionally required or merely an exercise of
judicial supervisory authority. Significantly, in 1970 Congress sought to overrule this aspect
of Alderman for pre-Title III eavesdropping by passage of Title VII of the Organized Crime
Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2) (Supp. 1982). S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 64;
see 116 CONG. REc. 35, 192-93 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff); 116 CONG. Rac. 35, 293-94
(1969) (statement of Rep. Pofi). Further amendment of Title III was unnecessary as the
original enactment adequately treated the disclosure question for post-Title III surveillance.
See 116 CONG. REC. 36, 295 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). A complete historical
analysis of this issue is set forth in the Government's initial brief in District Court. Brief for the
United States at 36-47, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). In
District Court, however, the Supreme Court, declined to reconsider the merits of its original
analysis in Alderman. 407 U.S. at 324 n.21. Consequently, the original holding of Alderman
retained vitality. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 707 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Sacco, 571 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Plotkin,
550 F.2d 693, 697-98 (1st Cir. 1977).
412 See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 416-17, 422-25, 425 n.14 (1979); United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514-17 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152-53
(1974); United States v. Gelbard, 408 U.S. 41, 51 n.10 (1972).
413 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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in civil contempt 41 4 for refusing to answer pertinent questions.4 15 They
argued on appeal that the questions had been derived from illegal elec-
tronic surveillance, thereby giving them "just cause"-a substantive de-
fense under the federal contempt statute-for declining to answer.4 16
Normally, grand jury and contempt proceedings are conducted without
regard to exclusionary principles, but petitioners were relying upon the
protective mantle of section 2515,4 17 which provides in relevant part:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived there-
from may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
414 Proper analysis requires that civil and criminal contempt be distinguished. In essence,
civil contempt is coercive in nature, since it is designed to effect compliance with a court
order. Thus, the person being coerced may purge himself of the civil contempt by complying
with the order. Until then, subject to possible due process or statutory limitations, he may be
kept in confinement. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1966). In contrast,
criminal contempt is punitive in nature, since it is imposed to vindicate the authority of the
court. Id. Consequently, once criminal contempt has been established, there is no possibility
of a purge-the misconduct in question having already occurred. See, e.g., D. DOBBs, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAv OF REMEDIES 96-98 (1973); Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (civil contempt as remedial; criminal contempt as punitive). Compare
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976) (civil contempt) with 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) (criminal con-
tempt). Note, however, that the same conduct may give rise to both criminal and civil con-
tempt. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368-72.
415 Gelbard involved an investigation of possible violations of federal gambling laws. The
Government had told the petitioners that they would be interrogated about third parties and
that the questions would be based upon intercepted telephone conversations. Petitioners re-
fused to answer any questions based on the electronic surveillance until they had a chance to
challenge its legality. They were held in contempt, and committed to custody under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a). Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 44-45. Egan v. United States, decided together with
Gelbard, involved an alleged plot to kidnap Henry Kissinger and other government officials.
The respondents were granted transactional immunity, but refused to testify, claiming that
the questions were derived from illegal electronic surveillance. They, too, were held in con-
tempt and committed to custody. Id. at 45. In Egan, the Government originally did not reply
to respondents' charges. Nevertheless, the Solicitor General advised the Supreme Court that
no electronic surveillance had occurred. Id. at 61 n.23. For a discussion of the political over-
tones of Egan, see E. LAPIDUS, supra note 216, at 184; see United States v. Ahmad, 347 F.
Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (prosecution of Berrigan Brothers).
416 408 U.S. at 46. The contempt statute provides in relevant part:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of
the United States refuses withoutjut cause shown to comply with an order of the court to
testify. . . the court, upon such refusal. . . . may summarily order his confinement at a
suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony. . . No
period of such confinement shall exceed the life of-
(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which such refusal to comply
with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen
months.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
417 Title III provides a uniquely broad suppression sanction. See supra notes 232-33 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court later expressly ruled that the Constitution does not
require application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-55 (1974).
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in or before any court [or] grandjuO, .. .if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter. 41 8
As posed, petitioner's substantive question presented the Court
with a procedural quandary because section 2518(10)(a), which pur-
ports to provide the statutory procedure for exercising the section 2515
exclusionary right, does not extend to grand jury witnesses;4 19 conse-
quently, the legality of the electronic surveillance had not been formally
adjudicated below. Nevertheless, without explanation, the Court as-
sumed that the questions propounded had, in fact, been based upon
illegal electronic surveillance and proceeded "on the premise that sec-
tion 2515 prohibits the presentation to grand juries of the compelled
tesitmony of these witnesses. ' 420 This premise soon proved to be deter-
minative of the case; for although Justice Brennan's opinion next said
that "[t]he narrow question, then, is whether under these circumstances
the witnesses may invoke . . . section 2515 as a defense to contempt
charges, '42 1 the express language of section 2515 and Congress' empha-
sis on protecting privacy by a strict exclusionary deterrent obviously
precluded a negative response. Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan
shortly concluded that "[t]he purposes of section 2515 and Title III as a
whole would be subverted were the plain command of section 2515 ig-
nored when the victim of an illegal interception is called as a witness
before a grand jury and asked questions based upon that intercep-
tion. '422 Section 2515, therefore, provided a "just cause" defense to con-
418 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976) (emphasis added).
419 Section 2518(10)(a) provides in relevant part:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, depart-
ment, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or
a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire
or oral communication or evidence therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insuffi-
cient on its face; or
(iii)the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or
approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless there was no
opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communi-
cation, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in viola-
tion of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(0)(a) (1976). Title III's legislative history expressly says that this provision
limits the operation of § 2515. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2185.
420 408 U.S. at 47.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 51. Justice Brennan went on to state:
Moreover, § 2515 serves not only to protect the privacy of communications, but also to
ensure that the courts do not become partners to illegal conduct: the evidentiary prohi-
bition was enacted also "to protect the integrity of the court and administrative proceed-
ings." Consequently, to order a grand jury witness, on pain of imprisonment, to disclose




This conclusion, flowing from its premise, is clearly unobjection-
able.423 However, it was foregone by Justice Brennan's initial assump-
tion of illegal electronic surveillance. The critical procedural question
of how the initial determination of illegality is to be made in grand jury
situtations was left unanswered.424 Consequently, Justice Rehnquist
and three other justices dissented.425
The Rehnquist dissent, noting that the eavesdropping at issue had
been by court order,426 rejected the Court's assumption of illegality and
characterized petitioners' defense as an attempt to effect a roaming dis-
covery of government files.42 7 To preclude this effort, section 2515 must
be given a narrow scope, which, Justice Rehnquist maintained, Con-
gress actually intended. Challenges to evidence presented before a grand
jury historically have been severely limited because the institution's pur-
pose and efficiency would otherwise be defeated by technical rules re-
quiring lengthy hearings for resolution. 42 8  Justice Rehnquist
tive of protecting individual privacy by excluding such evidence and to entangle the
courts in the illegal acts of Government agents.
In sum Congress simply cannot be understood to have sanctioned orders to produce
evidence excluded from grand jury proceedings by § 2515.
Id.
423 The Court also noted that both the legislative history and the plain language of 18
U.S.C. § 3504 supported the idea that grand jury witnesses could refuse to answer questions
based on illegal electronic surveillance. Id. at 52-58.
424 Indeed, the Court declined to address the question of whether a witness may even assert
this defense when there has been a court order. Id. at 61 n.22.
425 The other dissenters were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell. Jus-
tice Douglas concurred on the theory that the Constitution requires that grand jury testimony
be subject to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 62 (Douglas, J., concurring). This view was later
rejected by the Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-59 (1974).
426 Justice Rehnquist was referring only to the Gelbard case. See supra note 415. He did not
address the companion Egan case, supra note 414, because it had actually not involved elec-
tronic surveillance. Ge/bard, 408 U.S. at 72 n. 1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
427 Id. at 72. Justice Rehnquist said that the real issue in the case was: "[W]hether the
granting to these petitioners, at this particular stage of the proceedings, of sweeping discovery
as a prelude to a full hearing on the issue of alleged unlawful surveillance can fairly be in-
ferred from the enactment by Congress of the two statutes relied on the Court's opinion." Id.
at 73.
428 There have been many historical accounts of the grand jury. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 302 (1803); G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 1-44 (1906); 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-23 (1956); 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 151 (1909). The Supreme Court, however, has eloquently summarized the
grand jury's historical role and mode of operation:
The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. In Eng-
land, the grand jury served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and
present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this country the Founders
thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth
Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by "a pre-
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.". . . The grand jury's historic functions sur-
vive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether
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maintained that Congress sought to continue this practice when it omit-
ted grand jury witnesses from the section 2518(10) (a) suppression proce-
dure;429 this was purportedly further demonstrated by the legislative
commentary to section 2518(10)(a) indicating that previous limitations
on challenges to grand jury evidence were being retained. Moreover,
Congress had explained the statutory reference to grand juries in section
2515 by stating: "[i]t is the intent of this provision that when a motion to
suppress is granted in another context, its scope may include use in a future
grand jury proceeding. ' 430 Thus, reasoned Justice Rehnquist, since ille-
gality has never been established-a grand jury witness having no fo-
rum for litigating such claims-section 2515 does not afford a defense to
a contempt proceeding.
From a historical perspective, this aspect of Justice Rehnquist's ar-
gument was compelling.43 1 The majority, however, rejected this argu-
ment by reading the traditional limitations on grand jury witness rights
more narrowly and by reasoning that the grand jury omission from sec-
tion 2518(10)(a) may have reflected congressional awareness that the
section 2515 defense would be independently available at the contempt
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of
citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions ...
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into viola-
tions of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in
secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel
the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and
its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules
governing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of
investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly
by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by
doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation
of crime."
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and
effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which
the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is cxparte investigation to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings
should be instituted against any person. The grand jury's investigative power must be
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-44 (1974). See generally M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY-AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL (1977).
429 Ge/bard, 408 U.S. at 78-85.
430 Id. at 82 (emphasis added). The pertinent legislative history provides:
This provision must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517. . .which it
limits. It provides the remedy for the right created by section 2515. Because no person is
a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of
a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself. Normally, there is no
limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is
enforceable by an individual. . . . There is no intent to change this general rule. It is
the intent of the provision only that when a motion to suppress is granted in another
context, its scope may include use in a future grand jury proceeding.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2195.
431 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 279-86 (1919); see also supra note 428.
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hearing;432 consequently, there had been no need for Congress to pro-
vide a suppression remedy in the grand jury setting. On this basis, the
case was simply "remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. ' 433 No instructions were given explaining how the question of
illegality was to be determined and to what extent, if any, discovery
would be allowed. Ironically, this determination would only be difficult
when, as in Gelbard, court orders were involved; in other Title III situa-
tions, the absence of an order would automatically render the search
illegal. Only Justice White's concurring opinion explicitly offered some
guidance for handling the court order situation:
there may [then] be room for striking a different accommodation between
the due functioning of the grand jury system and the federal wiretap stat-
ute. Suppression hearings in these circumstances would result in protracted
interruption of grand jury proceedings, . . . [and] the deterrent value of
excluding the evidence. . . is marginal at best.4 34
Predictably, immunized grand jury witnesses routinely began to
raise the Gelbard objection in response to grand jury questions, and as a
defense to contempt proceedings. Two competing methods were devel-
oped by the courts of appeals regarding the discovery of electronic sur-
veillance materials when court orders were involved. In re Persico,435 a
second circuit case, originated the restrictive view that grand jury wit-
nesses were not entitled to any access. This conclusion was based upon
the absence of a statutory procedure for grand jury witnesses to exercise
their apparent section 2515 grand jury exclusionary right:
These seemingly inconsistent policy determinations can be reconciled
only by interpreting the statute as requiring exclusion only when it is clear
that a suppression hearing is necessary, as when the Government concedes
that the electronic surveillance was unlawful or when the invalidity of the
surveillance is patent, such as, for example, when no prior court order was
obtained, or when the unlawfulness of the Government's surveillance has
been established in a prior judicial proceeding. In these situations both
statutory policies-the exclusion of illegally acquired evidence and the
maintenance of unimpeded grand jury proceedings-are served.436
In other situations, the Persico court reasoned, Title III would not coun-
tenance the inevitable disruption of grand jury procedures; 437 instead,
the judge could review any surveillance documents in camera for facial
432 408 U.S. at 59-61.
433 Id. at 61.
434 Id. at 70.
435 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974).
436 Id. at 1161.
437 Id. at 1161-62. For other cases following this view, see In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197, 198
(9th Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 522 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 911 (1976); Drobach v. United States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 964 (1975). But see infra note 441.
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sufficiency. In re Persico was welcomed by prosecutors, especially since it
often allowed them to handle all matters in camera without revealing
whether any electronic surveillance had even occurred, as the grand jury
witness would not know if the prosecutor had shown the judge a court
order or merely an affidavit denying that surveillance had occurred.438
438 Under such circumstances, the government would give the grand jury witness an affida-
vit denying that any illegal electronic surveillance had taken place. Consequently, he would
not know if there had been surveillance, or whether eavesdropping had occurred but had
been effected legally. Hence, the witness is thereby deprived of what might otherwise effec-
tively be a license to commit perjury. See generally J. KwrNY, VIcIous CIRCLES 39 (1979).
This procedure, albeit in camera, arguably complies with the requirements of 18 U.S.C
§ 3504 which provides in relevant part:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury...
or other authority of the United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it is the
primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an
unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall ajinm or deny the occurrence of the alleged
unlawful act;
18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1976) (emphasis added). See TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF THE RECALCITRANT
WITNESS, § F.I1 (G. Blakey, R. Goldstock & A. Campriella eds. (1977)); United States v.
Pacella, 622 F.2d 640, 640-42 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. People v. Einhorn, 74 Misc. 2d 958, 960, 346
N.Y.S.2d 326, 329-30 (N.Y. County Ct. 1973), af'd 35 N.Y.2d 948, 948-49, 365 N.Y.S.2d 171,
171-72, 324 N.E.2d 551, 552 (1974) (state criminal contempt proceeding for which § 3504
inapplicable); People v. Briendel, 73 Misc. 2d 734, 739, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (N.Y. County
Ct. 1973), afd, 45 A.D.2d 691, 356 N.Y.S. 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), af'd, 35 N.Y.2d 928,
365 N.Y.S.2d 163, 324 N.E.2d 545 (1974) ("the People are under no obligation to disclose to a
grand jury witness that the questions about to be propounded are the product of electronic
surveillance . . . . Providing an uncooperative or hostile witness with the type of informa-
tion requested. . . permits him to tailor his testimony to matters already known to the grand
jury, thereby defeating the purpose of calling him"). But see NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, REPRE-
SENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES § 12.8(d) (2d ed. 1978) (sug-
gesting § 3504 requires more definitive response, rather than merely prosecutor's opinion).
Since Ge/bard, federal case law has failed to address this issue. The second circuit has
often been able to avoid addressing it by holding that the claim of illegality "may not be
based upon mere suspicion but must at least appear to have a 'colorable' basis before it may
function to trigger the government's obligation to respond under § 3504." United States v.
Pacella, 622 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1137-
38 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant must make colorable claim of electronic surveillance). Most
jurisdictions, however, hold that a mere assertion of illegality is sufficient to trigger a govern-
ment response. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 226 (1978). Even so, a
specific response acknowledging the occurrence of eavesdropping may not be required if the
claim of illegality is too general. See general'y United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 989 (5th
Cir. 1977). Ultimately, however, most courts apparently assume that § 3504 requires explicit
disclosure of whether any electronic surveillance has taken place. See In re Grand Jury, 683
F.2d 66, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d at 989. This approach ignores
both the risk that disclosure will result in perjured testimony and the fact that most witnesses
are more interested in gaining assurance that no eavesdropping has occurred than in con-
testing its legality. The right to such disclosure is not constitutionally protected, Taglianetti
v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969), nor is it required by the explicit terms of§ 3504. Pres-
ently, however, such disclosure in the context of civil contempt proceedings seems mandated
by § 2518(9). See infra notes 443-51 and accompanying text.
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Other jurisdictions, however, led by the first circuit in In re Lochiatto,439
interpreted Gelbard as necessarily allowing at least "a limited challenge"
to the electronic surveillance, 440 and consequently have required the dis-
closure of the application for surveillance, supporting affidavit, court or-
der, and a government affidavit indicating the period of
eavesdropping;44 1 provision is made for in camera deletion of sensitive
information.44 2 The defendant is then permitted to mount a facial chal-
lenge based upon these documents.
Neither approach, however, and particularly In re Persico, is analyti-
cally true to the language of Title III. Had the Supreme Court ap-
proached Gelbard with greater precision, a different analysis would have
been considered. In attempting to discount Justice Rehnquist's empha-
sis on the conflict between section 2515 rights and section 2518(10)(a)
suppression procedures, the majority opinion noted congressional aware-
ness that grand jury issues routinely are resolved at contempt proceed-
ings.44 3 Justice Brennan, however, failed to pursue explicitly the major
implication of his observation that section 2518(10) (a) is independently
available to raise the section 2515 defense in a civil contempt proceed-
ing. Specifically, although the section 2515 exclusionary sanction may
not be asserted via section 2518(10) (a) in a grand jury setting, the latter
provision is still fully applicable "in any ... proceeding in or before
any court. . . of the United States." 44 4 Since a civil contempt proceed-
ing would clearly fit this definition, the defendant is entitled to assert
this right in that forum. Thus, not only was the alleged illegal electronic
surveillance a substantive "just cause" defense under the contempt stat-
ute, section 2518(10)(a) provides the defendant with aprocedural means
for applying section 2515 to preclude the prosecutor from introducing
into evidence at the contempt proceeding the material question upon
which the contempt finding must be based.44 5
439 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974).
4 4 0 Id. at 807.
441 Cases following this view include In re Grand Jury Proceedings (McElhinney), 677 F.2d
738 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Demonte, 667 F.2d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Harkins, 624 F.2d
1160, 1166 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katasourous), 613 F.2d 1171, 1175
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Melickian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416, 420 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
986 (1977).
442 See, e.g., In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 807-08 (1st Cir. 1974).
443 408 U.S. at 60-61. See supra text accompanying note 432. Traditionally, however, the
limited issues that recalcitrant grand jury witness have been permitted to assert at the con-
tempt proceeding have not required extensive litigation. See generally M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, supra note 428, at 19-21.
44 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 418.
445 See In re Hitson, 177 F. Supp. 834, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1957), rev'don other grounds, 283 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1960) (requiring pertinent question to be introduced into evidence at contempt
proceeding). NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 438, § 16.4(a). Since most civil contempts
are uncontested in terms of what actually occurred in the grand jury room, most counsel
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Moreover, this analysis provides a more definitive basis for resolv-
ing the discovery issue because, under section 2518(9), the government is
required to make certain key divulgences as a prerequisite to admissibil-
ity or other courtroom disclosure. 4 4 6 Thus, at the very least, the defend-
apparently have not realized that the government may have to introduce formal proof on this
issue at the contempt proceeding.
The interpretation suggested in the text is consistent with § 2518(a), see infra note 446
and accompanying text, and with the most recent congressional pronouncement in this area.
Specifically, a similar result is effected by Senate Bill 1630, a bill proposing to recodify the
federal criminal code but which, nevertheless, purports to continue most of existing law in the
electronic surveillance area. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 11, 3107(d) (1982). See REPORT
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM AcT OF 1981,S. REP.
No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1075, 1087-89 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON CRIMI-
NAL CODE REFORM]; see also infia notes 928-33 and accompanying text.
446 Section 2518(9) provides:
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chap-
ter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed
in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party,
not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a
copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception
was authorized or approved. This ten day period may be waived by the judge if he finds
that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information ten days before
the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in
receiving such information.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976). Presumably, the notice provisions governing civil and criminal
contempt proceedings would have to accommodate this ten day rule. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
42(b), 45(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d); cf. United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir.
1973). Significantly, § 2 51 8 (a) is consistent with the proposed interpretation of§ 2518(10)(a).
Note that, to some extent, there is a conflict between the ten day rule and the flexibility
provided for in § 2518 (8)(d) with respect to postponing delivery of inventory notice for "good
cause" shown. Since the flexibility of § 2518(8)(d) is designed to preserve the investigation's
secrecy, the disclosure rule of§ 2518(9) would appear somewhat inconsistent with this policy.
However, once a grand jury inquiry has commenced and targets have been subpoenaed, the
investigation's secrecy has already been compromised. At that point, further eavesdropping
would rarely prove effective since the targets suspecting surveillance can be expected to act
with extreme caution. (Under some circumstances, however, witnesses may be subpoenaed
for purposes of stimulating conversations-i.e. "tickling the wire." See NWC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 151).
The proposed analysis was rejected as "superficially plausible" but "unrealistic" in In re
Persico. The Second Circuit viewed the contempt hearing as "so intimately connected with
the grand jury proceedings in which testimony is desired as to be really a part of those pro-
ceedings." 491 F.2d at 1162. In re Persico noted that Title III's legislative history provides that
"lilt is the intent of [§ 2 518(10)(a)] only that when a motion to suppress is granted in another
context, its scope may include use in afiture grand jury proceeding." Id. at 1161. Based upon
this language, the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress did not intend the suppression sanc-
tion to extend to "a contenporaneous civil contempt proceeding." Id. at 1162. This analysis,
however, directly ignores the language of § 2518(10)(a). While the contempt action may be
contemporaneous with the grand jury inquiry, it is nevertheless a functionally distinct pro-
ceeding within the clear language of § 2518(10)(a). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61
(1906) (grand jury not appointed for the prosecutor or for the court). Moreover, the court's
reliance upon the legislative history's reference to future grand jury proceedings is mistaken.
In relative terms, once the contempt issue has been resolved, any subsequent grand jury action
would be a future proceeding within the meaning of Title III's legislative history. See supra
note 430. Furthermore, this aspect of the legislative history is concerned with negating sup-
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ant would have to be provided a copy of the court order and
accompanying application. Disclosure of other materials would then be
left to the judge's discretion under Title III's regular discovery rule.44 7
Similarly, the judge would determine the scope of the suppression hear-
ing which, in appropriate cases, could be narrowly restricted by virtue of
a defendant's limited discovery rights; consequently ancillary grand jury
proceedings would not be unduly interrupted. 44a In practice, the proce-
dure would be closely akin to In re Lochiallo449 but would have the virtue
of statutory precision. From a prosecutor's tactical perspective, the pro-
posed analysis is undesirable because it virtually guarantees grand jury
witnesses a means of determining whether electronic surveillance has
taken place, thereby allowing them to tailor their testimony accord-
ingly.450 Moreover, it gives immunized witnesses important information
that can be shared with criminal compatriots. 45 1 Nevertheless, this re-
sult seems compelled by the statutory language of both section 2518(9)
and section 2518(10)(a).
In Gebard, however, the Court instead chose to make an unex-
plained critical assumption which, under any statutory circumstances,
would be directly dispositive of the case. This was accomplished in a
manner that both overlooked applicable provisions of Title III and gave
pression motions in a grand jury proceeding, whereas the proposed analysis is concerned with
such a motion in a contempt proceeding. But see In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197, 198-99 (5th Cir.
1976).
447 Section 2518(8)(d) provides in relevant part: "IT]hejudge, upon the filing of a motion,
may in his discretion make available to such person or his counsel for inspection such portions
of the intercepted communications, applications and orders as the judge determines to be in
the interest ofjustice." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976);see alro 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976).
448 For a survey of differing approaches taken with respect to discovery rights, see J. CARR,
supra note 18, at 416-18. In this respect, Title III drafters indicated that suppression motions
were not intended to serve as vehicles for unlimited discovery. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra
note 111, at 2195-96.
449 Under the proposed analysis, the defendant does not receive automatic access to the
affidavit supporting the application or to an affidavit disclosing the length of surveillance.
Even under In re Lochiallo, however, disclosure is potentially subject to secrecy limitations. See
supra notes 439-42 and accompanying text.
450 In re Special February, 1977 Grand Jury, 570 F.2d 674, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 437
U.S. 904 (1978). Conceivably, however, the In re Persico approach would retain vitality when
criminal, rather than civil, contempt proceedings are contemplated. Criminal contempt, of
course, is designed to punish previous misconduct before the court rather than to compel
compliance with a pending judicial directive. This would be dependent upon whether the
jurisdiction involved requires disclosure of the predicate question at a separate judicial hear-
ing as a prerequisite to a criminal contempt prosecution. If not, the recalcitrant witness
would not be able to rely upon § 2518(10)(a) until the actual criminal contempt trial (when
the predicate question must be introduced into evidence), or, more appropriately, until a
pretrial suppression motion can be filed. By then, however, it would no longer be possible to
purge himself of the original misconduct. See Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 688-89 (5th Cir.
1974); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 97-98 (1973). As yet, no court has addressed this issue.
451 In re Special February, 1977 Grand Jury, 570 F.2d at 678; J. CARR, supra note 18, at 30.
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the lower courts no direction on how to handle a procedural dilemma
which potentially precluded effective implementation of the statutory
scheme.
D. UNITED STATES V GIORDA4NO AND UNITED STATES V CHAVEZ
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to give lower courts direc-
tion in a substantive context with its decisions in United States v. Gior-
dano452 and United States v. Chavez. 453 Each case arose by virtue of the
Department of Justice's failure to comply, during Title III's early years,
with section 2516(l)'s requirement that any federal eavesdropping ap-
plication initially be approved by the Attorney General or a specially
designated Assistant Attorney General. 454  From 1968 through late
1971, Justice Department eavesdropping applications professed to have
been authorized by Will Wilson, Attorney General Mitchell's specially
designated Assistant Attorney General.455 When litigation later estab-
lished that Wilson had never reviewed or authorized any of these appli-
cations, the Justice Department maintained that they had actually been
sanctioned by Attorney General Mitchell---either directly or through his
executive assistant.45 6 However, because government memoranda filed
in Court suggested that Attorney General Mitchell had merely desig-
nated Wilson as the authorizing official, defense attorneys throughout
the country doubted that Attorney General Mitchell had really author-
ized these applications; 457 moreover, counsel contended that those appli-
cations purportedly approved through Attorney General Mitchell's
executive assistant improperly exceeded the Attorney General's scope of
delegation under section 2516(1). Hence, the Giordano litigation devel-
oped when it became apparent that Attorney General Mitchell's signa-
452 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
453 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
454 Section 2516(1) provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the
Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent juris-
diction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an
order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications ...
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
455 For a detailed description of Justice Department authorization procedures, see Pulaski,
supra note 15, at 755-61. Professor Pulaski's article also provides an excellent comprehensive
discussion of issues related to this case.
456 Id. at 759-60, 762-64.
457 The memorandum signed by Attorney General Mitchell purported only to designate
Wilson as the authorizing official, but in each case the Department of Justice nevertheless
maintained that the memorandum constituted the actual grant of authorization for applica-
tion. Inconsistencies in the Justice Department position are superbly critiqued by Professor
Pulaski. Id. at 768 n.51, 794-802, 794 n.184, 789 n.203, 810, 817. The government may have




ture on a so-called authorization memorandum had been affixed by
order of his executive assistant, who routinely reviewed and approved
authorization requests when Mitchell was away from Washington. 45 By
contrast, in Chavez the Justice Department contended that Attorney
General Mitchell in fact had personally approved the surveillance re-
quest at issue.459 Defendants maintained, however, that the resulting
wiretap was nevertheless illegal under section 2518(1) because the appli-
cation had misrepresented the authorizing official to be Wilson. 460
Since the Department of Justice had regularly followed these procedures
between 1968 and 1971, Giordano and Chavez stood to have substantial
immediate impact: Attorney General Mitchell's failure personally to
authorize applications involved sixty cases and 626 defendants; misiden-
tification of the authorizing official had occurred in ninety-nine other
cases involving 807 defendants. 461 Beyond that, however, Giordano and
Chavez potentially raised a question of long term consequences: whether
suppression is mandated for all Title III violations without regard to
severity of the wrong.
The government's argument in Giordano-that, under the delega-
tion powers of 28 U.S.C. § 510,462 authorization by the Attorney Gen-
eral's executive assistant constituted compliance with Title III-was
promptly and correctly rejected by a unanimous Court.463 Emphasizing
that the statute's comprehensive nature was indicative of Congress' con-
cern that electronic surveillance be used with restraint, Justice White
observed that the section 2516 authorization requirement was designed
to impose "[t]he mature judgment of a particular responsible Depart-
ment of Justice official . . .as a critical precondition to any judicial
order.''464 This interpretation was supported by abundant legislative
history which clearly viewed section 2516 as promoting restraint by cen-
tralizing eavesdropping responsibility in a politically accountable gov-
ernment official. 465 Since the Attorney General's executive assistant
does not fall into this category, Justice White concluded that the pur-
458 Giordano, 416 U.S. at 510. See Pulaski, supra note 15, at 763-66.
459 416 U.S. at 512-13.
460 Id. at 564-69. Section 2518(1) provides in relevant part: "Each application shall pro-
vide the following information: (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer
making the application, and the ofter authorizing the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)
(1976) (emphasis added).
461 416 U.S. at 599 (Douglas, J., concurring).
462 Section 510 provides: "The Attorney General may from time to time make such provi-
sions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee,
or agency, of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General," 28 U.S.C.
§ 501 (1976).
463 416 U.S. at 512-23.
464 Id. at 515-16.
465 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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pose of section 2516 would be defeated by allowing the Attorney Gen-
eral to delegate his authority in a manner inconsistent with the narrowly
tailored mandate of section 2516.466
This resolution generated a critical suppression issue because the
government next argued that Title III did not mandate exclusion for
statutory violations of this kind.4 67 This contention was based upon a
very restricted reading of section 2518(10)(a), the procedural counter-
part to section 2515. Section 2518(10(a) allowed suppression motions to
be made on the following grounds: "(i) the communication was unlaw-
fully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the intercep-
tion was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or ap-
proval. '468 Improper authorization, the government maintained, was
not a basis for suppression because it does not fall within the statutory
violations specified in paragraphs (ii) and (iii). Paragraph (i) was also
deemed inapplicable as supposedly reaching only constitutional viola-
tions. 469 The limited scope of paragraph (i) was, of course, basic to this
argument, but the government insisted that any broader interpretation
extending that provision to statutory violations would render
paragraphs (ii) and (iii) redundant.4 70
While ready to acknowledge that this argument had "sub-
stance," 47' the Court nevertheless found it unavailing:
[lilt does not necessarily follow, and we cannot believe, that no statutory
infringements whatsoever are also unlawful interceptions within the mean-
ing of paragraph (i). The words "unlawfully intercepted" are themselves
not limited to constitutional violations, and we think Congress intended to
require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory
requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to
limit the use of intercept procedures to those situtations clearly calling for the employ-
ment of this extraordinaiy inestigative device.472
Accordingly, since authorization by the Attorney General or a specially
designated Assistant Attorney General was considered "central" to the
statutory scheme, suppression was mandated. 4 73 This analysis ultimately
466 416 U.S. at 523.
467 Id. at 524.
468 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976). For the full text of§ 2518(10)(a), see supra note 419.
469 416 U.S. at 526.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 527.
472 Id.
473 Id. at 528-29. On this basis, derivative evidence flowing from an extension order of the
original authorization was likewise suppressed. Id. at 529-33. The Court seemed to adopt a
"per se" taint analysis, without examining whether the extension order in fact had been inde-
pendently derived. See J. CARR, supra note 18, at 369. The underlying rationale for this
approach, which deviates from traditional attenuation analysis, is set forth and properly criti-
cized in Professor Carr's treatise. Id. Seegeneral'y Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
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was dispositive of Chavez as well, albeit with a different result. There,
the Court acknowledged that misrepresenting the authorizing official in
the electronic surveillance application violated the identification re-
quirement of section 2518(10)(a), but denied suppression because this
provision was not considered central to the statutory scheme: "No role
more significant than a reporting function designed to establish on pa-
per that one of the major procedural protections of Title III had been
properly accomplished is apparent. '474 Furthermore, Chavez suggested
that even violations of so-called central requirements do not compel sup-
pression so long as the statutory purpose underlying that provision has
still been met.4 75
Justice Douglas, joined by three other justices, dissented in Chavez,
largely because he feared that the decision would allow lower courts to
suppress for statutory violations on a "pick and choose" basis. 4 76 Ac-
cording to Justice Douglas, the exclusionary language of section 2515 is
unqualified in terms of the violation involved, especially when read in
light of section 2511 (1) and section 2517(3), which similarly prohibited
disclosure unless there had been compliance with every statutory re-
quirement. 47 7 This interpretation was further supported by a legislative
history which emphasized the need for strict enforcement of the stat-
ute.478 Moreover, Justice Douglas also had a persuasive response to the
488 (1963) (recognizing prevailing standard: "whether, granting establishment of the pri-
mary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by the
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint").
474 416 U.S. at 579.
475 d. at 572-74; see United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974).
476 416 U.S. at 584-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The other dissenters were Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stewart.
477 Specifically, after citing the broad language of § 2515, Justice Douglas further argued:
The Court ... disregards two sections of Title III explicitly dealing with disclosure in
determining when disclosure is in fact "in violation of" Title III. Section 2511(1), which
provides criminal penalties for willful violations of Title III, prohibits in § 2511 (1)(c)
knowing disclosure of communications intercepted in violation of subsection (1), and the
subsection prohibits interception "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter." Section 2517(3) authorizes the disclosure in a criminal proceeding of informa-
tion received "by any means authorized by this chapter" or of evidence derived from a
communication "intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." The
statute does not distinguish between the various provisions of the Title, and it seems
evident that disclosure is "in violation of" Title III when there has not been compliance
with any of its requirements.
Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly, Professor Carr has suggested that § 2517(3) is
the "obverse" of § 2515, and is, therefore, a prerequisite to admissibility. J. CARR, supra note
18, §§ 6.03(1), 7.04(3). While some sections of Title III are actually evidentiary prerequisites
to admissibility, see supra note 446 and injfa notes 867 & 918 and accompanying text, neither
§ 2515 nor § 2517(3) may be characterized in this manner, since both are limited by the
procedural scope of§ 2518(10)(a). See supra note 419.
478 416 U.S. at 596-98; see supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
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majority's concern that any other analysis would have rendered
paragraphs (ii) and (iii) redundant:
The choice seems to be between attributing to Congress a degree of
excessive cautiousness which led to some redundancy in drafting the pro-
tective provisions of section 2518(10)(a), or foolishness which led Congress
to enact statutory provisions for law enforcement officials to scurry about
satisfying when it did not consider the provisions significant enough to en-
force by suppression. In view of the express prohibition by section 2515 of
disclosure of information "in violation of" the chapter, I would opt for the
conclusion that Congress was excessively cautious and that "unlawfully in-
tercepted" means what it says.4 7 9
Finally, Justice Douglas argued that even under the majority's central-
ity test, suppression was warranted as the identification requirement, in
fact, "directly and substantially" implemented an important congres-
sional limitation on the use of electronic surveillance. 480
Commentators uniformly agreed with Justice Douglas' analysis. 48 1
The government's narrow construction of section 2518(10)(a) was re-
jected as unduly rigid,482 and the Court's response was criticized for
neither eliminating the apparent redundancy4 3 nor abiding by lan-
guage in Ge/bard which had recognized that disclosure under Title III
was contingent upon conformity with all of the statute's "stringent con-
ditions."4 8 4 Other aspects of the opinion's analysis were also criticized.
For example, the Court uncritically assumed that Attorney General
Mitchell had, in fact, authorized the Chavez application, rather than
merely having designated Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson to
perform this function;48 5 likewise, the apparently intentional nature of
the government's violation was given virtually no consideration. 48 6
Most of these criticisms were quite valid. At the very least, the
Court should not have countenanced a violation which may have been
criminal in nature. 48 7 The court of appeals in Chavez had found that the
479 416 U.S. at 586.
480 Id. at 587.
481 See J. CARR, supra note 18, § 6.02(3); Pulaski, supra note 15, at 787-88.
482 See J. CARR, supra note 18, at 344-45; Pulaski, supra note 15, at 783.
483 For example, unless paragraphs (ii) and (iii) are limited to noncentral statutory viola-
tions, the Court's analysis still deprives them of independent significance. See Pulaski, supra
note 15, at 783-84. Subsequent cases, however, have nevertheless interpreted paragraph (ii)
as applying only to central violations. See United States v. Swan, 526 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1975).
484 Pulaski, supra note 15, at 782; see Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972).
485 See supra note 457.
486 Pulaski, supra note 15, at 789-98.
487 Section 2511 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication . ..
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government's misrepresentation had been executed carefully in a man-
ner which created an illusion of statutory compliance.4 8  Similarly,
courts in other cases condemned Justice Department documents filed
between 1968 and 1971 for creating an elaborate "paper charade" 489
designed to mislead the judiciary.490 One commentator has suggested
that this pattern of institutional deception was motivated by a desire "to
foster the appearance of scrupulous compliance with section 2516(1)
while actually employing a procedure which it regarded as more bu-
reaucratically desirable than that which the statute required."'491 The
Supreme Court, however, could conceive of no motive for deliberate
misrepresentation, and chose to ignore the possibility that both the inter-
ceptions and disclosure in court may have constituted separate viola-
tions of Title III's criminal prohibitions.492 The fact that conventional
search warrants had been suppressed in some jurisdictions for inten-
tional misrepresentations of nonmaterial facts was never considered. 493
Nevertheless, while this aspect of Chavez may properly be condemned,
the centrality test established in Giordano was actually consistent with
legislative design. In Giordano, however, the standard was derived from
a fundamentally mistaken mode of analysis, forced upon the Court by
its desire to avoid a statutory redundancy. Moreover, in Chavez, the
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any
wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection...
Shall be fined no more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976).
488 416 U.S. at 590-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
489 United States v. Lanese, 385 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
490 Pulaski, supra note 15, at 778-79, 789-92; see United States v. Chavez, 478 F.2d 512, 515
(9th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 502
(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Marder, 362 F. Supp. 484, 486
(S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 496 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sklaroff, 362 F. Supp.
478, 483-84 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Stanley,
360 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (N.D. Ga. 1973),reu'd, 496 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 55 (S.D. Fla. 1973), re'dper curiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974)
(en banc).
491 Pulaski, supra note 15, at 792. For what seems to be a more plausible explanation, see
supra note 457.
492 See supra note 487.
493 See supra note 486. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that proof of intentional or
reckless misrepresentations would not require suppression of evidence seized under a tradi-
tional search unless the misstatement was essential to the probable cause determination.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-76 (1978). Therefore, by analogy, it now appears clear
that the fourth amendment does not require suppression for intentional nonmaterial viola-
tions of Title III. Nevertheless, at least on its face, Title III does not make such a distinction.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2515, 2517. In any event, the alleged intentional misconduct in Chavez
hardly can be said to pertain to a nonmaterial statutory provision. See infra notes 505-10 and
accompanying text.
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standard was blatantly misapplied. 494
Professor Carr's treatise accurately observes that the centrality test
represented acceptance of the "harmless error concept proposed by a
1968 draft of the American Bar Association-s Standards Relatig to Electronic
Surveillance but discarded prior to final adoption. '495 Professor Carr is
generally critical of the centrality test,496 and notes that the harmless
error principle "was implicity rejected for constitutional violations by
Mapp v. Ohio .497 Both Carr and other commentators suggest that virtu-
ally any statutory violation should be a basis for suppression.498 Never-
theless, a sound basis existed for applying a harmless error analysis to
electronic surveillance litigation-albeit a basis not recognized by the
Supreme Court in Giordano and Chavez. Although Title III was intended
to be exclusive with regard to electronic surveillance, it did not restrict
the independent operation of the federal harmless error statute. Thus,
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2111 seems directly applicable: "On the
hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to er-
rors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. '49 9
Admittedly, Title III does not contain any harmless error language.
The existence of 28 U.S.C. § 2111, however, obviously made such a pro-
vision unnecessary. Since Title III was derived, at least in part, from the
ABA Standards, 5°° the following analysis contained in the ABA report
may explain why Congress would have regarded a harmless error ap-
proach desirable:
While recognizing the validity of the principle of a suppression sanc-
tion, the standard also recognizes that not all violations of rules and proce-
dures should be treated in the same fashion. Some go to the essence of
privacy, for example, resort to a magistrate. . . . Others in comparison
are only of peripheral significance, for example, presenting the showing of
probable cause orally rather than in writing. . . . "It is a kind of
quackery in government," as 4 Blackstone Commentaries 16 (Beacon ed.) says,
"and argues a wont of solid skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the
ultimum suppliciun, to every case of difficulty." Consequently, the standard
494 See Pulaski,supra note 15, at 783-85;see also supra notes 468-74 & 479 and accompanying
text.
495 J. CARR, supra note 18, at 355.
496 Id. at 355-57.
497 Id. at 355.
498 See Pulaski, supra note 15, at 782-83. Professor Carr, however, would not require sup-
pression in cases of "de minimis" violations such as obvious clerical mistakes. See J. CARR,
supra note 18, at § 6.03(3)(a).
499 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); cf. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (adopted in 1975 but said to reflect
pre-existing law). For a brief discussion of the legislative history underlying this provision, see
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757-63 (1946).
500 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 456-57; see also supra notes 232 & 378.
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embodies a harmless error rule .... [28] U.S.C. section 2111 (1964).
The rule is designed to apply, of course, not at trial, but during the process
of the use of the electronic surveillance techniques themselves.5 ° '
A harmless error provision was omitted from the ABA's Final Stan-
dards, but only because a specific provision was considered unneccesary;
individual determinations were to be handled on a case by case basis. 50 2
Moreover, the deletion was not effected until 1971; consequently, the
provision in the 1968 draft version may still have impacted upon Title
III draftsmen.50 3 Finally, the Supreme Court's implicit rejection of the
harmless error doctrine with respect to constitutional violations com-
mited during the investigative process has no bearing in this instance,
since the doctrine is being applied only to statutory violations of non-
constitutional dimension.
Nor does the legislative history suggest that harmless error, as codi-
fied in 28 U.S.C. § 2111, was inapplicable to Title 111.504 Certainly, em-
phasis on strict enforcement does not compel suppression for every
statutory violation, however minor. Even given the broad deterrence
remedy provided by Title III, strict judicial enforcement requires only
that the significance of each violation be carefully evaluated in terms of
its underlying policy considerations; neither general nor specific deter-
rence are furthered by suppressing for minor violations which occa-
sioned no prejudice and were not marked by prosecutorial bad faith.50 5
501 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 119 (some citations omitted). By analogy, in 1966,
the American Law Institute took a similar position with regard to illegally obtained state-
ments: A statement "shall not be excluded from evidence if the court finds that the violation
which would render the statement otherwise inadmissible was insubstantial and resulted from
error excusable under the circumstances." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 9.10 commentary at 77-78 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). The Institute reasoned that the
exclusionary rule could not deter minor accidents and oversights occasioned in good faith. Set
id. The "substantiality test" devised by the Code, however, was somewhat broader than the
"harmless error" doctrine that traditionally applied to evidence erroneously admitted at trial.
Thus, the "substantiality test" took into consideration the "effect upon the system," whereas
"harmless error" was concerned only with "the prejudicial effect, or lack thereof, of errone-
ously allowing such evidence to be used in a particular case." MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 commentary at 407 (1975); see alSo TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note I11, at 104.
502 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 9 (Proposed Final Draft, 1971).
503 Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (providing for harmless error standards comparable to § 2111).
504 On the contrary, the legislative history indicates that the scope of the suppression sanc-
tion is not to be expanded in every respect. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2185;
see supra note 232.
505 The Supreme Court, for example, has indicated that the exclusionary principle "is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deter-
rent effect." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (emphasis added). Hence,
"application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served." Id.; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3 (1978).
This approach is also reflected in the American Law Institute's most recent commentary on
criminal procedure. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 150.5,290.2 com-
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's analysis in Giordano and Chavez
did not expressly reflect any of these considerations. Section 2111 was
not mentioned, and no explicit consideration was given to questions of
prejudice and willfulness, both factors which should normally be impor-
tant in determining whether substantial rights have been violated.50 6
mentary at 394-401, 563 (1975) (declining to suppress for insubstantial violations); see a/so
supra note 501.
Note that there is a possible argument that the drafters of Title III intended to suppress
only for willful statutory violations. Under this construction, § 2515 is not triggered unless
there has been a willfully wrong interception (and knowledge thereof by the disclosing party)
within the meaning of Title III's criminal prohibition set forth in § 2511 (1)(c). See Pulaski,
supra note 15, at 786-87. Professor G. Robert Blakey, principal draftsman of Title III, main-
tains that this is what Congress intended when the statute was written, and, indeed, this
approach clearly had been adopted in Senate Bill 675, one of Title III's main predecessors.
See S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 137, §§ 3, 4, at 75-
76. Cnminal Law Hearingssupra note 387, at 6 (§ 3 of Senate Bill 2198). According to Profes-
sor Blakey, since the § 2515 suppression remedy applies when "disclosure [of the surveillance]
information would be in violation of this chapter," reference must then be made to § 2511 as
the parallel provision which defines when disclosure is in violation of Title III. Professor
Blakey further states that although § 2518(10)(a) does not expressly refer to willfulness, the
provision is procedural in nature, and, therefore, merely assumes the substantive law else-
where in Title III. Telephone interview with Professor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law
School (Mar. 6, 1982). In some respects, this approach is actually broader than the centrality
test because suppression appears to be mandated regardless of whether the violation is minor
in nature. Most often, however, this analysis would serve to save evidence from suppression,
since relatively few violations are willful. Nevertheless, Professor Blakey asserts that this re-
sult is desirable: "We agree that strict liability is bad for defendants. Why then do we impose
strict liability standards upon the police?" Id. Professor Blakey indicates, however, that since
the Supreme Court has not adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the will-
fulness approach was only intended to apply to violations of nonconstitutional dimensions.
Id. See generally, LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World. On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and Good Faith, 43 PITT. L. REv. 307 (1982).
Regardless of the possible merits of this approach from a policy standpoint, it is inconsis-
tent with important language in Title III. For example, § 2517, which governs when disclo-
sure may occur, is not qualified by any willfulness language. Similarly, § 2518(10)(a), while
procedural in nature, lists bases for suppression which clearly seem to be operative regardless
of subjective good faith. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii)(iii) (1976). See supra note 419. Given the
dramatic shift from traditional analysis this approach would have occasioned, it is likely that
Congress would have made its intent clear, both in the statutory language and the legislative
history, had such a result been intended. While this approach does appear in Senate Bill 675,
it is not present in Senate Bill 2050, the other major congressional predecessor to Title III. S.
2050, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Controlling Crime Hearings, supra at 1001. See generally ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 113; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 111, at 108-11.
Finally, from a policy standpoint, the willfulness analysis ignores the potential prejudice
to a victim of a nonconstitutional violation, thereby diminishing statutory protections. See
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 1055 (statement of Professor Richard Uviller); J. CARR,
supra note 18, at 670. This question must be considered anew in the context of recent propos-
als to effect a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See LaFave, supra, at 336-37.
Interestingly, at least one state adopting such an approach has specifically exempted elec-
tronic surveillance from its operation. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925(e), noted in 31 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2101 (Apr. 20, 1982).
506 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(4) commentary at 406-
07, 565-66 (1975).
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Moreover, the Court's conclusion in Chavez that no central provision
had been abridged reflected a disingenuously narrow statutory interpre-
tation. As Justice Douglas established in his dissent, immediate and ac-
curate certification of responsibility for eavesdropping authorization is
important to prevent subsequent disavowals. 50 7 In Chavez, Attorney
General Mitchell acknowledged after the fact that he had authorized
the surveillance, but he had every reason to do so; the surveilance had
been successful and otherwise properly executed. 508 Moreover, had
Mitchell not acknowledged his authorization in these cases and others,
hundreds of defendants might have gone free. 50 9 The purpose of the
immediate identification requirement, however, was to fix responsibility
for the surveillance without regard to its significance as subsequently
developed.510 Thus, the requirement was hardly minor to the statutory
scheme.
Concerning potential ramifications of its centrality standard, the
Justices cautioned "that strict adherence by the Government would
nonetheless be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has
imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic
surveillance is sought." 511 Nevertheless, it was now clear that not all Ti-
tle III violations were suppressible, and critics predicted that the central-
ity test would not be uniformly applied by lower courts. 512 Indeed, the
Supreme Court soon had difficulty in United States v. Donovan513 in apply-
ing that standard to Title III's target identification and inventory re-
quirements. The statutory issue in Donovan, however, was foreshadowed
by some unexpected constitutional dicta in United States v. Kahn.514
E. ZNITED STATES V KAHN AND UNITED STATES V. DONOVAN
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kahn "to resolve a seem-
ingly important issue" of statutory construction,5 15 but its ultimate dis-
postion of the case had constitutional implications beyond that of any
prior Title III decision. Title III requires that, if known, the identity of
targets to be intercepted must be specified in the application and or-
der.5 16 Consequently, federal agents investigating gambling activity in
Chicago had obtained an eavesdropping order authorizing the intercep-
507 416 U.S. at 590-94.
508 Id. at 591.
509 See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
510 J. CARR, supra note 18, at 164-66; Pulaski, supra note 15, at 754-55.
511 416 U.S. at 580.
512 See Pulaski, supra note 15, at 821.
515 429 U.S. 413 (1977). See infra notes 561-95 and accompanying text.
514 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
515 Id. at 150.
516 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1976).
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tion of "wire communications of Irving Kahn and others as yet un-
known." '5 17 During the course of surveillance, two gambling related calls
made by Irving Kahn from Arizona to his wife in Chicago were inter-
cepted; agents also intercepted gambling related calls made by Mrs.
Kahn to a third party in Chicago. 518 On appeal, the Kahns maintained
that none of these calls properly were subject to surveillance since Mrs.
Kahn was, in fact, known to the agents and, therefore, could not have
been unknown within the meaning of Title III or the order.51 9 A further
argument, concerning the third party calls made by Mrs. Kahn, main-
tained that the eavesdropping order only authorized the seizure of calls
to which Mr. Kahn was a party.520 The constitutionality of the "others
as yet unknown" clause was not before the Supreme Court. 52 1
Two subsections of section 2518 had to be interpreted to determine
whether Mrs. Kahn was a person "as yet unknown" under Title III. In
pertinent part, section 2518(l)(b)(iv) provides that "[e]ach application
shall include . . . the identity of the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted"; 52 2 a corre-
sponding provision for orders, section 2518(4)(a), requires that "[e]ach
order. . . shall specify. . . the identity of the person, if known, whose
communications are to be intercepted. '52 3 In an effort to limit the scope
of surveillance, the court of appeals had interpreted these subsections, as
applied to the language in the Kahn order, to mean that a person was
not unknown if prior careful investigation would have revealed that he
was probably using the subject telephone for illegal activities. 524
"Known," in other words, meant actual knowledge or reasonably dis-
coverable complicity;52 5 once a person was "known" under this stan-
dard, his conversations could not be seized unless his identity had been
specified in both the application and order. The court of appeals ac-
517 415 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
518 Id.
519 Id. at 149-50. The thrust of this argument was twofold. First, since Mrs. Kahn was
arguably "known," her conversations were not subject to seizure under Title III unless she
was named in the surveillance application and order. Second, since Mrs. Kahn was "known,"
she was not an "unknown" person within the terms of the warrant. Therefore, none of her
conversations could be lawfully seized.
520 Id. at 149. Mrs. Kahn's third argument, premised upon the marital privilege, had been
rejected by the court of appeals, and was not pursued in the Supreme Court. See United
States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1972), revd, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
521 In support of their statutory arguments, however, the parties briefed the question of
whether the fourth amendment requires the surveillance target to be identified. Brief for
Petitioner at 27-31; Brief for Respondent at 7-20. Nevertheless, this issue was beyond the
scope of the certiorari grant, and, consequently, was not analyzed in depth.
522 18 U.S.C. § 2518()(b)(iv) (1976).
523 Id. § 2518(4)(a).
524 471 F.2d at 196.
525 415 U.S. at 151.
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cordingly concluded that Mrs. Kahn must be considered "known," and,
therefore, should have been named in the application and order, be-
cause the government had failed to show that further investigation
would not have implicated her.526 Consequently, the seizure of Mrs.
Kahn's conversations was ruled illegal as beyond the purview of the
eavesdropping order.
The Supreme Court, however, read the statute more literally. Ironi-
cally, the comprehensiveness of Title III was now used to the govern-
ment's advantage, as Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, observed
that Congress surely would have explicitly qualified the term "known"
had a discoverability standard been intended.527 Instead, the "statutory
language would plainly seem to require the naming of a specific person
in the. . . application only when law enforcement officials believe that
such an individual is actually committing one of the offenses speci-
fied."'528 Since no such belief was held when this application was filed,
Mrs. Kahn was properly unknown within the meaning of Title III and
the surveillance order.529 Admittedly, law enforcement officials knew of
Mrs. Kahn's existence and probable use of her home telephone; never-
theless, she was still legally "unknown" because there was no probable
cause to believe that she was using the telephone for criminal
purposes.530
This aspect of Kahn was properly decided. It was consistent with
the statutory language, and it avoided a result which would have both
increased investigatory burdens and potentially occasioned greater in-
trusions into privacy by requiring the government to investigate any
non-target who might be overheard on the subject telephone.53' In at-
tempting to allay fears that permitting interception of unidentified par-
ties would, in effect, resurrect general warrants for eavesdropping,
however, the Supreme Court actually indicated that it would counte-
nance many seizures of generalized scope. According to Justice Stewart,
unlimited seizures would not result because surveilling officers still had
to minimize the interception of conversations unrelated to the desig-
nated crime and respect the order's time limitations.5 32 The Constitu-
tion, he suggested, affords no further protections; conventional warrants,
526 471 F.2d at 196-98.
527 415 U.S. at 153.
528 Id. at 152.
529 Id. at 152, 155.
530 Id.
531 Justice Stewart observed: "[I]n the case at hand, the Court of Appeals' holding would
require the complete investigation, not only of Mrs. Kahn, but also of the two teenaged Kahn
children and other frequenters of the Kahn residence before a wiretap could be applied for."
Id. at 153.
532 Id. at 154.
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by analogy, may properly be issued without even describing the owner
of the premises to be searched: "[tihe Fourth Amendment requires a
warrant to describe only 'the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized,' not the persons from whom things will be seized. '5 33
Indeed, Justice Stewart reasoned, Title III drafters must have recog-
nized this possibility since the statutory language directly implies the
availability of an eavesdropping order against unknown subjects, and
because the Senate rejected an amendment limiting the admissibility of
surveillance evidence to persons specified in the order.5
34
This analysis was fundamentally mistaken from both a constitu-
tional and legislative perspective. Constitutionally, the Court's reliance
upon the conventional search warrant analogy was misdirected. 535 In a
standard premises search and seizure, the scope of the search is ade-
quately limited by describing with particularity the item(s) to be seized
and the place to be searched. 536 Once probable cause has been found
regarding the target place, this description also serves to protect third
parties by prohibiting searches of other places. Under such circumstances,
describing the person whose place is to be searched adds little third
party protection beyond ensuring that the correct place is actually
searched. Moreover, any other users of the place specified in the war-
rant neither deserve nor need any further protection, since the search is
533 Id. at 155 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972),cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 917 (1974)).
534 415 U.S. at 157 n.18.
535 The Court borrowed the following unfortunate analogy from the government's brief:
If a warrant had been issued, upon a showing of probable cause, to search the Kahn
residence for physical records of gambling operations, there could be no question that a
subsequent seizure of such records bearing Minnie Kahn's handwriting would be fully
lawful, despite the fact that she had not been identified in the warrant or independently
investigated.
415 U.S. at 155 n.15. See Brief for Petitioner at 29. This analogy is inapplicable to Kahn.
The discovery of Minnie Kahn's gambling records would be lawful under the plain view
doctrine because the initial entry into the Kahn residence was properly authorized by the
warrant. If eavesdropping warrants constitutionally must identify the criminal targets to be
overheard, however, surveillance officers would not have effected a valid initial intrusion by
listening to a conversation between two unnamed parties. The officer, of course, must be
given leeway to determine whether the persons intercepted are those named in the order (and
plain view principles would properly operate during this process). Nevertheless, once the
monitoring agent realizes that no party on the line has been named in the order, interception
must cease. After this period, subject to occasional spot monitoring to determine if the parties
on the phone have changed, seizure of further conversations may not be cured by plain view
because the predicate intrusion is outside the scope of the surveillance order. "A closer search
and seizure analogy would therefore be the discovery of Minnie Kahn's records in Irving
Kahn's garage, under a warrant limited to a search of the residence of Irving Kahn." Note,
Minimization of Wre Interception- Presearch Guidetines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1411, 1431 n. 103 (1974). For a detailed discussion of the minimization and plain view princi-
ples underlying this analysis, see infa notes 596-660 & 839-75 and accompanying text.
536 See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.10; see also supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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primarily directed against the place and they normally cannot be searched per-
sonally.S In contrast, for an electronic search to achieve the same type
of protection for third parties, its scope must be limited by describing
with particularity the conversation to be seized, the telephone or place
to be surveilled, and the persons to be overheard. 538 Here, too, the pur-
pose of the description is not only to protect the target of the surveil-
lance, as to whom a showing of probable cause has already been made,
but also to shield third parties against interception. Since this type of
search is primarily directed against a person rather than a place, third
party users in conversations between two unnamed parties are not ade-
quately protected merely by a description of the place or telephone
under surveillance; multiple users of a single telephone, for example, are
vulnerable to seizure of their conversations unless the eavesdropping or-
der limits surveillance to specified parties.539 True, law enforcement
agents are required to refrain from listening to conversations not perti-
537 In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), a valid search warrant authorized police to
search the premises and person named in the warrant for certain specified items. Standing
alone, the warrant did not confer the authority to search unnamed persons who happened to
be on the target premises when the search occurred:
It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern
in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But, a person's
mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, with-
out more, give rise to probable cause to search that person, Sibron v. New York ....
Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot
be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may
happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the "legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy" of persons, not places. See Rakas o. Illinois, . . . Katz o. United States
Each patron who walked into the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, was
clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an unreasona-
ble seizure. That individualized protection was separate and distinct from the Fourth
Amendment protection possessed by the proprietor of the tavern or by "Greg." Al-
though the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to
search the premises and to search "Greg," it gave them no authority whatever to invade
the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers.
Id. at 91-92 (citation omitted). Admittedly, Ybanra was a post-Kahn case, but the Court's
citation to pre-Kahn authority indicates that new constitutional authority was not being pro-
pounded. Applying the Ybarra analysis to electronic surveillance, it is apparent that an order
authorizing the interception of A's gambling wire communications does not constitutionally
permit interception of third party conversations between B and C. Cf. Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d
1209 (1956) (person to be searched must be identified with reasonable certainty).
538 "Naming the person to be subjected to an electronic surveillance intrusion provides
merely the same protection given to the subject of a conventional search-there, protection
takes the form of a particular description of the place to be searched. Both descriptions serve
to limit an otherwise limitless search." J. CARR, supra note 18, at 37. The only situation in
which this analysis would not apply is when there is probable cause to believe that every
person using the phone or facility will be doing so for the specified criminal purpose.
539 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. See generalby Comment, An Examination of the
Naming Requirement of Title III in Light of United States o. Donovan-A Case for Suppression, 24
VILL. L. REV. 73, 81-83 (1978).
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nent to the crime specified in the warrant, but even this procedure ex-
poses third party users to a limited intrusion without a prior showing of
probable cause.54° Moreover, given the difficulty of both particularizing
the target conversation and achieving effective minimization,5 4 t an
identification requirement is a constitutional necessity. Indeed, even
this approach would not protect second parties conversing with the tar-
get individual, although that is a consequence which does not rise to
constitutional significance. 542
Prior to Kahn, the Supreme Court had given no intimation that the
identification requirement was not constitutionally mandated. Rather,
Berger v. New York twice suggested that specificity of person was a consti-
tutional absolute. 543 Similarly, in Katz the Supreme Court seemed to
emphasize that the Constitution protects people and not just places.5 44
Moreover, it is certain that Congress believed this to be so, and conse-
quently did not intend to sanction surveillance between exclusively un-
named parties-especially since the concept of indiscriminate third
party eavesdropping had long been a major source of opposition to elec-
tronic surveillance. 545 The legislative history expressly noted that iden-
tification seemed to be required by Berger,546 and concluded that by
linking together a specific person, offense, and place, the statutory re-
quirements "are intended to meet the test of the Constitution that elec-
tronic surveillance techniques be used only under the most precise and
discriminate circumstances, which fully comply with the requirement of
particularity. ' '547
Admittedly, the language of section 2518(1)(b)(iv) and section
2518(4) (a) suggests that if a person is unknown, a surveillance order may
540 Under the proffered analysis, officers must terminate interception, subject to spot moni-
toring, as soon as they recognize that unnamed parties are conversing. Hence, the agents
would not be permitted to listen further to determine the conversation's potential pertinency.
See supra note 535. For a detailed discussion of minimization procedures, see infra notes 596-
669 & 839-75 and accompanying text.
541 See supra notes 323-26 and infra notes 596-670 and accompanying text.
542 See infia notes 553-54 and accompanying text.
543 388 U.S. 41, 56, 58 (1967). The Court did state that the New York statute's identifica-
tion requirement merely specified the person whose rights were to be infringed by the surveil-
lance, id. at 59, but this simply meant that additional particularity safeguards were needed
rather than that the naming requirement was unnecessary. See Comment, supra note 539, at
86 n.114.
544 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
545 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 101, at 162 ("Sometimes, it is said that innocent people
have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this ignores the [private]
nature of conversation. . . .The unedited quality of conversation is essential" to a free soci-
ety); Westin, supra note 39, at 188 & n. I1I ("wiretapping is dragnet in its nature"); see also
supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
546 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2161; see Scott, supra note 118, at 17.
547 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2191; see United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S.
143, 161 n.4 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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still be available.548 However, the legislative history's concern with the
constitutional mandate of Berger and Katz belies such a conclusion. A
careful analysis of these subsections suggests that Congress intended to
require identification by name, if known, and otherwise at least some
other description-perhaps by voice or manner of speech-of the person
to be surveilled. 549 The Senate Report indicates this by its citation to
West v. Cabell,550 in which the Supreme Court both criticized vague ar-
rest warrants for failing to protect third party interests, and endorsed a
Texas statute that required warrants by name but otherwise allowed
their issuance upon "some reasonably definite description" of the sus-
pect.551 Nor does the Senate's rejection of an amendment limiting ad-
missibility to named parties suggest a different conclusion. The
proposed amendment was simply too broad, as it would have precluded
admissibility against unnamed second parties overheard conversing with
a properly identified target individual. 552 Such seizures do not violate
the fourth amendment; each party received the benefit of a prior judi-
cial determination evaluating both probable cause and particularity as
to crime, conversation, and person, so that the resulting warrant was
appropriately limited in scope.553 The second party's situation is com-
parable to someone whose illegal goods are seized during a warrant au-
thorized seach of another's properly described premises. Seizure of third
party conversations, in contrast, is more akin to a search of nonspecified
premises under a warrant with too broad a description. Alternatively,
seizure of the second party's end of the conversation may be analogized
to traditional plain view seizures. 554 Consequently, the Senate's rejec-
548 See supra notes 522-23 and accompanying text. Both provisions superficially suggest
that identification is required only if the person is known.
549 Note, supra note 524, at 1425 & n.73 (order should specify all known information relat-
ing to a target's identity, especially if his or her name is not known). See general/p MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 99(I)(3) (West 1970) (order must name or describe person and place to
be surveilled). Cf. United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 930 (1977) (order identifying a target by first name held to comply with naming
requirement).
550 153 U.S. 78 (1894), cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2191.
551 153 U.S. at 87.
552 114 CONG. REc. 14,718 (1968); see also Bryant v. Yetter, 447 U.S. 352, 376 (1980) ("fail-
ure to enact suggested amendments. . . not . . . most reliable indication of Congressional
intention").
553 The second party's conversations, however, are properly intercepted only if they come
within the scope of the probable cause predicate. For example, if probable cause establishes
only that pertinent conversations will occur between A and B, discussions between A and C
would not be subject to seizure. Cf. United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195-96
(W.D. Pa. 1971). But if the probable cause predicate is broader--establishing, for example,
that A will speak with others as yet unknown-conversations between A and unknowns could
be intercepted. Cf supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text and in/ra notes 833-37 and
accompanying text.
554 For a discussion of plain view principles, see infa notes 839-74 and accompanying text.
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tion of the proposed amendment no doubt reflected the drafters' desire
to retain admissibility against unknown second party conversants. This
desire, however, did not necessarily translate into acceptance of uniden-
tified, third party eavesdropping as approved in Kahn.555
For these reasons, the Kahn dicta was not expected. 556 Remarkably,
the Court once again pronounced significant new law without having
given the parties an opportunity to brief the point in depth. 55 7 Some-
what forlorn, Justice Douglas warned that the Court had created a con-
stitutional dragnet clause that would hereupon be incorporated into all
eavesdropping applications and orders. 558 There were other implica-
tions as well: if the Constitution does not require party indentification
in surveillance orders, a fortiori persons may be named in the order (or
left unnamed) without regard to probable cause limitations. 559 Al-
It must be emphasized that this observation is merely by analogy to the plain view situation.
If anything, the analysis is on an a fortiori basis as plain view involves seizure of items not
specified in the warrant, whereas the situation described involves seizure of conversations
specified in the warrant.
555 See Note, supra note 535, at 1431. Similarly, it is apparent that pre-Kahn cases, which
held the naming requirement not to be constitutionally required, were addressing themselves
only to the situation where unnamed persons had been conversing with named parties. These
opinions did not address the interception of conversations between two unknown partici-
pants. See United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 917
(1974); United States v. Curreri, 368 F. Supp. 757, 760-62 (D. Md. 1973), aJ'd sub nom.
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 430 U.S. 902
(1977); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 538-40 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modifitd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Perillo, 333
F. Supp. 914,919-21 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 324-25 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).
556 Indeed, Professor G. Robert Blakey, principal draftsman of Title III, has indicated that
the Kahn dicta was completely unexpected. Telephone interview with Professor G. Robert
Blakey, Notre Dame Law School (Mar. 6, 1982).
557 See supra note 52i.
558 United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 163 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The insertion of a
"dragnet clause" and the "and others as yet unknown" language has become routine practice
in surveillance applications and orders. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, § 51. See generaly
United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1982) (fourteen month surveillance
involving interceptions of hundreds of persons besides five defendants, although it is not clear
how many intercepts occurred purely under warrant's dragnet clause); United States v. Dorf-
man, 542 F. Supp. 345, 370 (N.D. Ill.) (warrant included "and others yet unknown"), afd,
690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982). It should be noted, however, that such clauses were often
deployed before Kahn as well. See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 499 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 842 (1973); United States v. Bowdach, 474 F.2d 812, 813 (5th Cir. 1973), affd
after remand, 501 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975). The legitimacy of
this practice apparently was not questioned.
559 For example, one court has intimated that naming someone in the order without prob-
able cause does not present a basis for suppression. See United States v. DePalma, 461 F.
Supp. 800, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See general4y United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 884-85
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 377
n.30 (N.D. Ill.), af'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982). But see generally United States v. Dietz,
622 F.2d 476, 479-81 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1275 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 901 (1977); J. CARR, supra note 18, at 49 (Supp. 1982).
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though Title III still requires party identification based upon probable
cause, 560 Kahn had made this provision constitutionally insignificant,
and, as a mere statutory safeguard, it was vulnerable to the vicissitudes
of the Giordano-Chavez centrality test.
The impact of Kahn was plainly demonstrated in United States v.
Donovan .56 1 Although not apparent from the decision's text, the legiti-
mation of dragnet clauses may have been determinative of Donovan's
outcome. Donovan was a gambling prosecution against multiple defend-
ants who had been incriminated by a series of wiretaps.562 Two separate
issues were raised on appeal. First, Donovan and two co-defendants
maintained that one of the eavesdropping warrants was void because
the application and order had failed to name them, despite the existence
of probable cause to believe that they would be overheard discussing
illegal gambling on the target telephone. 563 Second, two other defend-
ants, Merlo and Lauer, acknowledged that they need not have been
named in the application and order, but argued that all eavesdropping
evidence pertaining to them should have been suppressed because they
had not been served with inventory notice under section 2518(8)(d);
since neither had been named, inventory notice was discretionary by the
judge,56 but Merlo and Lauer protested that the court never had a
chance to exercise this discretion because the government had omitted
their names from a list of overheard persons.565 The government's ap-
peal from adverse determinations below brought the case before the
Supreme Court.
The government conceded that there was probable cause as to
Donovan,566 but argued that Title III only required the identification of
persons who would be using the target phone directly to place or receive
calls. 567 Under this view, incoming callers, such as Donovan, did not
have to be named. From a constitutional standpoint, naming Donovan
560 See supra notes 522-23 and accompanying text. Note that the statutory naming require-
ment creates an unfortunate dilemma for prosecutors. Inevitably, persons named in the war-
rant contend that there was no supporting probable cause, while persons unnamed argue that
they should have been specified because probable cause existed as to them. See NWC RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 66; J. CARR, supra note 18, at 174-75. See generaly United States v.
Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.), cter. denied, 414 U.S. 962 (1979). The impact of this
dilemma, however, was substantially diminished by the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977), that suppression for naming violations usually would
not be required. See infia notes 571-74 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. injfra note 887.
561 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
562 Id. at 421.
563 Id. at 419-21.
564 Id. at 422; see supra notes 263 & 338-40 and accompanying text.
565 429 U.S. at 420.
566 Id. at 419 n.5.
567 Id. at 424 & nn.13-14.
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normally would not have been required, so long as he was only being
monitored while conversing with a properly named party.5 68 The
Supreme Court correctly noted, however, that since Title III apparently
requires identification in the application of each person for whom prob-
able cause exists, a statutory violation had occurred. 569 Similarly, Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the Court, found that the government had
violated Merlo's and Lauer's Title III rights by failing to provide the
supervising judge with sufficient information with which to exercise in-
ventory notice discretion.5 70  Accordingly, the next question was
whether suppression was required for these transgressions.
Dispositon of the identification violation turned upon an applica-
tion of the Giordano-Chavez centrality test. While acknowledging that the
target identification requirement was important, 57' the Court neverthe-
less declined to suppress for this infringement. Once all other Title III
requirements have been met, Justice Powell reasoned, "the failure to
identify additional persons who are likely to be overheard engaging in
incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful
judicial authorization. ' 5 72 At worst, he suggested, the only consequence
of this omission is to make the issuing judge unaware that others might
be overheard. 573 On this basis, the identification requirement was
deemed peripheral and, in the absence of prejudice, suppression was
denied. 574
This broad analysis plainly disregarded any limits on the scope of
surveillance that might be effected by the identification requirement. 575
The scope of the surveillance was admittedly not directly at issue in
Donovan; as each of the unnamed "known" parties was overheard dis-
cussing gambling with an identified target, the range of interception
had not been improperly expanded. Justice Powell's broad language,
however, seemed equally applicable to situations where the unnamed
"known" individual had spoken to another unnamed person. Such a
conclusion is suggested by Kahn.576 Prior to Kahn, conversations be-
568 See supra notes 543 & 552-54 and accompanying text.
569 420 U.S. at 428.
570 Id. at 432.
571 Id. at 434.
572 Id. at 435.
573 Id. at 436.
574 Id. at 439-40. The Court implied that its decision might have been different if Dono-
van, Robbins, and Buzzacco had not received inventory notice or if the government's failure
to identify them had been in bad faith. Id. at 436 n.23; see injia note 594. This suggestion
potentially represented a significant expansion upon the centrality test formulated in Giordano
and Chavez. See supra notes 452- 74 and accompanying text.
575 See supra notes 535-41 and accompanying text.
576 Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed its Kahn dicta that the Constitution does not require
target identification. 429 U.S. at 427 n.15; see supra notes 543 & 555 and accompanying text.
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tween two unnamed parties arguably were not subject to interception,
since neither party had been identified in the surveillance order.5 77
However, since Kahn had sanctioned surveillance over two unnamed
parties, the failure to identify a known person was no longer significant;
the scope of interception had already been expanded by Kahn, and,
thus, the conversation would have been subject to seizure regardless.
Kahn, therefore, seems to have deprived improperly unnamed parties of
the argument that, because identification potentially limits the scope of
surveillance, the naming requirement is central under Giordano and
Chavez.
Even given Kahn, however, the Court should still have found the
party identification requirement to be central. Justice Powell found the
identification requirement to be peripheral, despite Congress' percep-
tion of it as constitutionally necessary.578 Beyond that, however, virtu-
ally every court of appeals considering the matter had decided that
target identification "directly and substantially implement[s] the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures. '579 As Jus-
tice Marshall stated in his Donovan dissent, the identification
requirement serves as a "statutory 'trigger' by virtue of its relationship
to other Title III provisions.580 Disclosure of prior eavesdropping appli-
cations under section 2518(l)(e), for example, is required only for per-
sons listed in the present application. 581 This disclosure is necessary
because judges have complete discretion to deny surveillance requests
for policy reasons;582 consequently, revelation of prior applications is im-
portant in determining whether the present application is an effort to
circumvent a restrictive ruling by a previous judge or possibly to harass
the eavesdropping target. Moreover, identification ensures that judges
reviewing future eavesdropping requests will learn that the application
577 In fact, however, since dragnet clauses were often used in eavesdropping warrants, such
seizures probably occurred with frequency. See supra note 558.
578 See supra notes 546-49 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's majority opinion con-
ceded that Congress might have believed that the Constitution mandates the naming require-
ment, but suggested that Congress did not intend suppression to follow for all violations of
this statutory provision. 429 U.S. at 437 n.25. This comment might mean that suppression
would be granted for violations involving conversations between two unnamed parties.
579 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974); see United States v. Scully, 546
F.2d 255, 265 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Civella, 533
F.2d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1056 (1977); United States v. Moore, 513
F.2d 485, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, 556 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Donovan, 513 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v.
Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1003.04 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 430 U.S. 903, rev'd, 556 F.2d 244 (4th
Cir. 1977).
580 429 U.S. at 446-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
581 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e) (1976).
582 429 U.S. at 447-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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then under consideration was not the first.5 3 Finally, the identification
requirement triggers mandatory inventory notice, thereby guaranteeing
notification of interception5s4
Thus, as in Chavez, the Court misapplied its own centrality test.
Indeed, the Chavez and Donovan decisions suggest that too flexible a stan-
dard is being allowed. If the Court is to enforce this principle in a man-
ner consistent with legislative intent, the centrality question should
simply turn on a harmless error analysis. Hence, only minor, nonpreju-
dicial violations should be excused.58 5 In Donovan, once Justice Powell
conceded that the identification requirement was important, no further
inquiry should have been necessary; instead, suppression should have
automatically followed.
Justice Powell likewise considered the inventory requirement im-
portant, but peripheral, to the statutory scheme.586 Inventory notice, he
maintained, was a post-interception procedure which Congress did not
intend "to serve as an independent restraint on resort to [electronic sur-
veillance]. ' 5 7 Consequently, since Merlo and Lauer had received no-
tice before trial, and therefore had not been prejudiced, suppression was
not required. 58  Although this analysis was somewhat imprecise, Justice
Powell's conclusion actually cannot be faulted. Although inventory no-
tice serves an important function by making the statute's civil remedies
more meaningful-and thereby discouraging unlawful surveillance 8 9-
failure to comply is, in fact, a post-interception violation. Thus, it
583 This is because disclosure, as required by § 2518(l)(e), applies only to those prior inter-
ceptions in which the present target had been named in the application. See United States v.
Easterling, 554 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 576 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Chiarizio, 388 F. Supp. 858, 874
(D. Conn.), aff'd, 525 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1975); State v. Assuntino, 180 Conn. 345, 350-51, 429
A.2d 900, 903 (1980). On occasion, however, courts have properly held that disclosure is also
required as to prior intercepts in which the present target should have been named. See State
v. Rowman, 116 N.H. 41, 45, 352 A.2d 737, 739 (1976).
584 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
585 Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (government has burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that violation did not contribute to verdict). See generally supra
note 505 and accompanying text.
586 429 U.S. at 434, 438-39. Prior to Donovan, most courts of appeals had found this provi-
sion to be central, but had declined to suppress absent a showing of prejudice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d
872, 881-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v. lannelli, 477 F.2d
999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1972), aftdon other grounds, 400 U.S. 770 (1975).
587 429 U.S. at 439. Defendants can- rarely, if ever, demonstrate prejudice. See generally
United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879, 884 (Ist Cir. 1977); United States v. Cirillo 499 F.2d
872, 881-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974). Consequently, critics have argued
that, at the very least, the burden should be on the government to show an absence of
prejudice. See, e.g., J. CARR,supra note 18, at 356-57; Comment, supra note 539 at 87-88.
588 429 U.S. at 439.
589 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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should not retroactively illegitimize an otherwise lawful surveillance,
provided, of course, that proper notice is given prior to use at trial.5 90
The language of Title III consistently suggests that its section 2515 sup-
pression provision is not to be applied to such violations;59' other sanc-
tions are available.5 92 Accordingly, suppression for violation of the
inventory notice requirement was not warranted.
Nevertheless, the quality of analysis in both Kahn and Donovan was
hardly consistent with careful judicial supervision. Together, these deci-
sions reduced the identification requirement from a constitutional pre-
cept to an insignificant statutory chore. Ironically, the Donovan Court
once again called for strict enforcement of the statute,593 and for the first
time intimated that intentional violations would be treated more se-
verely.594 Despite this, just a year later, in Scott v. United States595 the
Court would decline to suppress even for purposeful misconduct.
F. SCOTT V UNITED STATES
After years of controversy, 596 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Scott to address the meaning of Title III's so-called minimization re-
quirement. Section 2518(5) requires that "the authorization to intercept
. . .shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception . . . . -597 The
limits of permissible surveillance are defined by the identified target
(subject to use of the dragnet clause), specified crime, and particularized
description of conversation contained in the eavesdropping order. In
theory, conversations not pertinent to the warrant may not be inter-
590 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976); see infia note 592.
591 The text of§ 2515 speaks in terms of unlawful disclosure. See supra note 232. Unlawful
disclosure is addressed in § 2511 (1) and § 2517 in terms of information having been improp-
erly obtained. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2517 (1976). Further, § 2518(10)(a) applies only to un-
lawful interceptions. See supra note 419. Professor Carr disagrees with this analysis because he
believes that too many post-interception violations would, consequently, go unpunished. J.
CARR,supra note 18, at 352-53. He fails to realize, however, that other sanctions are available
to deter misconduct in this context. See infra notes 592, 865-67 & 917-20 and accompanying
text.
592 For example, inventory violations are punishable by contempt. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(c)
(1976). Furthermore, proper notice is a prerequisite to admissibility at trial. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(9) (1976). Admittedly, the scope of notice under § 2518(9) is not as broad as
§ 2518(8)(d)'s inventory notice requirements, but the judge has discretion to rectify this defi-
ciency. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). For a discussion of other independent sanctions, see
infra notes 865-67 & 917-20 and accompanying text.
593 429 U.S. at 439-40.
594 Id. at 439 n.26; see supra note 574 and accompanying text.
595 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
596 See generally Fishman, The Minimization Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, The
Fourth Amendment, and The Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 315 (1979); Note, supra note
258; Note, supra note 535.
597 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
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cepted; perfection, of course, cannot be achieved, but surveilling officers
are required to minimize interception to the extent possible.5 98
Minimization was incorporated into Title III in an effort to re-
spond to historical concerns that electronic surveillance was by nature
inevitably indiscriminate.5 99 The Supreme Court in Berger had shared
this concern. Among other reasons, the New York law had been struck
down because it allowed "general searches by electronic devices" and
permitted broad interceptions "without regard to their connection to
the crime under investigation. ' '6 00 In effect, the statute gave law enforce-
ment "a roving commission to 'seize' any and all conversations." 60 1 This
procedure conflicted sharply with the constitutional maxim that govern-
mental intrusions must be accomplished by the least drastic means pos-
sible.60 2  Thus, Title III's minimization requirement is actually
constitutional in origin.60 3
Since the statute, however, neither defined minimization nor pro-
vided criteria for its implementation, 6 4 critics were quick to suggest
598 See infa notes 610-21 and accompanying text. Critics of electronic surveillance argue
that law enforcement officers cannot conduct electronic surveillance without seizing nonper-
tinent conversations. This may be so, but the Constitution does not require perfection. See
supra notes 314, 317 & 329-71 and accompanying text. Moreover, it should be noted that,
from the law enforcement perspective, minimization often causes the loss of incriminating
conversations. See NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 575, 715; COMMISSION STUDIES, supra
note 322, at 121; Note, supra note 258, at 96. Skeptics suggest that this factor will prompt
officers to avoid the minimization directive either by monitoring without recording or by
using bootleg cassettes to record the full conversation. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 475.
These are realistic concerns. Nevertheless, proper supervision should deter the use of bootleg
cassettes, and equipment can be obtained which makes listening without recording more diffi-
cult to effect. See NWC HEARINGS, supra, at 88, 683. Abuses certainly have occurred, see
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92; id. at 182 (minority report); NAT'L COMM'N, ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, NWC STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC
STAFF STUDIES]; see generall infra notes 622-30 and accompanying text. There have also been,
however, numerous examples of proper minimization. See, e.g., United States v. Armocida,
515 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1975) (officers terminated calls pertaining to another crime); Fish-
man, supra note 596, at 349 n.21. Indeed, at times highly cautious monitors may have
overminimized. See NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra, at 266.
599 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
600 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1967).
601 Id. at 59.
602 See, e.g., id. at 94-101; J. CARR, supra note 18, at 257. See generaly infra note 757 and
accompanyng text.
603 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 59;J. CARR,supra note 18, at 256; Note, supra note
258, at 96-97. Some authorities have failed to realize that the minimization requirement is
constitutionally premised. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972) ("the
touchstone for deciding the issue is that it rests on a statutory command and therefore turns
on the intent of Congress in issuing that directive"); Note, Minimization: In Search ofStandards,
8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 60, 63 (1973). The Department of Justice, for example, mistakenly
asserts in its procedural manual that minimization is merely a statutory requirement. U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL title 9, 46-48 (1979).
604 By comparison, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides somewhat more gui-
dance in this respect. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1981); see Schwartz, Oversight of
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that indiscriminate eavesdropping would not be curtailed.60 5 Defini-
tional and procedural problems arose almost immediately. What was
meant, for example, by the term "intercept"? Defined by statute simply
as "the aural acquisition of the contents of a wire or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device, ' 60 6 inter-
ception could mean any of the following: (1) listening to conversations;
(2) recording conversations; (3) both listening to and recording conversa-
tions; or (4) either listening to or recording conversations. Under alterna-
tives (1), (2), and (3), statutory protections would be significantly
reduced because, depending upon the alternative, no interception occurs
if agents either record without listening (alternatives (1) and (3)), or lis-
ten without recording (alternatives (2) and (3)) .607 Moreover, once in-
terception was appropriately defined, standards had to be developed for
determining when conversations were to be considered pertinent and,
therefore, properly subject to interception. Although the Supreme Court
had essentially decreed minimization to be a constitutional necessity, it
chose to leave the lower courts with the responsibility for resolving these
questions. Prior to its 1978 decision in Scott, certiorari had routinely
been denied in all minimization cases.608
Scott can best be understood in the context of the lower court stan-
dards which preceeded it. These standards in large part were designed
to encourage flexibility. While most courts sought to maximize privacy
by defining "intercept" broadly in terms of either listening or recording
Minimization Compliance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing
Theirjobs, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 405-14 (1981).
605 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 15, 82, 91; Spritzer, supra note 15, at 187-89; Note, supra
note 535, at 1432.
606 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
607 The statute should thus be amended to define "intercept" as including either listening
or recording. See J. CARR, supra note 18, at 261; Note, supra note 535, at 1415; Note, supra
note 258, at 104; see also United States v. Bynum, 487 F.2d 490, 502 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903, afdon rehearing, 387 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 513
F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); Spence v. State, 275 Md. 88, 90-91, 338
A.2d 289-92 (1975); COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at 24, 366.
608 See United States v. Abascal, 563 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953
(1978); United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977);
United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United
States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976);cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v.
Chavez, 533 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Turner, 528
F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 997 (1975); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29
(3d Cir.),cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903, afd on rehearing, 386 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 513 F.2d 533
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975).
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conversations (alternative (4) above),60 9 the judiciary accomodated law
enforcement by developing liberal guidelines which purported to reflect
the difficulties inherent to the minimization process. Thus, perfection
was not required, since the courts realized that each interception inevi-
tably involved the seizure of some innocent conversation before a mini-
mization decision could be made.6 10 Moreover, the standards reflected
the recognition that achieving minimization was often not easy; neither
speaker identification nor subject relevance were always apparent. 6 11
609 Most decisions actually assumed this definition without expressly adjudicating the
point. See, e.g., United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
610 For example, the following observation was quoted with approval:
[Ilt is often impossible to determine that a particular telephone conversation would
be irrelevant and harmless until it has been terminated.
It is all well and good to say, after the fact, that certain conversations were irrelevant and
should have been terminated. However, the monitoring agents are not gifted with presci-
ence and cannot be expected to know in advance what direction the conversation will
take.
Cox v. United States, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972); see NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at
92; Note, supra note 258, at 96-97; Note, supra note 535, at 1432 n.118 (implicit in the concept
of minimization is the assumption that some conversations will be inadvertently seized, even
when they are, in hindsight, not pertinent).
611 See United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 405 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1973), vacated on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 201.
For example, the following extract from an eavesdropping warrant should demonstrate the
difficulty of discerning subject relevance:
8. Conversations intercepted pursuant to the Order of April 14th reveals that Matteo
DiLorenzo a/k/a "Uncle Marty" has spoken in very guarded terms to several persons
including "Fishell" (true name unknown) concerning planned meetings and other ar-
rangements in what is apparently an extortionate credit transaction. A conversation be-
tween DiLorenzo and Fishell (TNU), which occurred on April 24, 1972, is set forth in
paragraph 9 below:
9. Marty (in) to Fishell (out).
F Hello.
MD FishelP
F Yeah, hello. Marty, how are you?
MD All right, I got tied up, I couldn't afford much time.
F I contacted his wife, you know?
MD Yeah, right.
F And she in turn, is gonna contact him, and bring him back.
MD Oh very good.
F Because, I relayed the message that, I sez look, come back and whatever could be
done will be done for you, ya know.
MD Of course, yeah.
F So, I'm gonna wait to hear from him now.
MD Very good.
F And-ah-I think you can handle the situation because it's just two people besides
yourself and another guy that could be discarded until you get-your first, any-
way.
MD O.K.
F You know what I'm trying to say?
MD Yeah, we'll try to get everything, yeah.
F That's right that's right.
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This difficulty was compounded by the frequent use of foreign lan-
guages and codes. 612 Finally, the courts also realized that minimization
MD Yeah, we'll try to get it squared away.
F I told her to tell him, look everything will be done in my house, I don't even have
to be there, he sits with him himself and fix his own situation.
MD Yeah, very good.




F And as soon as I get word, I'll call you, if not, I'll wait until I hear from you
anyway-I know he'll call me.
MD Very good.
F You know what I mean.
MD O.K.
F And if this Monday, stop by, you'll get it.
MD O.K. Fish.
F O.K.?
MD O.K. Take care.
F Bye bye.
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 456. Not surprisingly, defense lawyers have frequently
questioned the monitors' ability to discern relevant conversations: "There is something to be
said for not trusting the constable who sits there day after day with earphones, eating salami
sandwiches, and having him pick out a conversation which he thinks may be pertinent or
impertinent." NWC HEARINGS, supra, at 613 (statement of Stanley Arkin).
612 See, e.g., United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 930 (1978); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38-39 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
858 (1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020
(1974); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
The following is a typical example of a coded conversation:
Conversation A
ALDO: I called. I talked to him.
GAZAL: We're out of tires.
ALDO: Huh?
GAZAL: We don't have no tires.
ALDO: I know.
GAZAL: Huh.
ALDO: Well let me see--said he'd be up Sunday.
GAZAL: Why don't you call him tonight. Meet him tonight. He could tell you the
same story tonight.
ALDO: Yea, I know it.
GAZAL: And find out what's what.
ALDO: Yea.
GAZAL: Why does he have to wait until Sunday to tell you a story.
ALDO: Yea, alright, I'll call him in a little while.
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poses an inherent dilemma for executing officers: if they fail to mini-
mize enough, defendants will argue the statute has been violated; if po-
lice minimize too much, defendants may contend that exculpatory
evidence was not recorded. 6 13
Given this need for flexibility, a multifaceted approach was devel-
oped for assessing minimization compliance. Five basic factors were
typically included in the matrix: (1) the nature and scope of the investi-
gation (extent of leeway directly to reflect complexity of crime and
breadth of conspiracy);6 14 (2) character of the target facility (greater
flexibility allowed for telephone used primarily for criminal purposes,




GAZAL: I was talking to the shoe salesman, and he said he's going to give that guy a
call today. He was waiting to hear from him, you know.
SONNY: Yeah.
GAZAL: He said I think I'll-I better give him a call. Okay?
SONNY: Yeah, I'll call that kid.
GAZAL: Okay.
SONNY: - Alright.
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 37 nn.13-14 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975)
(emphasis added). The reference to "tires" and the "shoe salesman" respectively pertain to
narcotics and the narcotics supplier. See id. One lawyer told the National Wiretapping Com-
mission that the use of coded language makes it easier to defend cases because there are
"alternative explanations" for the defendant's conversations. NWC HEARINGS, supra note
166, at 620 (statement of James K. O'Malley); see COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at
122, 431.
613 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 93. This was somewhat analogous to aspects of the
defense offered by Senator Harrison Williams in his Abscam trial. See STAFF OF SENATE
SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., TRIAL PROCEEDINGS (TRIAL TRAN-
SCRIPT EXCERPTS AND TAPE RECORDING TRANSCRIPTS) IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA V. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., ET AL. IN THE UNITED STATES DIS-
TRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CRIM. No. 80 CR-00575 3882-83
(Comm. Print 1981) (defendant Williams maintaining that video recordings were conducted
in a manner that did not permit him to make exculpatory statements); see also R. GREENE,
THE STINGMAN 280-81, 284-85 (1981); Latham, Anatomy of a Sting." John DeLorean Tells His
Stogr, 391 ROLLING STONE, March 17, 1983, at 18, 20, 25, 28. But see NWC REPORT, supra, at
94 (defense attorneys suggesting that claims of exculpatory materials being minimized out are
rarely made). The resulting dilemma for law enforcement has prompted some jurisdictions to
use a dual recorder system. One recorder intercepts all conversations in their entirety, while
the other is used to minimize. Then, unless a claim is made that exculpatory information has
been minimized out, law enforcement officials are not given access to the nonminimized tape
recording. See NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 682 (statements of Messrs. Ronald G.
Martin, James Foody, Richard Belton, and Donald Brandon, New York State Police); C.
FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 205-06. The validity of this approach, however, has not been
established definitively. NWC REPORT, supra, at 93-94. The procedure is well analyzed in
Note, supra note 258, at 106.
614 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 68; see, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858
(1975) (when the enterprise under investigation is a large scale conspiracy, it may be neces-
sary for the government to intercept more conversations than in the case of a more limited
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special precautions necessary for public places,615 and more latitude for
wider ranging bugs than for relatively narrow wiretaps);616 (3) the pe-
riod in surveillance (early in surveillance agents may monitor approxi-
mately two minutes of every call so that parties and subjects can be
classified into categories of nonpertinence; thereafter, such nonpertinent
conversations may not be intercepted);617 (4) clarity of language (greater
freedom to intercept when parties conversing in code);61 and (5) extent
of judicial supervision (considerable deference shown to judge who has
actively overseen interception process).619 Although not explicitly ex-
pressed, the first four standards generally reflected the proposition that a
monitoring official was initially entitled to listen to any conversation
criminal undertaking); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
615 See United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1020 ("Where. . . a telephone is used exclu-
sively to conduct illegal business and is located in a place which serves no residential or busi-
ness purpose in the sense in which those terms are ordinarily used, then the users of that
telephone do not have the expectation of privacy which society accepts and less stringent
minimization standards are both reasonable and permitted by Title III"); see also United
States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d at 869; United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 244 n.21, 327 N.E.2d 814, 842 n.21 (1975).
616 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The Commission explained the basis for the prob-
lem associated with bugs:
[D]epending upon their location, bugs can create difficult minimization problems. Some
witnesses testified that minimization with a bug was virtually impossible, because bugs
are indiscriminate and overhear all speakers. Unlike a telephone conversation, which
involves only two persons, except in the rare instance of a conference call, the number of
persons in a conference room or social club who may be overheard with a bug is unlim-
ited. In such circumstances, minimization can be very difficult ...
Id. at 44. Professor Fishman has made similar observations:
The task of defining minimization standards and practices is even more complex for
bugging devices than it is for wiretaps. Face-to-face conversations cannot be divided into
"discrete units" or "assessed on an individual basis." Unless voice-activated tape record-
ers are utilized, there may be no way of knowing when a conversation is taking place. If
visual surveillance of the bugged premises is impracticable, monitors may be unable to
establish, aside from the listening device, whether the premises is [sic] unoccupied, occu-
pied by only one individual, or by several. In addition, conversants may discuss diverse
matters, swiftly and unexpectedly moving from one topic to another.
Fishman, supra note 596, at 344; see United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d at 717; United States
v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 392, 397 n.65 (N.D. Ill.), afd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982).
617 See Note, supra note 258, at 114; see a/so United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 493-94
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048-
50 (D. Md. 1972), a fd, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir.), aj'dsub nim. United States v. Giordano, 414
U.S. 505 (1974).
618 See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d at 53; United States v. Q uintana, 508
F.2d 867, 874 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1019; United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 783 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
619 See, e.g., United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d at 44-45; United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at
875 ("Where the judge has required and reviewed such reports at frequent intervals, courts
have been more willing to find a good-faith attempt to minimize unnecessary interception");
Spease v. State, 21 Md. App. 269, 279, 319 A.2d 560, 566 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); People
v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 253, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 257, 264, 360 N.E. 2d 935, 943 (1976).
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until he no longer had probable cause to believe that it was pertinent,
and the fifth presumed that judicial supervision ensured that this was
being done.620 Once deemed nonpertinent, the agent was required to
terminate transmission, although occasional spot monitoring was per-
mitted to verify that a seemingly nonpertinent conversation had not
later taken a pertinent turn.62'
In theory, these standards were well suited for addressing a complex
modern problem. In application, however, they often served as bases for
boilerplate affirmations of minimization practices rather than as a
framework for careful analysis. Leading commentators uniformly agree
that, prior to Scott, many courts handled the minimization requirement
permissively. 622 Apparently concerned that too rigid an approach would
handicap law enforcement, 623 "the cases [showed] a strong inclination to
find pertinent any conversation that [had] any conceivable connection
to the investigation, no matter how remote. ' '624 Several decisions, for
example, sustained as reasonable "minimization" efforts that had re-
sulted i*n total interception of every conversation; 625 on occasion, fewer
than ten percent of these calls were actually pertinent.62 6 Other courts
found compliance despite minimization having occurred on only a small
fraction of calls. 627 In conspiracy cases, the judiciary tended to be par-
ticularly lenient, often ruling that wide leeway had to be given to iden-
tify all participants, 628 and, at times, even suggesting that every
620 See generally United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 391. Moreover, the standards
are indicative of greater tolerance for situations in which minimization is difficult to achieve.
621 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
622 Note, supra note 258, at 108-09; see J. CARR, supra note 18, at 266; Fishman, supra note
596, at 340; Note, supra note 535, at 1411.
623 For example, one court has stated that "[a]n overly restrictive interpretation of the
minimization requirement could make it impossible to use [electronic surveillance] in connec-
tion with the investigation of organized criminal conspiracies." United States v. Cox, 567
F.2d 930, 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
624 Note, supra note 258, at 108-09.
625 See United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953
(1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d at 716-19; United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d at
495; United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at 873-75 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. James,
494 F.2d at 1019-22; United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 534-36, 291 A.2d 825, 833-34, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972).
626 United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at 873; United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d at 599;
State v. Dye, 60 N.J. at 529, 291 A.2d at 830.
627 See United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1979); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1269, 1276 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 433
U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156-58 (9th Cir.), cerl denied, 423 U.S.
996 (1975). See generally NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 1083.
628 See, e.g., United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 417 n. 15 (S.D.N.Y.), a fd 485 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1973), vacatedon other grounds , 417 U.S. 903 (1974); State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super.
276, 291, 284 A.2d 385, 393 (1971), rev'd per curiam, 122 N.J. Super. 181, 299 A.2d 750, cert.
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conversation between co-conspirators could be seized in full.629
Certainly, in cases of total interception "[t]he assertion that the
agents were unable to screen out a single conversation despite a reason-
able minimization effort strains credulity." 630 Even where some minimi-
zation had been effectively accomplished, the courts clearly were not
enforcing their own standards with appropriate judicial scrutiny. Broad
interceptions, for example, were frequently justified because a "far
flung" conspiracy was under investigation, but the cases never explicitly
examined whether there was probable cause both to believe such an ex-
tensive conspiracy existed and would be discussed on the telephone. 631
Similarly, judicial supervision was often cited as a basis for approval
without thoroughly examining its qualitative contribution to the mini-
mization process.632 Moreover, the courts tended to apply the standards
in general terms, without analyzing whether a particular conversation
could, nevertheless, have been reasonably minimized. 633 For example,
the mere fact that a conversation was between co-conspirators does not
denied, 62 NJ. 574, 303 A.2d 327 (1973). Nonminimized surveillance on this basis conceiva-
bly could continue throughout the authorization period, especially since the Department of
justice has indicated that identification of all co-conspirators is not always possible. UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL title 9, supra note 603, at 31 (1979) (cautioning, however, that
"blind reliance" should not be placed on this ground). There is, however, no more reason to
allow agents to listen to seemingly nonpertinent calls in the hope that co-conspirators will be
named, than to allow them to listen to such calls for any other investigative purpose. Once a
call appears to be nonpertinent, spot monitoring should commence.
629 See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917
(1976); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. at 416; United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523,
542 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modifled, 478 F.2d 984 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); NWC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 93; Note, supra note 258, at 107 n.74.
630 Note, supra note 258, at 112 n.95; C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 229 n.8, 299. Investi-
gations, however, have often been successful despite compliance with the minimizaton direc-
tive. Id. Seegeneraly United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d at 156-58; United States v. Armocida,
515 F.2d at 142-46.
631 For example, United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at 873, barely addresses the question
of probable cause. Similarly, in United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 759, there is minimal
discussion of this issue. Although probable cause may have been assumed implicitly-and
even properly decided---careful analysis demands thorough coverage of this issue.
632 See C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 264; see alro NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 93-94.
In Scott, the judge was never advised that agents had not been minimizing, nor that the
conspiracy was smaller than originally anticipated. See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at
759-60; see also United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 867-70 (D.N.J. 1977), afd, 575 F.2d
1344 (3d Cir.), afd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (agents' progress reports contained intentional mis-
representations). But see United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd,
503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974) (suppression despite appearance of
judicial supervision). Significantly, the Department of Justice uses progress reports as predi-
cates for establishing that close judicial supervision occurred. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL title 9, supra note 603, at 18 (1979). While such reports are designed to serve an
important role, see infta notes 814-16 and accompanying text, they should not be used as part
of the minimization analysis unless they are qualitatively sound. Significantly, deficiencies in
these reports are rarely a basis for reversal. See infra notes 817-21 and accompanying text.
633 Fishman, supra note 596, at 353-55.
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necessarily mean that minimization was impossible. 634 Similarly, use of
codes should not automatically result in approving an interception,
since the code may have been deciphered. 635 Likewise, the existence of
even extensive judicial supervision, or perhaps a wide ranging bug in-
stead of a wiretap, does not preclude the possibility that more effective
minimization could reasonably have been achieved.6 36 Nevertheless,
these factors were rarely considered-at least explicitly-by the review-
ing courts.637
This was the state of the law prior to Scott. In part, the Supreme
Court was responsible for this situation by its denial of certiorari in sev-
eral questionable cases.638 Scott, however, provided the Court with an
opportunity to rectify the consequences of its prior neglect. Further, as
the agents in Scott had "purposely and knowingly" made no effort to
minimize any of the 384 conversations that were intercepted during a
month long surveillance,639 the case posed another question for the
Supreme Court as well: is an intentional failure to comply with the min-
imization requirement automatically a statutory violation? Although
the question seemed almost rhetorical, the Supreme Court remarkably
held that intentional misconduct does not necessarily constitute a mini-
634 Minimization in such circumstances may be difficult but not necessarily impossible.
Certainly, the difficulty does not justify failure to attempt compliance.
635 Note, supra note 535, at 1419 n.42.
636 A bug can be minimized on the following basis: monitors may listen continuously until
a conversation starts to occur; once discussion commences, spot monitoring should be initi-
ated as soon as the subject matter appears to be nonpertinent. Professor Fishman similarly
acknowledges that bugging does not preclude minimization. Fishman, supra note 596, at 344.
Courts, however, have tended to ignore this possibility. In United States v. Clerklq, the court
uncritically assumed that bugging does not allow the same selectivity as telephone tapping for
minimization: "[c]onversation may range over many subjects, shifting instantaneously, and
without warning. Because of this uncertainty, we cannot say that anything less than continu-
ous monitoring would suffice." United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d at 717. See generaly
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
637 Some courts, however, have stated that there is not unlimited leeway with respect to
early categorization of nonpertinent conversations. Once categories of nonpertinence are es-
tablished, minimization must commence. See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 754-58;
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at 874-75. But see United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d at
1012 (agents were allowed to listen for five minutes to ascertain pertinence).
638 See, e.g., United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d at 593, 599 (1,595 calls intercepted en-
tirely; approximately 150 pertinent); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. at 536-39, 291 A.2d at 835 (105
hours of conversation intercepted, two and one-half hours thereof relevant to the investiga-
tion). In one case, the suspect's babysitter made totally innocent calls which accounted for
fourteen and one-half hours of the intercept, an additional nineteen hours of innocent calls,
lasting at least ten minutes each, were intercepted, and sixty-seven telephone communications
with lawyers were intercepted, forty-two of which, at least arguably, fell within the attorney-
client privilege. The monitoring agents were not advised of other developments in the investi-
gation so that they could determine whether further surveillance was necessary. United States
v. Bynum, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952, 954-56 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
639 United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 145 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mization violation. 64° Critical to its analysis was the following distinc-
tion advanced by the Department of Justice:
[P]etitioners' argument fails to properly distinguish between what is neces-
sary to establish a statutory or constitutional violation and what is neces-
sary to support a suppression remedy once a violation has been established.
In view of the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, consideration of
official motives may play some part in determining whether application of
the exclusionary rule is appropriate after a statutory or constitutional viola-
tion has been established. But the existence velnon of such a violation turns
on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time. Subjective intent alone...
does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional. 64 I
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the fourth
amendment's proscription against "unreasonable" intrusions necessarily
implies that an objective standard is to be employed in determining
whether a constitutional right has been abridged. 642 Hence, he main-
tained, recent cases confirm that fourth amendment questions initially
must be examined "under a standard of objective reasonableness with-
out regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers in-
volved. ' 643 By analogy, Justice Rehnquist concluded, an objective test
must also apply to alleged statutory miminization violations. 64 4 This
holding was not considered inconsistent with congressional intent; ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, use of the word "conducted" in section
2518(5), Title III's minimization provision, was purportedly indicative
of a "focus . . .on the agents' actions not their motives; ' 64 5 moreover,
the legislative history to section 2515, the statutory exclusionary rule,
was said to state that the law "was not intended 'generally to press the
scope of suppression beyond present search and seizure law.' ",646 On
this basis, Justice Rehnquist ruled that motive became a factor only af-
ter a violation had been objectively established. 64 7 According to the
Court, however, no such violation had occurred. Instead, application of
the traditional minimization factors was held to have established that
the total seizure of all conversations for a one month period was not
objectively unreasonable. 648 Justice Rehnquist, however, applied these
640 Id. at 135.
641 Id. at 135-36.
642 Id. at 137.
643 Id. at 138.
644 This analogy was not made explicitly, but was apparent from Justice Rehnquist's refer-
ence to fourth amendment principles.
645 436 U.S. at 139.
646 Id. The remainder of the legislative history, however, makes clear that the availability
of the suppression remedy has been expanded to new situations. See supra note 232 and ac-
companying text.
647 436 U.S. at 136.
648 Id. at 139-43.
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factors in a mechanistic and conclusory manner. No apparent effort was
made to determine whether, given the knowledge and expertise of the
agents involved, minimization could still reasonably have been
achieved. 649 Nor was a comprehensive analysis of individual calls ex-
plicitly undertaken to determine whether the agents had failed to sus-
pend surveillance despite the expiration of probable cause to believe
those calls were pertinent. 650
From a constitutional standpoint, the Court's statement that al-
leged fourth amendment violations were to be objectively evaluated
without reference to subjective intent was of questionable validity; as
applied to conventional searches, scholars frankly disagree. 65' Given the
greater intrusion occasioned by electronic surveillance, however, the
fourth amendment's reasonableness clause would seem to require such
searches to be undertaken in good faith.652 Moreover, from a statutory
perspective, the holding directly contravened basic Title III principles.
Section 2518(5) requires that execution of the order be "conducted in such
a way as to minimize the interception of [nonpertinent] communica-
tions. '653 Given the broad deterrent purpose underlying Title III, there
is no reason to read the term "conducted" as excluding subjective intent.
On the contrary, the requirement of good faith in section 2517(5), a
related provison which requires proper minimization in the context of
plain view seizures, suggests that intent is likewise an important minimi-
zation factor. 654 Furthermore, provision for criminal prohibitions in sec-
649 Id; see United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 759.
650 It is possible that such an analysis was undertaken. If so, this should have been made
explicit in the opinion.
651 Compare I W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 1.2, at 7-18 (Supp. 1982) with Burkhoff, Bad
Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 74-81 (1982). See also Washington v. Chrisman, 455
U.S. 1 (1982) (suggesting that objective test still controls).
652 Professor Fishman makes the following compelling argument:
[I]n assessing the constitutionality of the failure to minimize, the Court completely ig-
nored the distinction between an isolated physical search and seizure and a continuing
series of surreptitious interceptions. A considerable body of case law has developed
under the fourth amendment that strictly circumscribes the circumstances under which,
and the procedures by which, a physical search can be conducted. This is true even
though a physical search is of limited duration and usually is conducted with the knowl-
edge of the suspect. A prolonged investigation utilizing electronic surveillance presents
increased opportunities for abuse; those utilizing the telephone or premises under surveil-
lance can neither observe nor complain about the conduct of the police during the course
of the search because they are unaware of it. Such factors would seem to dictate more
rigorous procedures to meet constitutional requirements.
Fishman,supra note 596, at 335. Seegenerally State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 436, 427 A.2d 537,
547 (1981) (holding that under state statute minimization requires subjective good faith);
People v. Calogero, 75 A.D. 2d 455, 459, 420 N.Y.S. 2d 970, 973 (1980) (implicitly assuming a
good faith requirement).
653 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).




tion 2511(1), outlawing willful misconduct, demonstrates that intent
was an integral aspect of the overall statutory scheme-indeed, by "will-
fully" intercepting or "endeavor[ing]" to intercept in a manner unau-
thorized by Title III, the agents appear to have committed statutory
felonies. 655 Nor, as Justice Rehnquist otherwise suggested, is this inter-
pretation inconsistent with Congress' expression of intent regarding the
scope of Title III's exclusionary rule. Simply put, the scope of section
2515 is irrelevant when determining whether a violation has
occurred. 656
Ironically, prior to Scott there was uniform agreement in minimiza-
tion cases that, "on the whole, the agents [must] have shown a high
regard for the right to privacy and have done all they reasonably could
to avoid unnecessary intrusion. ' 657 This principle seems to be com-
pelled by a straightforward statutory analysis, but it may additionally
reflect awareness that enforcement of a judicial directive is also at
stake.658 Yet, this was a consideration that Justice Rehnquist ig-
nored.659 Certainly, conformance to a court order should be evaluated
in subjective terms. For example, assume that, for the sake of efficiency,
surveillance agents decide to put their equipment on "automatic rec-
ord," thereby allowing them to devote their energies to other aspects of
the investigation. 66° Even if all the resulting interceptions could be jus-
tified subsequently under prevailing minimization standards, would any
judge be satisfied that the authorization had been "conducted" in com-
pliance with his order? Similarly, if agents inform a judge that they
"purposely and knowingly" made no effort to minimize, the judge obvi-
ously would be impelled to conclude that his directive had been vio-
lated. 661 When there has been no minimization, it is a non sequitur to
655 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976). Significantly, the statute's use of the word "endeavors" in
§ 2511 eliminates any prospect of a legal impossibility defense. See Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (continuous validity of complex impossibility doctrine need not be
resolved, as doctrine inapplicable to statute outlawing endeavors rather than attempts); LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2181.
656 § 2515 is triggered only after a violation has been established. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)
(1976).
657 United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1018; United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 784;
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1046 (establishing that intentional misconduct
would be violative of Title III); NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
658 United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. at 131. The text of the relevant court orders is pro-
vided in the Record on Appeal at 95, 118, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (United
States Supreme Court Appendix).
659 Thus, the case should have been analyzed under § 2518(10)(a)(ii) rather than
§ 2518(10)(a)(i). See supra note 419.
660 This practice was routine prior to the enactment of Title III. See NWC HEARINGS,
supra note 166, at 1083.
661 If agents inform the judge of their intent not to minimize during the application pro-
cess, it is unlikely that any judge would grant the surveillance order. To avoid the Scott
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surmise that the minimization was reasonable.
Finally, the Court's willingness to embrace a purely objective test
was troublesome from an analytical viewpoint. Even though minimiza-
tion standards are purported to be applied contemporaneously, without
reference to post-interception information which may retrospectively
demonstrate a conversation's pertinence,662 the analysis inevitably is in-
fluenced by post-interception considerations. At that time, the nature of
the offense and the defendant's criminal background, as well as the in-
criminating nature of the tapes, may subtly influence judicial review. 663
This possibility is facilitated by broad minimization standards that
make it relatively easy to justify the seizure of any conversation. Ac-
cordingly, when resort to the vagueness of post-interception judicial re-
view can readily be avoided because a clear case of intentional
misconduct has been presented, the opportunity to do so should
promptly be seized.
Nor did the Supreme Court suggest in Scott that minimization stan-
dards should be applied with careful scrutiny. If anything, the Court's
approach was directly contrary to one which would inquire whether,
notwithstanding facial compliance with prevailing standards, minimiza-
tion could still reasonably have been achieved. Like its lower court pred-
ecessors, the Supreme Court apparently assumed "that in complex cases
effective minimization and successful investigations are mutually exclu-
sive."' 664 Indeed, despite its decision negating intent as a factor in evalu-
ating compliance, the Court's superficial application of prevailing
standards actually created an interesting irony: regardless of whether
minimization was actually possible, surveillance agents could now argue
that they had acted in good faith by intercepting any conversation
whose seizure could be justified by judicial guidelines.665
In dissent, Justice Brennan rebuked the Court for effectively emas-
culating the minimization requirement. 666 Kahn, he reminded, had em-
phasized that allowing conversations of "others as yet unknown" to be
scenario, Professor Fishman suggests that judges include a "good faith" directive in the eaves-
dropping warrant. Fishnan, supra note 596, at 356.
662 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 756 n.10; Note, supra note 535, at 1420-2 1.
Retrospective analyses always seem to find a higher percentage of pertinent calls. See United
States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. at 417 n.15; United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. at 542-43.
663 State v. Catania, 85 N.J. at 442-43, 436-39, 427 A.2d at 549-50, 546-48. For this reason,
New Jersey has rejected the Scott approach. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 156A- 12() (West 1980);
see also People v. Calogero, 75 A.2d at 459, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
664 Fishman, supra note 596, at 349.
665 For example, the Department of Justice procedural manual, while emphasizing the
need for good faith, simply suggests that any conversation fitting the minimization standards
may be seized. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL title 9, supra note 603, at 46-47 (1979).
666 436 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (minimization requirement has been
eviscerated).
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intercepted did not constitute an impermissible general warrant because
agents still had to minimize the seizure of nonpertinent material.6 67
Since "the Court's holding permits Government agents deliberately to
flout the duty imposed upon them by Congress," Justice Brennan main-
tained that reconsideration of Kahn was now mandated.668 In terms of
constitutional theory, Justice Brennan was quite correct. Together,
Kahn and Scott had made Title III safeguards against indiscriminate
electronic surveillance potentially meaningless. In effect, the scope of
interception was now essentially subject to the monitor's discretion
rather than strictly governed by the watchful eye of an impartial
magistrate.669
For Justice Brennan, Scott must have been particularly frustrating.
Fifteen years earlier, his remarks in Lopez had provided the impetus for
constitutionalizing and legislating electronic surveillance standards.670
Since then, the Court's composition had changed dramatically, 67 , and
subsequent electronic surveillance decisions had deviated substantially
from both Warren Court principles and Title III's expression of legisla-
tive intent. This deviation, of course, had evolved over time. In the
667 Id. at 147-48. Justice Brennan also made the following penetrating remarks:
Beyond the inconsistency of today's decision with the reasoning of Kahn, the Court
manifests a disconcerting willingness to unravel individual threads of statutory protec-
tion without regard to their interdependence and to whether the cumulative effect is to
rend the fabric of Title III's "congressionaly designed bulwark against conduct of author-
ized electronic surveillance in a manner that violates the constitutional guidelines an-
nounced in Berger v. New York. . . and Katz o. United States . . . ." This process of
myopic, incremental denigration of Title III's safeguards raises the specter that, as judi-
cially "enforced," Title III may be vulnerable to constitutional attack for violation of
Fourth Amendment standards, thus defeating the careful effort Congress made to avert
that result.
Id. (citations omitted).
668 Id. at 145.
669 See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them
impossible, and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant").
670 See supra note 81-90 and accompanying text.
671 The change in Court composition has had a clear effect on electronic surveillance deci-
sions. Since there was only one change between Lopez and Berger, the latter case provides a
more suitable basis for comparison. When Scott was decided, four members of the Berger
majority, Justices Warren, Clark, Douglas and Fortas, were no longer on the Court. Al-
though Justice Clark was replaced by Justice Marshall, Republican presidents replaced Jus-
tices Warren, Fortas, and Douglas with Justices Burger, Blackmun and Stevens, all members
of the Scott majority. Furthermore, the conservative wing of the Court maintained its
strength with the appointments ofJustices Rehnquist and Powell. Justice Powell, in particu-
lar, given his previous interest in electronic surveillance and organized crime, see supra note
198 and accompanying text, has undoubtedly had a strong impact in this area. See generally
Fleck, Changing Voting Pattemrs in the Burger Court: The Impact of Personnel Change, 17 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 1021 (1980); Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Prciples and
Politics (pts. 1-3), 1941 Wis. L. REv. 172, 343, 461.
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Supreme Court's most recent Title III case, Dalia v. United States,672 the
extent to which the Court's mode of statutory analysis had changed
since 1972 would become readily apparent.
G. DALIA V. UNITED STATES
As with most matters involving statutory construction, Title III liti-
gation has often involved questions of legislative intent. In resolving
these issues, early Supreme Court cases occasionally relied upon the stat-
ute's apparently comprehensive character to provide a basis for analysis.
Indeed, in District Court, Justice Powell had ruled that given the careful
and exhaustive manner in which Title III had been drafted, "it would
have been incongruous for Congress to have legislated with respect to
the important and complex area of national security in a single brief
and nebulous paragraph. '673 In other words, anything not specifically
sanctioned by Title III was not authorized. This interpretation was con-
sistent with both the statute's overall prohibitory format and congres-
sional emphasis on strict enforcement. 6 74
In 1979, Dalia v. United States raised a statutory issue that was ana-
lytically similar to the one addressed in District Court seven years ear-
lier.675 Specifically, petitioner Dalia argued that, since Title III did not
expressly authorize any buggings effected by covert entry, no electronic
surveillance of that kind was permissible under the statute. 676 Accord-
ingly, Dalia maintained, the eavesdropping order that federal agents
had obtained to bug his business premises was null and void.6 77 If any-
thing, this claim was even stronger than the one successfully made in
District Court. While Title III at least made some reference to national
security seizures, 678 there was no mention whatsoever to covert entries.
Petitioner Dalia was not the first to raise this question. By 1979, the
issue had been raised several times and the circuits were sharply di-
672 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
673 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 297, 306 (1972). Seegeneral4y
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 441 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 506-07, 515 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152-53
(1974), United States v. Gelbard, 408 U.S. 41, 51 n.10, 61 (1972).
674 See supra notes 229-33 & 267-71 and accompanying text.
675 See szra notes 392-412 and accompanying text.
676 441 U.S. at 249. Dalia also made two other arguments. First, he maintained that the
Constitution per se prohibited covert entries to effect electronic surveillance. Id. at 246. Sec-
ond, he argued that even if Title III permitted covert entries, "the authorizing court must
explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fact." Id. at 254-55. Both of these
grounds were rejected. Id. at 247-48, 257-59. Congress, however, is presently considering
legislation that would require specific authorization as a prerequisite to covert entry. See, e.g.,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDMENTS TO THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1982).
677 441 U.S. at 238.
678 See supra note 400-01 and accompanying text.
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vided.679 Their disagreement was easily explainable, as there were per-
suasive arguments on both sides. Those judges sustaining the
government found implicit authorization via a pragmatic statutory in-
terpretation: Congress was obviously aware that most bugs necessitated
covert entries; therefore, specific provision for such surveillance was un-
necessary since authorization was already implicit to the statutory
scheme.6 80 Opposing courts, however, could not justify inferring author-
ity for such drastic intrusions from a comprehensive statute which ap-
parently was explicit in all other respects. 68 ' Given this situation, one
commentator made the following realistic observation:
Lacking any reliable indications of legislative intent, a court facing
the issue could plausibly accept any of three possible interpretations of
Congress' attitude toward forcible entries: Congress may have meant to
prohibit such activities by omitting them from an otherwise comprehensive
statute; it may have assumed that such activities were valid without men-
tion of them in the Act; or, Congress may have not considered the matter
at all.68
2
Absent any definitive indications of congressional purpose, a path of ju-
dicial restraint was accordingly urged:
When legislation affects matters of constitutional concern, the
Supreme Court may demand a "clear statement" of the act's scope. This
ensures that courts will not sanction constitutionally questionable practices
before the legislature explicitly articulates an intent to approve them. This
requirement also derives from a respect for the different institutional re-
sponsibilities of the courts and the legislature: Congress must develop and
formulate policy before the judiciary can properly fulfill its reviewing role.
When a court is faced with a statute that is vague or silent with respect to a
constitutionally sensitive issue, it should not undertake the legislature's ob-
ligation to articulate a policy; to do so would discourage the proper func-
tioning of political processes and undermine the protection of individual
rights advanced by those processes. As Professor Bickel wrote, "[t]he more
fundamental the issue, the nearer it is to principle, the more important it is
that it be decided in the first instance by the legislature." Once the policy
is fully stated, the rights and duties arising from the statute-and, if appro-
679 Compare, e.g., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 903 (1978) andIn re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642-44 (4th Cir. 1977) with United
States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 842-45 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 29 (1979) and United
States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 939 (1979).
680 See United States v. Scafidi, 563 F.2d at 639; United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879,
883 (D.D.C. 1976), afd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
681 See United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 845-46, 848-52; United States v. Santora, 583
F.2d at 458, 463-64.
682 Comment, The Illegality of Eavesdrop-Related Break-ins: United States v. Finazzo and United
States v. Santora, 92 HARV. L. REv. 919, 924 (1979) [hereinafter Eavesdrop-Related Break-in]. See
generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutog Interpretation in the Supreme
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). There have been those, however, who have argued that
legislative intent is an "absurd fiction." Radin, Statutog Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863,
870 (1930). But see Landis, A Note on "Statutog Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
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priate, its constitutionality--can be adjudicated without conjecture.683
In effect, such was the philosophy underlying Justice Powell's opinion in
Diltrict Court. 684 In Dah'a, however, Justice Powell deviated from this
perspective. Though his opinion argues that, in fact, Title III did con-
tain a clear statement of congressional purpose, Justice Stevens' dissent
demonstrates otherwise.
According to Justice Powell, despite the absence of a specific refer-
ence to covert entries, "[t]he language, structure, and history" of Title
III demonstrates that Congress was sanctioning, subject to prior judicial
review, the execution of eavesdropping warrants by means of trespassory
covert entries.68 5 The statutory language, he argued, treated bugs and
wiretaps identically, without "any indication that the authority of
courts. . . is limited to approving those methods of interception that do
not require covert entry for installation of the intercepting equip-
ment. '68 6 Moreover, Justice Powell asserted, a 1970 Title III amend-
ment authorizing courts to direct third parties, such as landlords, to
assist in accomplishing the interception "unobtrusiveoy" confirms that cov-
ert entries were anticipated. 68 7 Regarding the legislative history, Justice
Powell maintained that covert entries were not addressed specifically
because Congress intended to treat all electronic surveillance identically.
The Senate Report, for example, refers to Katz and Berger without dis-
tinguishing that the latter involved a trespass.68 8 Testimony before vari-
ous subcommittees considering electronic surveillance acknowledged
"that covert entries were a necessary part of most . . . bugging opera-
tions."68 9 Furthermore, statements made on the floor of Congress also
demonstrated such an awareness. 690 Finally, since most bugs, in fact, do
require a covert entry, reading the statute to exclude this technique
would defeat Title III's purpose of providing new evidence gathering
methods for organized crime control.69'
683 Eavesdrop-Related Break-ins, supra note 682, at 926 (footnotes omitted).
684 Justice Powell has since affirmed this philosophy in other cases. See New Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1930 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Only rarely may legisla-
tive history be relied upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress itself did
not include"); Middlesex City Sewage v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981).
685 441 U.S. at 249.
686 Id. at 250.
687 Id. at 250 n.10.
688 Id. at 25 1.
689 Id.
690 For example, Justice Powell cited the following remarks by Senator Tydings:
"Surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic] must be installed on telephones, and wire
strung. Bugs are diftult to install in many places since surreptitious ent ir often impossible. Often,
more than one entry ir necessaty to adjust equipment." 114 Cong. Rec. 12986 (1968) (emphasis
added).
Id. at 252.
691 Id. at 252-53.
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Justice Stevens, however, argued that the statute must be limited
by the scope of its terms, and that neither legislative intent nor statutory
purpose were inconsistent with this approach. According to Justice Ste-
vens, congressional grants of authority permitting search warrant intru-
sions upon fourth amendment rights historically have been specific and
limited in scope; there is no indication that Title III was intended to be
different in this respect. 692 The statutory language does not refer to cov-
ert entries and "it is most unrealistic to assume that Congress granted
such broad and controversial authority to the Executive without making
its intention to do so unmistakably plain. '693 Moreover, he maintained,
given Title III's otherwise exhaustive coverage, "[t]his is the paradigm
case in which 'the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to
determining Congress' intent.' "694 Indeed, inferring authorization for
covert entries would be fundamentally inconsistent with legislative de-
sign, since a statute which closely regulates the Attorney General, prose-
cuting attorneys, and district judges throughout the issuance process
would then be giving investigative personnel carte blanche in executing
the order.695 As covert entries give executing officials virtually unlim-
ited access to the target premises and its contents, 696 the absence of a
provision regulating these procedures cannot be explained away, espe-
cially "since the sponsors of the legislation expressly stated that they had
specified 'every possible constitutional safeguard' for the rights of indi-
vidual privacy. ' 697 Justice Stevens conceded that the 1970 amendment
allowed "'unobstrusive" surreptitious entries, but contended that this did
not signify an intent to condone "unlimited and unauthorized breaking
and entering by police officers. ' 698 Next, characterizing the legislative
history in this respect as "meager," 69 9 Justice Stevens advanced alterna-
tive interpretations to the statements cited by Justice Powell,7T o and
692 Id. at 264-65.
693 Id. at 266.
694 Id.
695 Id. at 266-71. Note that the absence of a provision in Title III requiring the application
and order to specify the need for covert entry is inconsistent with language in Katz suggesting
that the judge must be apprised of the precise intrusion involved. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
696 j. CARR, supra note 18, at 59-60 (Supp. 1982).
697 441 U.S. at 274.
698 Id. at 271 n.21. Specifically, Justice Stevens argued:
A Congress that was careful to limit the temporal extent of electronic surveillance
and the opportunity for it to infringe on protected (i.e., noncriminal) conversations, and
one so quick to amend the statute to provide for "unobtrusive" entry through the aid of
private persons (i.e., "custodians" and "landlords") who already have a degree of access
to the property, surely cannot have condoned unlimited and unauthorized breaking and
entering by police officers with the aid of nothing but a burglar's tools.
Id.
699 Id. at 271.
700 Id. at 271-73. Justice Stevens argued that statements made by eavesdropping oppo-
1983]
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH [Vol. 74
concluded that Congress had never considered the possibility of covert
entries; indeed, outspoken Title III opponents had not even bothered to
address this issue.70 1 Admittedly, Title III and its legislative history con-
templated the use of bugs, but limiting this authority to exterior bugs,
Justice Stevens posited, would have reflected congressional purpose
more appropriately. 702 In the face of this comprehensive statutory de-
sign and ambiguous legislative history, he concluded, the Court should
not automatically presume that Congress intended to give law enforce-
ment any authority not otherwise prohibited by Title III or the Consti-
tution. Rather, he insisted, when constitutional rights are involved,
congressional silence should be construed in favor of privacy rather than
as an affirmative grant of authority to law enforcement. 70 3
Not surprisingly, after Dalia another commentator acknowledged
that both Justices had made compelling arguments.7 04 In all likelihood,
the majority's pragmatic analysis more closely reflected congressional in-
tent; despite the absence of detailed references to covert entries in the
legislative record, it is inconceivable that, after years of debate, Congress
would have failed to realize that most bugs necessitate covert entries. 70 5
Indeed, there is some basis for concluding that, by leaving the subject
untreated, the drafters sought to avoid the risks inherent in debating
explicitly a potentially explosive issue; instead they may have hoped
that the necessary authority might be read into the statute implicitly. 70 6
nents could not be read as an endorsement of covert entries and that other remarks cited by
Justice Powell had been taken out of context. Id. Here, however, Justice Stevens' reading of
the legislative history is probably unduly narrow. At the very least, remarks by eavesdrop-
ping opponents regarding covert entries served to demonstrate that such methods were con-
templated as a necessary incident to surveillance by means of a bug. Moreover, there is no
evidence that any remarks were cited out of context. Justice Stevens maintained that a state-
ment by Senator Tydings mentioning that "surreptitious entry is often impossible" suggests
that Title III prohibited such methods since, according to Justice Stevens, "surreptitious entry
is by no means impossible (indeed it is hardly difficult) if it may be effected by whatever
means the police-unhampered by the provisions of the criminal law---can bring to their
disposal." Id. at 273. Given the practical difficulties associated with the installation of bugs,
however, it is apparent that Senator Tydings was referring to logistical rather than legal
barriers to successful implementation.
701 Id. at 271-75.
702 Id. at 278-79 & n.33. Justice Stevens also rejected Justice Powell's reliance upon Con-
gress' identical treatment of bugs and wires. References to Supreme Court decisions in the
legislative history, Justice Stevens argued, were not meaningful because all but one of these
cases involved nontrespassory conduct, and the one which did involve a trespass had been
severely criticized by the Court. It was, therefore, unreasonable to assume from these cita-
tions that Congress was sanctioning covert entry. Id. at 276-78.
703 Id. at 278-79; see also Comment, Sneaking through the Castle Gate: Covert Ent&y by Police to
Plant Bugging Devices, 67 GEO. L.J. 1429 (1979).
704 Note, Breaking and Entering into Private Premises to Eect Electronic Surveillance: Dalia v.
United States , 39 MD. L. REv. 754, 779-80 (1980).
705 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 15, 43, 86 n.19.
706 Professor G. Robert Blakey, principal draftsman of Title III, acknowledges that this
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Nevertheless, as enacted the statute contained a potential defect which
had to be remedied. Ultimately, in Dalia, judicial process was used to
rectify this legislative interstice.70 7
Hence, the true significance of Dalia lay not in the Court's holding
that Title III conferred authority to effect covert entries, but in the man-
ner in which this decision was made. Notwithstanding Title III's com-
prehensive structure and the Burger Court's reluctance in other contexts
to cure statutory omissions through liberal constructions of legislative
history, 708 Dalia abandoned the mode of analysis adopted in District
Court to remedy what Congress might otherwise have made explicit. In
the process, the Court's statutory perspective seems to have undergone a
fundamental change: although Title III had been designed to constitute
a blanket prohibition against electronic surveillance, subject to narrowly
tailored statutory exceptions, 70 9 Justice Powell's analysis now suggested
that the law conferred a general grant of authority subject to narrowly
issue was purposely left unaddressed. Telephone Interview with Professor G. Robert Blakey,
Notre Dame Law School (July 1, 1982). In contrast, the issue was specifically treated in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(b)(1)(D) (Law. Co-op. 1980).
707 From a jurisprudential perspective, the Burger Court's willingness to assume what was,
in effect, a legislative role raises fundamental separation of powers concerns. In this regard,
Judge Learned Hand's words most eloquently make the point:
In our country we have always been extremely jealous of mixing the different
processes of government, especially that of making law, with that of saying what it is
after it has been made. This distinction, if I am right, cannot be rigidly enforced; but
like most of those ideas, which the men who made our constitution believed in, it has a
very sound basis as a guide, provided one does not try to make it into an absolute rule,
like driving to the right. They wanted to have a government by the people, and they
believed that the only way they could do it, was by giving the power to make laws to
assemblies which the people chose, directly or at second hand. They believed that such
assemblies would express the common will of the people who were to rule. Never mind
what they thought that common will was. . . .It is enough that they did not mean by it
what any one individual, whether or not he was a judge, should think right and proper.
They might have made the judge the mouthpiece of the common will, finding it out by
his contacts with people generally; but he would then have been ruler, like the Judges of
Israel.
[T]he judge must always remember that he should go no further than he is sure the
government would have gone, had it been faced with the case before him. If he is in
doubt, he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society for
which he speaks would have come to a just result, even though he is sure that he knows
what the just result should be. He is not to substitute even his juster will for theirs;
otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails, and to that extent the people
would not govern.
L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 108-09 (1. Dillard 3d ed. 1960); see id. at 216-17 (drafters of
statute "presumably said no more than they wanted"); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutler, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533-35 (1947); see also infra text accompanying note
925.
708 See Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
184 n.29 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 620-26 (i978). Seegenerally
Federenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) ("we are not at liberty to imply a
condition which is opposed to the explicit terms of a statute. . . . To [so] hold. . . is not to
construe the Act but to amend it').
709 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH [Vol. 74
tailored prohibitions. 7 10 Thus, analytically and perhaps philosophically,
Dalia symbolized the extent to which the Supreme Court had changed
direction since 1968 when Title III was enacted. Accordingly, it is now
appropriate to consider the Court's impact upon Title III jurisprudence
elsewhere.
V. AFTEREFFECTS: ENFORCEMENT IN THE LOWER COURTS
In recent years, defense counsel have lamented the demise of Title
III. As drafted, they maintain, the statute may have been sufficiently
protective of privacy rights, but courts have declined to enforce the law
strictly as Congress intended.7 1 I The preceding review of Supreme
Court Title III cases confirms that, even at the highest level of judicial
review, the statute has neither been carefully analyzed nor strictly en-
forced. Both constitutional and statutory protections have declined as a
result.
Ironically, however, two of the most severely criticized cases, Gior-
dano and Chavez, have not been responsible for an overall decline in
710 See supra text accompanying note 686.
711 For example, one prominent defense counsel voiced the following complaint:
I would just like to say [that], if there had been strict interpretation of the wiretap
laws [as] written by Professor Blakey and his cohorts, there would be no tapping in the
United States. The statute is impossible to follow as it is strictly written. Since June of
1969, when wiretaps were first used in the federal courts, the courts have done the follow-
ing. You do not have to instruct the monitors how to minimize. You do not have to
minimize the interception if you only intercept all the calls for 9'/2 days. You do not have
to minimize even when the U.S. Attorney instructs the monitors to intercept all of the
calls. The recordings of the conversations are not intercepted if they are stored and never
listened to. You do not have to identify the persons intercepted even if they are known.
You do not have to serve an inventory on time. You do not have to seal the tapes
immediately upon termination of the interception. You do not have to file the applica-
tion and obtain the order to use the interception pertaining to other crimes not men-
tioned in the order. You do not have to date the order of interception, even when the
interception can only continue for 15 days after the day of the order.
You can tap [for] 18 days when there are only 15 days on the order; this is under
Rule 45 where you do not include Sundays or holidays and you do not include the first
day. The prosecutor [is allowed] to lie under oath as to who the person was who author-
ized the interception (Now, the prosecutor really did not know, when he was swearing to
the judge under oath, that Will Wilson had authorized the interception; he really did not
know Will Wilson had never seen the papers). It allows breaking and entering by the
police to install, repair, and remove the bug. . . . It allows probable cause to be shown
even where probable cause was shown 21 days before the order [was] signed; it was not
stale because there was a continuing criminal conspiracy.
These are just some of the cases [which] have interpreted the wiretap laws as we
have them now. . . . But personally, I think we are giving up too much of our individ-
ual rights [with] the way [wiretaps] are being used now, especially in the state courts.
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: Two VIEWS, upra note 218, at 94-96.
Some defense counsel have maintained that the high manpower and economic cost of
electronic surveillance have deterred courts from suppressing evidence obtained in violation
of Title III. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 130. For this reason and others, the concept of
strict judicial enforcement has been characterized as illusory. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 216,
at 22-24.
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strict enforcement. Although the centrality test they established was de-
rived from an incorrect premise, it was actually consistent with the pre-
existing legislative concept of harmless error.71 2 Moreover, although the
Supreme Court may have had difficulty applying this standard in Dono-
van, 7 3 the harmless error analysis has worked effectively and fairly in
the lower courts. Thus, for example, facially deficient warrants have not
automatically occasioned suppression when the defect was neither con-
stitutional in nature nor prejudicial in effect.7 14 Moreover, most juris-
dictions have supplanted Giordano and Chavez by recognizing that
intentional violations of even peripheral provisions may mandate sup-
pression. 71 5 As yet, no case has interpreted Scott to the contrary; nor
should Scott have an impact here, since it reached only the narrow ques-
tion of whether a violation had occurred. 7 16 Nevertheless, Scott's willing-
ness to tolerate intentional misconduct in the context of minimization
712 See sufra notes 493-505 and accompanying text.
713 See supra notes 571-92 and accompanying text.
714 Citing either Giordano or Chavez, courts have often focused on whether there has been
"substantial compliance" with statutory requirements. See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d
838, 860-61 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1056 (1974). Though neither Giordano nor Chavez spoke in terms of "substantial
compliance," the term is implicit to the centrality test and consistent with the harmless error
analysis. Those few state jurisdictions which have stressed the need for absolute compliance
with even purely technical requirements are being unduly rigid. See State v. Baldwin, 289
Md. 635, 643-44, 426 A.2d 916, 921-22 (1981) (omission of progress report directive mandates
suppression under Maryland law, despite reports actually having been submitted). See gener-
ally State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 383-91, 333 A.2d 676, 678-82 (1975) (suppression for im-
proper termination clause; opinion not clear but possibly mere typographical error).
715 See United States v. Caggiano, 667 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1982) (government's fail-
ure to seal the original wiretap application and order properly did not warrant suppression,
absent intentional misconduct or prejudice); United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 472 (7th
Cir. 1977) (government's failure to comply adequately with statutory sealing requirement did
not require suppression, absent intentional misconduct or prejudice), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978); United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 193-95 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (absent deliberate
noncompliance or prejudice, government's failure to provide formal notice to the defendant,
pursuant to § 2518(8)(d), did not warrant suppression), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977);
United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1975) (absent prejudice, suppression
was not required for failure to comply with inventory notice provision; likewise, although
some of the seals were broken, suppression was not required as integrity of tapes was unchal-
lenged); United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395, 1406 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905
(1977) (absent deliberate misconduct, minor delays in compliance with inventory notice pro-
vision did not require suppression); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 864 (government
failed to deliver notice of the wiretaps to the defendants within the ninety day period pre-
scribed by § 2518(8)(d); suppression denied, absent prejudice or deliberate violation); United
States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1974) (case remanded for consideration of
whether government's failure to comply with inventory notice provision constituted deliber-
ate attempt to gain tactical advantage). Note that this approach is consistent with the sugges-
tion made in Donovan that prejudice and intent should be factors in the suppression analysis.
Se supra note 574 & 594 and accompanying text.
716 Indeed, Scott suggested that the intentional nature of a violation may affect the scope of
suppression. 436 U.S. at 139 n.13.
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH [Vol. 74
poses a serious threat to privacy. Thus far, however, its impact may
have been slight, as relatively few defendants have since raised minimi-
zation issues. 7 17 Alternatively, Scott may have been responsible for this
dearth by having made minimization an impossible defense to mount.
In most respects, however, the Supreme Court's most direct impact
upon Title III litigation is plainly reflected by a lack of consistently care-
ful judicial analysis in the lower courts. Although the judiciary has cor-
rectly enforced the statute in many respects, several important
provisions have often been misapplied. Errors have most frequently
been occasioned in six important areas: (1) standing; (2) exhaustion of
investigative alternatives; (3) probable cause; (4) particularity of conver-
sation; (5) plain view seizures; and (6) post-interception sealing of tapes.
The failure to analyze carefully the various provisions governing these
areas has precluded strict statutory enforcement and, on occasion, has
disregarded constitutional rights.
A. STANDING
Although statutorily defined, Title III standing principles were ef-
fectively determined, albeit prematurely and improperly, by Alderman v.
United States .7 18 A few courts have resisted Alderman either by inferen-
tially acknowledging standing when the movant was named in the ap-
717 The following are the post-Scott minimization cases: United States v. Feldman, 606
F.2d 673, 677-79 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Cruz, 587
F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 389-98 (N.D. I11.),
aJ'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Napolitano, No. 81-803, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1982); United States v. Ljubas, No. 81-0402, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
1982); United States v. Lilla, 534 F. Supp. 1247, 1264-68 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v.
Gale, 508 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Lyons, 507 F. Supp. 551, 556-
59 (D. Md. 1981); United States v. Webster, 473 F. Supp. 586, 597-98 (D. Md. 1979), rev'don
other grounds, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1991 (1981); United States v.
Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102, 108-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 817-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Lica-
voli, 456 F. Supp. 960, 966 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Higgins v. Fuessenich, 452 F. Supp. 1331,
1334-35 (D. Conn. 1978).
One jurisdiction has rejected Scott. State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 436, 427 A.2d 537, 546
(1981). See also People v. Calgero, 75 A.D.2d 455, 459,429 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) (applying good faith test). Since Scott, there has been only one major decision which
blatantly disregarded minimization principles. See Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 395, 405,
249 S.E.2d 110, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979) (four detectives
refrained from recording, but listened to every call); see also United States v. Clerkley, 556
F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978) (sanctioning interception of all
conversations). Other decisions may also be wrongly decided, but their conclusory adoption
of the Scott standards effectively precludes effective critique.
718 See supra notes 344-91 and accompanying text. Ironically, in Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 135-36 n.10 (1978), the Supreme Court said that the question of standing under the
fourth amendment is still open for someone neither overheard nor identified in the order and
for whom any proprietary interest in the premises is lacking.
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plication,719 ignoring the issue, 720 or finding a creative alternative for
recognizing the defendant as "aggrieved." 721 Ironically, on occasion, ex-
plicit recognition of target standing might have served to narrow the
719 See United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167, 1172 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
867 (1981) (by implication); United States v. Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (no standing to defendants who were neither overheard nor
named in wiretap order); United States v. Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 261-62 (D. Kan. 1975),
reo'don other grounds , 560 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1977) ("no question" about standing of defend-
ant named in wiretap orders); State v. Catania, 85 NJ. 418, 424-27, 427 A.2d 537, 540-41
(1981). These decisions are clearly correct in terms of statutory language and Title III policy
considerations. One named in an application has had electronic surveillance "directed
against" him. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1976). In this respect, the statutory identification re-
quirement, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1976), serves as a predicate for target standing. See supra
note 379; see also NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 438, at 279. But see United States v.
Giacalone, 455 F. Supp. 26, 42 (E.D. Mich. 1977), afdsub nor. United States v. Feldman,
606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979) (no standing to defendants named in applications and orders
who were not overheard).
720 United States v. Gibson, 500 F.2d 854, 855 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106
(1975); United States v. Marcello, 508 F. Supp. 586, 601 (E.D. La. 1981); People v. Amsden,
82 Misc. 2d 91, 93, 368 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Brown, 80 Misc. 2d 777,
786-87, 364 N.Y.S.2d 364, 373-74 (Sup. Ct. 1975). These cases permitted defendants to con-
test evidence derived from earlier wiretaps even though defendants were neither overheard
nor claiming any property interest in the premises under surveillance. Most courts, however,
have denied standing under such circumstances, because to do otherwise would permit the
defendant to accomplish indirectly what he could not do directly. See, e.g., United States v.
Civella, 648 F.2d at 1172; United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578, 583 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977); United States v. Lanese, 385 F. Supp. 525, 527-28 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
721 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. deniedsub nom. Light v.
United States, 414 U.S. 846 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974) (message and reply thereto
intercepted; defendant at whose behest message sent granted standing). See generaly NAT'L
LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 438, at 379 (citing other eavesdropping cases implicitly recogniz-
ing target standing). On occasion, defendants have also shown creativity. In United States v.
Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982), intercepted parties who had not been indicted
moved to suppress evidence derived from electronic surveillance. Though never explicitly
discussed, these motions may have been filed at the behest of some of the defendants who did
not have standing under Alderman because they had not been parties and could not assert a
proprietary interest. The court of appeals inferentially recognized that conferring standing
upon unindicted parties would have been inconsistent with congressional intention that Title
III was not "generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present [as of 1968]
search and seizure law." Id. at 1220-21, 1227; see supra note 232. Therefore, standing was not
automatically to be granted to unindicted parties who otherwise fit within the literal lan-
guage of § 25 10(1 1)'s definition of "aggrieved person." United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d
at 1226-27. Nevertheless, while the court denied standing in this instance, it indicated that
the statutory suppression remedy should be made available to unindicted parties in those
cases in which none of the indicted defendants had standing to contest the propriety of the
surveillance. Under such circumstances, the court reasoned, an unindicted party should be
given the opportunity to contest the courtroom disclosure of potentially illegal electronic sur-
veillance. However, since one of the defendants, Dorfman, had standing to contest the sur-
veillance as a whole by virtue of his proprietary interest in the premises surveilled, there was
no reason to confer standing in this case upon unindicted parties. Id. at 1228-29. This analy-
sis is questionable in light of Congress' desire not to expand the scope of suppression, but is
correct from the policy standpoint of discouraging unlawful surveillance. See Anthony v.
United States, 667 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982). A more
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scope of the standing that was conferred. 722 Most judges, however, cit-
ing A/derman, have uniformly denied standing to anyone neither over-
heard nor claiming a possessory interest in the surveillance site. 723 Thus,
by rejecting target standing, Alderman sharply reduced potential Title III
litigation before it had a chance to develop. 724
Unfortunately, some courts effected even further restrictions by ig-
noring Title III's explicit conferral of standing to overheard parties. 725
Although Alderman recognized that overheard parties have standing, at
least one case has suggested in dicta72 6 -and others have squarely
held-that such persons are not entitled to receive consideration of their
claims. For example, in Khaalis v. United States ,727 standing was denied
two terrorist kidnappers whose telephone conversations with accom-
plices were overheard. The Khaalis court read Alderman as establishing
that Title III standing limitations were designed to reflect "existent
standing rules,' ' 728 and that such rules, at the time of enactment, did not
confer standing upon trespassers. 72 9 While it is true that underJones v.
United States7 30 one basis for effecting standing was not available to per-
sons not "legitimately on the premises,' 73' Khaalis failed to acknowledge
that this preclusion did not extend to all other bases potentially bestow-
ing standing. For example, although the Supreme Court has recently
legitimate way to achieve the purpose contemplated by the court would simply be to apply
the statute's target standing provisions. See also infra note 740.
722 For example, in the cases that conferred standing, see supra note 720, a different result
would have been mandated had the courts found that these defendants, none of whom had
been intercepted or claimed to have had property interests at stake, were not targets of the
investigation.
723 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated sub noma.
Croucher v. United States, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); United States v. Bynum, 513 F.2d 533, 534-
35 (2d Cir.),cer. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 359
n. 6 (N.D. Ill.), ajf'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp.
912, 932 (M.D. Pa. 1972), afd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Berrigan, 482
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. deniedsub nom. Hood v. United States, 446 U.S. 987 (1980),cert. deniedsub nor. Rideout v.
United States, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
724 See generally NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 62 (chart from which inference may be
drawn about number of people without standing).
725 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1976).
726 United States v. Whittaker, 474 F.2d 1246, 1247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973).
727 Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 340-41 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092
(1980).
728 Id. at 340.
729 Id.
730 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).




held that an "expectation of privacy" is a prerequisite to standing, 732
"existent standing rules" in 1968 would have conferred standing upon a
trespassing felon arrested on private property in possession of an illegal
handgun; 73 3 alternatively, his standing claim could have been recog-
nized under "automatic standing" for crimes of possession734 or through
the search incident to arrest of his person.735 The Khaalis court may
have been influenced both by the particularly gruesome facts before it-
the taking of 130 hostages, murder of one man, repeated threats of exe-
cution by beheading-and by the distinct possibility that defendants
were actually asserting a valid Title III claim. 736 Nevertheless, the legis-
lative history's reference to Jones v. United States was painfully misapplied
and the statute's plain language blatantly ignored.
Although Khaalis admittedly may be an example of a "hard case
making bad law," the decision is not an isolated aberration. In the con-
text of minimization, statutory standing principles have frequently been
frustrated. This has been accomplished in two different respects: (1) by
denying standing altogether to overheard parties lacking a sufficient,
court imposed, nexus to the subject telephone; or (2) by restricting the
scope of one's standing only to suppression of those conversations im-
properly minimized. The most remarkable statutory violation has been
occasioned in those jurisdictions holding that a minimization claim may
not be asserted unless the overheard party is the telephone subscriber, a
member of his family, or otherwise has a privacy interest in the premises
where the phone is located.737 Typically, these rulings have been made
either without explanation or by a conclusory statement that no privacy
interest is impinged unless one of these preconditions has been met. 73 8
732 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
140-43 (1978).
733 Federal law makes it illegal for convicted felons to possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a)(1) (1976).
734 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 264. Jones was overturned by United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 89-90, but nevertheless reflects the standing rules codified by Title III.
See supra notes 362-88 and accompanying text.
735 See Russo v. United States, 391 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 885
(1968); Baily v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Clemas v. United States,
382 F.2d 403, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 962 (1968).
736 See Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d at 319. Defendants claimed, inter alia, that the
use of Title III's emergency provision was improper. Since the kidnapping apparently in-
volved neither national security interests nor organized crime elements, their argument may
have been valid. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
737 See United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Hinton,
543 F.2d 1002, 101 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); United States v.
Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); United States v.
Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972); United States v. Aloi, 449
F. Supp. 698, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally Fishman, supra note 596, at 350-51.
738 See supra note 737.
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This result baldy disregards Title III's definition of aggrieved person,
and may ultimately remove law enforcement's incentive to minimize.
739
For example, if police obtain a wiretap for Citizen Small Fry's telephone
to intercept conversations of "Citizen Small Fry and others as yet un-
known," knowledge that virtually all who speak with Citizen Small Fry
may not raise minimization claims could prompt a decision to sacrifice
the case against Citizen Small Fry and gain the benefit of indiscriminate
listening to all of his calls involving "higher ups."' 74 0
While not all courts have defined standing so restrictively, 74 1 many
have severely limited its scope by holding that only those conversations
improperly minimized are subject to suppression. 742 Law enforcement
739 Prior to Dalia, this was also a problem in cases involving covert entry. Some jurisdic-
tions limited standing to raise that claim to persons with a proprietary interest in the prem-
ises. See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, § 296, at 396.
740 But see generally supra note 718. Of course, even in these jurisdictions conversations be-
tween "Small Fry" and other household members would be amenable to Title III minimiza-
tion claims. Nevertheless, B and C, using "Small Fry's" telephone, would not qualify for
minimization protection if they were not household members, or otherwise had a cognizable
privacy interest. This analysis might also preclude the availability of criminal or civil penal-
ties to serve as deterrents because courts taking this stance may be saying that there is no need
to minimize when the parties lack sufficient nexus to the target telephone. See supra note 737;
see also Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 877-88 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2959 (1982). Even so, the admissibility of Title III evidence should not turn on a litigant's
ability to convince, or, indeed, to pressure, a non-defendant to file a suppression motion.
741 See United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
947 (1975); State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 426, 427 A.2d 537, 541 (1981).
742 See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United
States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 746- 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. King,
335 F. Supp. 523, 543-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974). "Cases adopting this view generally remit the defendant to
civil remedies for the interception of innocent conversations." United States v. Principie, 531
F.2d 1132, 1140 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
In United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir.
1982), the court ruled that any intercepted person could achieve suppression of conversations
which fell within "a pattern of unlawful interception." Id. at 395. The court acknowledged
that "[tlhe evidence demonstrates that the monitoring agents intercepted a substantial
number of conversations involving individuals who were not subjects of the surveillance order
concerning matters that even on a liberal reading of the authorized objective. . . . had noth-
ing to do with [the stated investigative purpose]." Id. at 393. Nevertheless, suppression was
not mandated because the conversations in question were said not to have fallen within the
overall pattern of unlawfulness. Id. at 395-97. In this respect, however, the court's analysis
was in fundamental error. Focusing on whether a particular conversation falls within "a
pattern of unlawful interception" is an appropriate analytic mode only if the pattern concept
in not construed in unduly narrow terms. While, in the context of a long-term investigation,
it would ordinarily make no sense to mandate total suppression by virtue of a few isolated
paterns of unintentional unlawful interception, from a deterrence standpoint it likewise
makes no sense to hold that only improperly minimized conversations fall within the pattern
of illegality. See infta notes 743-44 and accompanying text. Rather, once a pattern of illegal-
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thereby loses only that to which it had never been entitled. 743 More-
over, in most instances, this approach leads to suppression only of
nonpertinent innocent conversations which the prosecution had never in-
tended to use.7 4 Although these decisions are derived by analogy to the
scope of suppression that is applied when conventional search warrants
have been exceeded,745 the result is hardly one which promotes deter-
rence.746 Accordingly, some courts have insisted on total suppression, at
least when the minimization violation was intentional.747 This ap-
proach conforms more with the underlying purpose of Title III;748 as
yet, however, it is a minority view.749 Thus, in the context of standing,
Title III litigation has been hampered both by Alderman and the courts'
frequent failure to enforce the statute in light of its literal language or
foundational policy considerations.
B. EXHAUSTION OF INVESTIGATIVE ALTERNATIVES
Section 2518(l)(c) requires that each surveillance application con-
tain "afull and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to
ity has developed, all conversations occurring within the relevant timespan (i.e. all calls han-
dled that day by that particular monitor) should be viewed as falling within the unlawful
pattern.
743 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 94; see Note, supra note 258, at 123-24; Note, supra note
535, at 1432.
744 See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046-47 (D. Md. 1972), afd, 469 F.2d
522 (4th Cir.), afd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) ("Knowing that
only 'innocent' calls would be suppressed, the government could intercept every conversation
during the entire period of a wiretap with nothing to lose by doing so since it would use at
trial only those conversations which had definite incriminating value anyway . . .";
United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 403 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973),vacatedon other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). This will not always be true. Occasionally,
an apparently innocent conversation becomes relevant in other respects. See COMMISSION
STUDIES, supra note 32, at 122, 185.
745 See, e.g., United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. at 746-47; United States v. King, 335 F.
Supp. at 544; Note, supra note 258, at 123-24.
746 One commentator, however, has suggested that, under a total suppression approach,
courts would be reluctant to find minimization violations. Note, supra note 535, at 1435
n.116.
747 See Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41,
49-50, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1328, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 635 (1977). In Scott, the Court left open the
question of what remedy is required for excessive monitoring. 436 U.S. at 135 n. 10. New
Jersey has provided, by statute, for total suppression wihout regard to whether the violation
was intentional. State v. Catania, 85 NJ. at 426, 427 A.2d at 541.
748 Since most surveillances involve the seizure of numerous conversations, absent inten-
tional misconduct, blanket suppression should not be mandated for an isolated violation.
Instead, such suppression should be required only when the minimization violations are such
that a pattern of illegality has been established. Arguably, this is what the statute already
requires. See supra note 742. If not, it should be explicitly amended accordingly.
749 Partial suppression, however, has created similar problems in other Title III contexts.
See J. CARR, supra note 18, at 357-59.
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be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. ' 750 Based upon
this statement, section 2518(3)(c) requires the authorizing judge to find
that alternative means for achieving the investigation's objectives are
inadequate.75 1 This determination is a prerequisite to the issuance of
any eavesdropping order. Thus, basic to Title III is the concept of ne-
cessity; electronic surveillance is not to be routinely employed. 752
This requirement stems from two distinct constitutional principles
underlying Title III: (1) prior notice of fourth amendment intrusions,
and (2) utilization of the least drastic means. The Constitution, of
course, does not expressly require that governmental searches be accom-
panied by notice. In conventional searches, this has not become an issue
because execution of the warrant normally serves notice that a search is
about to occur.753 The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that, ab-
sent exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment requires an an-
nouncement of purpose prior to entry pursuant to warrant.75 4 This
constitutional ingredient, however, clearly would pose insuperable barri-
ers to effective electronic surveillance, where success necessarily depends
upon secrecy; hence, prior notice obviously cannot be given. Berger and
Katz, however, strongly intimated that this omission cannot be constitu-
tionally justified unless there has been some "showing of special facts" or
"exigent circumstances. '755 In effect, a showing of necessity thereby be-
came a constitutional substitute for prior notice.756 The necessity re-
quirement, however, also relates to a more direct constitutional source,
since both Berger and Katz seemed to suggest that fourth amendment
jurisprudence independently requires governmental intrusions to be
minimized by a least drastic means approach. 757
While a necessity requirement is therefore constitutionally based,
Title III sponsors also considered it desirable from a policy standpoint.
750 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
751 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1976).
752 See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415
U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974).
753 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967). Of course, if no one is on the
premises at the time of the search, prior notice is not given.
754 Se Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-42 (1963).
7-55 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60
(1967); accord NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 56-57.
756 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 60.
757 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 355-56; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 57
(citing with approval a warrant of limited duration so that "no greater invasion of privacy
was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances"). Title III's durational limita-
tion, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(I)(d), (5) (1976), similarly reflects this concept. See LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2190. The use of least drastic means has also been implicit in
conventional fourth amendment situations. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-57




They clearly perceived that the severe intrusion occasioned by electronic
surveillance should be avoided if effective law enforcement can be
achieved through less drastic means. 758 Electronic surveillance was not
to be used if it would merely be helpful; rather, it was to be a "tool of
last resort. ' 759 This posture, however, did not appease Title III critics
who reasoned that whenever law enforcement invoked the name of or-
ganized crime, the necessity requirement would be expeditiously
deemed satisfied. 760 Unfortunately, this predicton soon became reality.
Since Title III was enacted, suppression for failure to comply with
the necessity requirement has been extremely rare.76 ' Although Con-
gress did not intend boilerplate assertions of exhaustion to constitute
statutory compliance, 762 that, in fact, has too often become the norm.
763
758 For example, during the legislative debate, one Senator made the following
observations:
[Title III] further requires a showing that "normal investigative proceedings have been
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous." We agree with the thought underlying this requirement that wiretapping
and eavesdropping should not be used unless absolutely necessary. [Title III] should
not, however, leave open the possibility of satisfying this requirement by a boilerplate
recital of the statutory language. It should provide for a description with particulars of
the efforts that have been made to obtain evidence without wiretapping or eavesdrop-
ping methods.
114 CONG. REC. 14, 474 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long), quoted in Note, Electronic Surveillance,
Title III and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 571, 604 (1975).
759 Senator McClellan viewed the necessity requirement as: "a requirement designed to
make the use of [electronic surveillance] a tool of last resort." 115 CONG. REc. 23, 240 (1969).
In a somewhat different context, the ABA study intimated that the concept of need could be
viewed from four different perspectives:
(1) "helpful," that is, it will make the investigation easier; (2) "necessary," that is, some
investigations will be successful without it, but not enough; (3) "indispensable," that is,
few, if any investigations will be successful without it; and (4) "certain," that is, other
techniques of investigation will only sometimes work while electronic surveillance tech-
niques will always work.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 49. Given the need to limit electronic surveillance, alter-
native three, indispensability, represents the most appropriate perspective for applying this
concept. Nevertheless, the statutory exhaustion mandate at times may be self-defeating. For
example, it is certainly conceivable that long term undercover infiltration or visual surveil-
lance may be more intrusive than short term atdio surveillance, but the statute does not even
consider this possibility.
760 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 486. For example, one skeptic observed:
Mr. Justice Clark said only that overcoming the requirement of notice would require
"some showing of special facts" to justify the secrecy and the "unconsented entry"-a
nice euphemism for an otherwise tortious and possibly criminal trespass. In practice, this
will mean no more than that the police will say that no other means of obtaining the
evidence is known to them.
T. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 110 (citations omitted).
761 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66; J. CARR, supra note 18, at § 4.05(4) (Supp. 1982).
For examples of cases that have suppressed evidence for failure to comply with the necessity
requirement, see United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, (D. Md. 1974); State v.
DiMauro, 205 Neb. 275, 279, 287 N.W.2d 74, 77-78 (1980); cf. United States v. Spagnuolo,
549 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1977).
762 See, e.g., supra note 758.
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Rather than provide a "full and complete statement" detailing the fail-
ure, or likely failure, of investigative alternatives, law enforcement has
often simply stated in conclusory terms that success cannot otherwise be
achieved. Typically, these representations have relied upon the affiant's
experience in dealing with other cases involving the same type of crimi-
nal activity;76 in fact, the statement is often simply a "cut and paste"
job from prior applications. 765 The use of boilerplate terminology sug-
gests that alternative investigative modes actually are not being consid-
ered. 76 6 Moreover, such applications do not give the judge an
independent means for evaluating whether electronic surveillance is nec-
essary in the particular cases under consideration. While it is certainly
true that previous experience with certain types of crimes-narcotics
and gambling, for example-may have amply demonstrated that alter-
natives are unavailing, law enforcement should still be required to sup-
plement this boilerplate assertion with a "full and complete statement"
tied to the facts of each case. 76 7 At the very least, the statement should
detail all efforts made in determining whether other means were reason-
ably available in the instant investigation. 768
763 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67. Testimony before the National Wiretapping
Commission repeatedly emphasized this problem. For example:
[I]t would appear that issuing judges rarely require more than a sworn allegation in
conclusory form that "other investigative procedures have been tried and failed and ap-
pear unlikely to succeed" based upon a ritualistic assertion by the investigative agency
that the intended subject acts in a "covert manner."
Of course, there are no statistics available on the number of applications rejected by
a judge who finds that other investigative means were available, but not one reported
Federal District or Circuit Court case has ever held that Title III's "normal investigative
procedure" requirement was violated. Such a record strongly indicates need for legisla-
tive direction as to the circumstances upon which a judge scrutinizing an eavesdropping
application may rely in making the determination required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(3)(c).
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 607-08 (statement of Stanley S. Arkin, Esq.). But see supra
note 761. Another example:
A graphic illustration of the illusory compliance with the statute occurred in one case I
defended where the affidavit contained the names of suspects from a prior case and not
those of the suspect in the case in question. The Government's explanation was that in
putting the affidavit together, a secretary had cut out too much of the prior affidavit for
use in the instant one. The Court allowed that this was not a fatal mistake.
Id. at 618 (statement of James K. O'Malley, Esq.). See infia note 771 and accompanying text.
764 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67. For examples of cases approving conclusion-
ary affidavits, see infra note 770.
765 See supra note 763.
766 See Note, supra note 758, at 604.
767 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2)(c) (1976).
768 While it may be true that "information about the thirtieth bookmaking operation for
which a wiretap is sought, except for names, dates, and addresses, is likely to be the same as
the information about the 29 bookmaking operations which preceeded it," NWC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 14, failure to include all relevant facts in the affidavit, even with classic
patterns of crime, ignores the possibility that other investigative techniques may still be effec-
tive in the case at hand. See infta note 775 and accompanying text; see also NWC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 66-67.
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Although a few courts have subjected the necessity statement and
concomitant judicial determination to meticulous review,769 most have
been inclined to give the matter cursory approval; consequently, defi-
cient applications have frequently been sustained. 770 Indeed, on occa-
sion, preprinted forms using stereotyped phrases have been
sanctioned,7 7 ' and some courts have even expressly suggested that, for
certain crimes, regular resort to electronic surveillance is not unreasona-
ble.772 Perhaps not, but the statute still requires that necessity be justi-
fied in each case with a "full and complete statement. '773 While many
of these decisions involved patterns of criminality not historically vul-
nerable to traditional investigative techniques, 774 electronic surveillance
was sometimes authorized in situations where less drastic means ap-
peared to have been working.775 Moreover, in numerous other instances
the courts' conclusory disposition of the issue effectively precluded sub-
sequent critique of investigative alternatives. 776
769 See United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867-68 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Daly,
535 F.2d 434, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 814; see also
supra note 761.
770 See United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1977);
United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977);
United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919
(1978); United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1975); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851-52 (S.D.N.Y.), aJ'd, 553 F.2d 94 (2d
Cir. 1977).
771 See Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 393,401-03,249 S.E.2d 110, 118 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1978).
772 See United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855
(1977); United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d at 1130 ("wiretapping is particularly appropriate
when the telephone is routinely relied on to conduct the criminal enterprise under investiga-
tion"); United States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y.), aJ'd, 663 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1980).
773 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976).
774 This is normally true with regard to narcotics and gambling. NWC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 66-67.
775 See United States v. Sandoval, 550 F.2d 427,429-31 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
879 (1977); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 257 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1976) (inside informant refused chance to gain more information, but court reasoned he
would have had difficulty learning all details of conspiracy and that his criminal record
would have detracted from credibility of his testimony); United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d
at 1130-32; United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1973); NWC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 51; COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at 61,419. Admittedly, informants
rarely penetrate high echelons of criminal enterprises, but it can be done. See Alpern, I Was a
Mobster For the FB.Z., NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1982, at 26. While it is true that informant testi-
mony is not always credible, once an informant is inside the organization, better sources of
evidence may develop. Finally, on occasion, the government may have misrepresented that
informants were not willing to testify. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51, 66; C. FISHMAN,
supra note 438, at 122-23; c. United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. at 851-52.
776 See e.g., United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v.
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Several factors explain this phenomenon. First, despite Berger and
Katz, some courts have not realized that a constitutional principle is at
issue. 777 Accordingly, they have failed to accord it much attention. Sec-
ond, many jurists, observing the Senate Report's commentary that this
requirement is to "be tested in a practical and common sense fash-
ion, ' 7 78 have responded with undue flexibility to government claims of
necessity. Thus, cases have held that electronic surveillance need not be
considered a last resort, 7 79 and that the burden to effect compliance is
"not great. '78 0 Finally, many judges, lacking investigative expertise, are
inclined to defer to the judgment of law enforcement personnel.78 1
Underlying each of these factors, however, is a deficiency in judicial
analysis. The failure to comprehend that the necessity doctrine was de-
rived from a constitutional premise is but a blatant example. Likewise,
the tendency to rationalize approval on the basis of "common sense"
fundamentally misunderstands Title III's legislative history. By sug-
gesting that this issue was to be handled in a "common sense fashion,"
Congress did not intend to intimate that the standard for compliance
was "not great," or that electronic surveillance was not a last resort. On
the contrary, careful analysis of citations provided in the legislative re-
port indicates that electronic surveillance was viewed as "an exceptional
method" that was "inherently objectionable" and which, therefore, had
Scully, 546 F.2d 255, 261 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1976); United States v. Lawson,
545 F.2d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
777 Most courts, however, appear to have ignored this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Pe-
rillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 921 (D. Del. 1971); Note, supra note 758, at 586.
778 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2190; see Note, supra note 758. at 589.
779 See United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Karri-
gan, 514 F.2d 35, 38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); United States v. Falcone, 364
F. Supp. 877, 889 (D.N.J. 1973),aft'd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974). On occasion, the Depart-
ment of Justice has had difficulty articuating the appropriate standard in this respect. See
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 35 (statement of Henry E. Peterson, Assistant Attorney
General). The UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL now states that "[w]ire and oral inter-
ceptions have been and should remain almost the last resort of law enforcement." UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL title 9, supra note 603, at 14 (1979) (emphasis added). The
MANUAL, however, does stress the importance of exhaustion and cautions against the use of
boilerplate. Id. at 12-14.
780 United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 20; United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428,
431 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982-83 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 342, 399 (N.D. I11.), aft'd, 690
F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Webster, 473 F. Supp. 586, 595 (D. Md. 1979),
rev'd in part and aj'd in part, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1991 (1982).
Other courts have taken a similar position: "It]o support a finding, that normal investigative
procedures are unlikely to be successful, we interpret the congressional directive as only re-
quiring that there exist a factual predicate in the affidavit." United States v. Armocida, 515
F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 1975). While not all of these cases were wrongly decided, they have
served to set a standard which is too easy for law enforcement to meet.
781 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 77.
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to "be used with great caution. ' 782 In context, the reference to common
sense only meant that "[m]erely because a normal investigative tech-
nique is theoretically possible, it does not necessarily follow that it is
likely. '783 Thus, comparative effectiveness and common sense were to
be factors in the last resort analysis. Moreover, merely because the ques-
tion of investigative alternatives is to be resolved using common sense
does not excuse the need for a "full and complete statement" addressing,
in nonconclusory form, all options in the context of each case;78 4 indeed,
without such compliance, intelligent judicial review cannot take place.
Similarly, a judge's tendency to accord great weight to investigative de-
cisions of law enforcement officials should not preclude him from ensur-
ing that the "full and complete statement" required by statute has, in
fact, been filed. Such a statement should contain, in effect, an investiga-
tive checklist of every alternative potentially available and an explana-
tion of its inutility. 78 5 Moreover, ranking the list in terms of severity of
782 PRIVY COUNCILLORS COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNI-
CATION, CMD. 283, at § 64 (1957). This report was cited in Title III's legislative history re-
garding the exhaustion issue:
This requirement is patterned after traditional search warrant practice and present Eng-
lish procedure in the issuance of warrants to wire tap. . . . Compare Report of the Commit-
tee of Councillors Appointed to Inquire into the Interception of Communication, par. 64 (1957)
[(which closely parallels the language in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (c))]. . . . Normal investiga-
tive procedure would include, for example, standard visual or aural surveillance . .. ,
general questioning or interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular search
warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or
informants.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I 1, at 2190; see also Blakey & Hancock, supra note 378, at
672. Although some authors have criticized the Senate Report for "diminish[ing] the impor-
tance of § 2518(1)(c)," see J. CARR, supra note 18, at 179, the legislative history is actually
clear. It is the court's misapplication which has occasioned this problem.
783 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2190.
784 In each application, the specific reasons underlying the need for electronic surveillance
should be included so that the judge may make his decision with regard to the facts of the
case. United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 620-21 (D. Md. 1974). For good examples of
appropriate exhaustion language, see C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 120-28. See aLso NWC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 56-58. It should also be noted that the affidavit must establish
probable cause as to both the "targeted person(s)" and the potential effectiveness of surveil-
lance. State v. Hinchion, 207 Neb. 478, 485-86, 299 N.W.2d 748, 753 (1980) (failure to estab-
lish probable cause that "higher-ups" in a gambling operation were connected to those using
the targeted premises, as well as failure to establish probable cause as to the targeted tele-
phone, required suppression of evidence).
785 A brief list of investigative alternatives was set forth in the legislative history. See supra
note 782. Other means which should be considered include the following: pen registers, con-
tempt proceedings, perjury prosecutions, use of accomplice testimony, and grand jury subpoe-
nas for documents. Of course, merely because alternatives are available theoretically does not
mean they necessarily will be effective. No technique is perfect. For example, there may be
considerable concern that a "target" will become aware of the investigation-with physical
surveillance, a lack of "fresh faces" may cause a target to notice surveilling officers and conse-
quently become "leery." NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 417 (statement of Detective
Robert Nicholson, N.Y.P.D.). Informant testimony has traditionally posed difficulties. Infor-
mants are often reluctant to testify out of fear of physical harm, their criminal records gener-
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intrusion would ensure that a least drastic means analysis has been em-
ployed by both law enforcement and the issuing court. Thus, for exam-
ple, before wiretapping could be authorized, prior utilization of pen
registers and short term consensual monitoring would have to be consid-
ered. Similarly, no bug could be sanctioned if use of a less intrusive wire-
tap might effectively achieve the same result. 78 6 As yet, however, no
court has imposed such a comprehensive requirement upon law enforce-
ment; on the contrary, this type of categorical approach has been uni-
formly rejected. 78 7 Consequently, it is hardly surprising that a 1976
study prepared for the National Wiretapping Commission concluded
ally subject them to damaging impeachment, and they frequently fail to recognize valuable
evidence. See, e.g., id. at 697 (statement of Steven Bertucelli, Office of Public Safety, Dade
County, Florida). Undercover officers, while valuable, risk physical injury if discovered. Pro-
viding effective cover, background identification, lodging, references, clothing to fit the inves-
tigation, backup officers, etc., is usually a very expensive proposition. The officer is also
subject to later allegations of misconduct and personal involvement in criminal activity; he
may, indeed, be forced to commit crimes in order to win the group's acceptance. Id. at 697-98.
Thus, every case should be considered on its own merits. While the standard of necessity
must be appropriately high, critics should not naively assume that alternatives will automati-
cally be as effective in achieving investigative goals.
786 "[T]he 'least intrusive means' test compels courts to consider as prima facie unreasona-
ble a government request to break and enter private premises in order to install a bug-a
presumption that should be rebuttable only by a government proffer of evidence demonstrat-
ing that a conventional wiretap would be ineffective." Comment, The Permissibility of Forcible
Entries by Police in Electronic Surveillance, 57 B.U.L. REx'. 587, 605 (1977). Presumably, the use
of an external bug or wiretap, if reasonably effective, should precede an internal bug. As is,
investigating officers, aware of the dangers inherent in planting an internal bug, favor exter-
nal bugs when tactically feasible. See S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1982). How-
ever, the concept of legally requiring wiretaps as prerequisites to bugs has not been widely
accepted. Seegenerally United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 641; United States v. Clerkly, 556
F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978).
787 See, e.g., United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 19-20. One court attempted to im-
pose a strict standard under which the government must inform the reviewing judge of "(1)
every technique which is customarily used in police work in investigating the type of crime
involved, and (2) explain why each of them has either been unsuccessful or is too dangerous
or unlikely to succeed because of the particular circumstances of that case." United States v.
Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1976). The language quoted above, however, appeared in a
service reporter, 17 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2428, 2429 (1975), modified, 18 CRIM,. L. REP.
(BNA) 2411 (1975), but was deleted in the opinion as it appears in the official reporter. See
also United States v. Fina, 405 F. Supp. 267, 272-73 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (explicitly rejecting
Kalustian as it appeared in the Criminal Law Reporter); United States v. Caruso, 415 F.
Supp. 847, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Hence, similar language should be made a statutory re-
quirement. In this respect, the National Wiretapping Commission's recommendation that
§ 2518 "be amended to require that the exhaustion of alternative investigative techniques
include consideration of the particular facts of the case under investigation, insofar as practi-
cable," NWC REPORTS, supra note 1, at 18, plainly does not deal with the problem ade-
quately. Moreover, the statute should be amended both to require an explicit statement in
the application of the investigative objective and to provide that this objective must be sup-
ported by probable cause. Although already implicitly required by § 2518(5), see supra note
320, an explicit provision would elminate any possibility of exhaustion being achieved by
virtue of an artificial statement of investigative objective (alleging, for example, an objective
not supported by probable cause).
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that "the 'last resort' requirement has gradually [been] eroded. 788
C. PROBABLE CAUSE
Title III, of course, requires probable cause as to person, crime, con-
versation, and communication facility.78 9 Nevertheless, although the
probable cause requirement is constitutionally mandated,790 it has not
always been strictly enforced.79 1 Eavesdropping orders have been
granted based upon stale probable cause; moreover, even when properly
issued, lengthy surveillances routinely have been allowed without regard
to the possibility that intervening factors may have vitiated the original
probable cause.
Staleness is more often a problem in the federal courts, due primar-
ily to the stratified authorization process employed by the Department
of Justice.792 While thorough evaluation is certainly desirable, an obvi-
ous consequence of tiered review is delay. Although special cases may be
expedited, 793 two weeks are typically required to process an application
for the Attorney General's authorization. By way of contrast, authoriza-
tion for state applications can often be accomplished in two days.7 94
Moreover, once the application has been authorized, another day or two
may be required before judicial sanction is received. Finally, although
Title III requires the orders to "be executed as soon as practicable, '795 a
wiretap may take a few days to effect, 796 and surreptitious installation of
788 NWC REPORT, .r.pra note 1, at 66. The Commission, while not expressly adopting this
finding, did recommend that Title III be amended to require, "insofar as practicable," more
detail in exhaustion statements. Id. at 18.
789 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(4) (1976); see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
790 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
791 This discussion focuses primarily on the problem of staleness. For an analysis of other
probable cause related problems in the context of electronic surveillance, see J. CARR, supra
note 18, at §§ 4.05, 4.06(2), 5.05(2)(b), 6.04(2)(b) (1977).
792 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8, 55-59 (describing six stages of review).
793 NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 184-85 (statement of Atlee W. Wampler, III, De-
partment of justice).
794 S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1982); NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 58. For
state procedure, see NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 381, 419; COMMISSION STUDIES,
supra note 322, at 123. Justice Department field personnel may try to expedite matters by
working with state law enforcement agencies to obtain state warrants, but the Department
presently restricts this practice because it circumvents review by the Attorney General. NWC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
795 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). Prompt execution is required to ensure fresh probable
cause. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2192; see ABA STANDARDS, se/ura note 81, at
148-49.
796 See NWC REPORT, supa note 1, at 87; COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at 77;
NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 421 (statement of Detective Robert Nicholson). In sev-
eral states, investigators have received little cooperation from telephone companies, thereby
increasing the amount of time necessary to execute a wiretap order. NWC REPORT, s/ira
note 1, at 8-9.
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a bug considerably longer. 797 Consequently, when surveillance finally
commences, the probable cause affidavit may often be dated by at least
three weeks. 798
Although far shorter periods have often not been tolerated with re-
spect to conventional search warrants, 799 courts have not been troubled
by staleness problems in electronic surveillance cases. To some extent,
this may reflect a lack of imaginative lawyering since defense attorneys
have not often raised the issue. Counsel may not be asserting this claim,
however, simply because the courts are perceived as unreceptive. Typi-
cally, staleness arguments have been rejected because of the continuing
nature of the criminal activity under consideration. 0 0 If the affidavit's
probable cause statement established that a continuing criminal activity
is involved, courts are willing to presume that probable cause is not ren-
dered stale by the passage of three weeks.
This proposition has some validity. Certainly, the duration of
probable cause should reflect its predicate facts.80 ' This concept has
been abused, however. Courts on occasion have sustained surveillances
based upon probable cause predicates from one to three months old.802
797 See, e.g., COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at 278, 396; see also infra note 941.
798 In Title III's early years, the Department of Justice had a three week "freshness" rule:
"Under this provision, no more than three weeks may transpire between the date of the last
information relating to probable cause in the affidavit and the time the affidavit itself reaches
the Attorney General's desk for approval." NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
799 See People v. Montgomery, 27 Ill. 2d 404, 404-05, 189 N.E.2d 327, 328 (1963) (eight
days); People v. Siemienic, 368 Mich. 405, 406-07, 118 N.W.2d 430, 431-32 (1962) (four days);
Commonwealth v. Suppa, 223 Pa. Super. 513, 514, 302 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973);
see also House v. United States, 411 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915 (1969);
United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1971) (execution of warrant within
the ten day limit prescribed by F.R. Crim. P. 41(d) not necessarily compliance with F.R.
Crim. P. 41(c) "forthwith" requirement); United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 841 (2d
Cir. 1969) (Smith, J., concurring), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970) (nine day delay in execu-
tion of warrant not "forthwith" within the meaning of F.R. Crim. P. 41(c)). The courts,
however, at times have been willing to accept substantial delays when the offense involved is
continuing in nature. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 3.7(a); Comment, A Fresh Look at Stale
Probable Cause: Examining the Timeliness Requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 59 IOWA L. REV.
1308, 1314 (1974).
8O See United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1991 (1982); United
States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 363 (N.D. Ill.), afjd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800,809 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.
2d 15 (Fla. 1974). This is the mode of analysis usually relied upon in conventional searches as
well. See supra note 799.
801 This may explain why staleness occurs more quickly in conventional searches. Many
items, narcotics and stolen property, for example, are retained only temporarily until they can
be redistributed. See, e.g., People v. Erthel, 194 Colo. 147, 570 P.2d 534 (1977). See generally
Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 111, at 1549-50.
802 See People v. Montoya, 44 Colo. App. 234, __, 616 P.2d 156, 160-61 (1980) (probable
cause more than three months old); State v. Manning, 379 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (59 days); Hudson v. State, 368 So. 2d 899, 901-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (81 days
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Under such circumstances a finding of enduring probable cause of the
complexity required by Title III is extremely unlikely, notwithstanding
the continuing nature of the crime involved. 0 3 Further, as a matter of
policy, it is questionable whether passage of more than ten to fourteen
days should be permitted.80 4 Even given the need for extensive internal
Justice Department review, ten to fourteen days should be sufficient for
this task; if anything, the courts' present flexibility encourages bureau-
cratic delay. Moreover, regardless of delays inherent to the bureaucratic
process, there is no reason why the government should not be required
to update the information upon which probable cause was based.805
The provision of such information would not necessarily entail further
delays because the affidavit could be supplemented at any time before
submission for judicial authorization. Since a constitutional concept is
potentially at stake, requiring probable cause to be no more than two
weeks old does not seem unreasonable. 8 6 Analytically, such a require-
ment would also be consistent with the necessity principle,80 7 since if
probable cause is based exclusively upon information that is three weeks
stale, it is doubtful law enforcement pursued less drastic alternatives
during the interim period.808
old); Washburn v. State, 10 Md. App. 187, 193-95, 310 A.2d 176, 180-81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1973) (three to six months old); State v. Murphy, 137 N.J. Super. 404, 422, 349 A.2d 122, 143
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (43 days old). But see State v. Ramirez, 351 A.2d 566, 569
(Del Super. Ct. 1976) (two months rejected as stale); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d 15, 17-18
(Fla. 1974) (38 days rejected as stale). Some federal cases have involved probable cause ap-
proximately three weeks old. See United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 866-67 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (34-46 days); United States
v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Fina,
405 F. Supp. 267, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (21 days).
803 See supra notes 246-47 & 318-40 and accompanying text (discussing statutory probable
cause requirement).
804 Although Connecticut has a 15 day staleness rule, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-41(c)(7)
(1979), the provision is unduly rigid since supporting affidavits may contain no information
more than 15 days old. See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 63; NWC HEARINGS, supra note
166, at 321 (statement of Pierce N. Lexal, Esq.).
805 The Department of Justice has, at times, taken this measure. NWC HEARINGS, supra
note 166, at 174 (statement of Atlee W. Wampler, III, Department of Justice). Professor
Fishman provides a number of examples for how this might be done:
A variety of methods can be used to freshen stale information. Toll call records or
surveillance may reveal that the target still calls or meets with others who are demon-
stratably involved in the type of crime under investigation. Informants may be able to
provide enough information to update the probable cause. Alternatively, it may be pos-
sible to affirmatively create the probability that the crime under investigation will be
discussed.
C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, § 78, at 110.
806 This suggestion, however, does not mean that the application may contain no informa-
tion more than 14 days old. See supra note 804.
807 See supra notes 750-59 and accompanying text.
808 This is especially true in situations involving 30 to 90 day staleness problems. See supra
note 802 and accompanying text.
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Although rarely considered, the existence of probable cause is also
basic to the continuation of electronic surveillance. Title III does not
explictly address this point, but it seems apparent that once probable
cause has dissipated by virtue of an unproductive or exculpatory investi-
gation, surveillance cannot constitutionally continue.8 0 9 The statute,
however, provides only limited means for enforcing this principle.
Under section 2518(6), the issuing judge may direct that periodic reports
be submitted "showing what progress has been made toward achieve-
ment of the authorized objective and the need for continued intercep-
tion."81 0 Presumably, should these reports reveal the loss of probable
cause, termination of surveillance would be required. In addition, the
existence of probable cause must be reviewed whenever applications for
extensions are filed.8 11 Neither of these safeguards, however, has proven
adequate.
Remarkably, the staleness issue has almost never been raised in the
context of progress reports. 81 2 This may be attributable, however, to
both legislative design and prevailing judicial analysis. Perhaps the
chief difficulty with the progress report provision is its discretionary na-
ture; reports are not required unless judicially mandated.81 3 This has
impacted upon the probable cause issue in two respects: (1) should a
judge decide not to require progress reports, he normally would not
know whether probable cause has dissipated;8 1 4 and (2) courts have re-
garded violations of this directive as generally insignificant and, there-
fore, as not worthy of careful analysis. Since most judges require
progress reports, 81 5 the question ofjudicial analysis is of greater concern.
Although early decisions suggested that progress reports serve a
critical constitutional role by potentially limiting the duration of elec-
tronic surveillance,1 6 violations of orders directing compliance have
809 For example, assume that police have obtained a valid warrant to search Suspect A's
house. Before execution, however, Citizen X confesses to the crime in question. Assuming
adequate corroboration, the police no longer have probable cause to search Suspect A's
house.
810 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976).
811 See zd. §§ 2518(1)(0, (5); see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 532 (1974);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2162;
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 5.9, at 150.
812 Only a few cases have touched upon this topic. See United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.
Supp. at 358 n.5. United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 867-69 (D.N.J. 1977) (by implica-
tion), aftdon othergrounds, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), zfid, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Howard v.
State, 51 Md. App. 46, -_, 442 A.2d 176, 187 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
813 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976).
814 At any time, however, the issuing judge may require oral progress reports.
815 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-97.
816 See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 306 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States




generally been ignored. Typically, the cases have held that, since these
reports statutorily could be dispensed with entirely,81 7 both their ade-
quacy and possible sanctions for noncompliance are matters best left to
the supervising judge's discretion.818 A few decisions have gone some-
what further by suggesting that noncompliance would warrant suppres-
sion if prejudice could be demonstrated.8 19 The concept of prejudice,
however, has been left undefined. Consequently, failure to provide the
reports, tardy submission, and possibly inadequate compliance have
gone unpunished.
Almost all of these cases, however, have been primarily concerned
with the progress reports' sufficiency from a procedural standpoint-
whether, for example, they accurately reported the number of intercep-
tions-rather than with their adequacy in terms of probable cause.820
Nevertheless, by emphasizing that these claims were generally matters of
judicial discretion, the courts seemed to ignore the possibility that,
under certain circumstances, the constitutionality of continued surveil-
lance also could be at stake. Ultimately, the negative tone of these deci-
sions may have discouraged defense attorneys from raising the probable
cause issue. Recently, however, a few decisions have suggested that pro-
gress reports indicating a loss of probable cause would mandate termi-
nation of surveillance.8 2' Whether this concept will become a
constitutional reality depends 'Upon the courts' willingness to view pro-
gress reports with greater scrutiny.8 22
817 See, e.g., United States v. lanelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1973), afdon othergrounds,
420 U.S. 770 (1975).
818 See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 853, 854 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Ianelli, 477 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 358 n.5 (doubtful that
court has authority to review adequacy of reports; matter of supervising judge's discretion).
United States v. Ianelli, 430 F. Supp. 151, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Morrow v. State, 147 Ga.
App. 395, 398, 249 S.E.2d 110, 115 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); State v. Kohout,
198 Neb. 90, 94, 251 N.W.2d 723, 725 (1977). Doff)man illustrates the deficiency of prevailing
analysis. While the court declined to review the adequacy of the progress reports, it subse-
quently acknowledged in dicta that "once surveillance commenced, the best indicator of
whether probable cause continued was the fruits of the actual surveillance conducted, rather
that the informants' prediction of what future surveillance might uncover." 542 F. Supp. at
363. For a case going to the other extreme unnecessarily, see State v. Baldwin, 289 Md. 635,
638-45, 426 A.2d 916, 919-22, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852 (1981) (progress reports provided, but
suppression for failure to include directive in order). Baldwin, however, was an extremely
rigid construction of a mandatory state statute.
819 United States v. Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841, 847 (N.D. Ala. 1975); State v. Aurilio, 366
So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Marino, 49 N.Y. 2d 774, 775, 403 N.E.2d
179, 181,426 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (1980);cf. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 358 n.5
(recognizing that egregious misrepresentations in reports may justify suppression).
820 United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 358 n.5, however, explicitly raised the sub-
stantive probable cause issue.
821 See Howard v. State, 51 Md. App. 46,_, 442 A.2d 176, 187 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
See generally People v. Marino, 49 N.Y.2d at 775, 403 N.E.2d at 181, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
822 Greater scrutiny could be achieved by amending Title III to require mandatory pro-
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Strict enforcement of probable cause principles also has been a
problem in the context of extension orders. Although, by statutory de-
sign, extensions were to be premised upon both enduring probable cause
and continued need for surveillance, 2 3 in actuality they have been
granted without careful consideration of these factors. Thus, the Na-
tional Wiretap Commission found that the quality of judicial review
varied considerably with regard to extensions, and suggested that closer
scrutiny was in order.8 24 Significantly, there are no reported cases hold-
ing an extension order invalid.8 25 Once again, this may reflect a lack of
creative lawyering, since very few cases have raised the issue. On at
least two occasions, however, courts have extended previously unpro-
ductive wiretaps without any additional showing of probable cause.8 26
Other times, extensions have been sustained by conclusory analysis that
failed to examine explicitly the probable cause issue. 2 7 Thus, there is
some basis for concluding that the concerns of early Title III critics, who
feared unduly prolonged electronic surveillance, have been realized.8 28
D. PARTICULARITY OF CONVERSATION
Particularity of conversation is critical to Title III because it serves
to limit the scope of surveillance. There is a direct relationship between
particularity and the minimization requirements; as anything not perti-
nent to the particularized conversation must be minimized, broader de-
scriptions afford law enforcement greater leeway. Nevertheless, courts
have not always been circumspect in evaluating the adequacy of these
descriptions. Since conversations usually cannot be precisely predicted
in advance,8 29 the courts have accepted generic descriptions particular-
gress reports. The reports should be required to address minimization concerns, the question
of continued probable cause, as well as continued necessity in light of the investigative objec-
tive. Since the filing of such reports may occasionally be unduly onerous, suppression should
not automatically follow for noncompliance, provided that an adequate oral report has been
given to the supervising judge.
823 See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
824 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 12; see also id. at 98.
825 J. CARR, Supra note 18, § 5.10, at 278.
826 United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972);
United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 537 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973). Both cases noted that anticipated incriminating conversa-
tions had not yet taken place, but did not find that nonoccurrence detracted from the original
probable cause predicate. It is difficult to justify long term surveillance on this basis.
827 See United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1979); People v. Marino, 49
N.Y.2d at 775, 403 N.E.2d at 181, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
828 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
829 See supra notes 305-06 & 323-26 and accompanying text. To some extent, conversations
can be predicted in advance. This is accomplished relatively easily in one party consensual
surveillance. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. On other occasions, success may
sometimes be achieved by taking certain investigative measures that are likely to stimulate
conversation. See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 151; COMMISSION STuDIES, supra note 322,
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ized only in terms of the type of criminal activity under investigation.8 30
While designation by categories may be constitutionally acceptable, 83'
courts occasionally have applied this principle too broadly.
As discussed in connection with the early critical response to Title
III, a valid description must particularize the crime in a manner directly
related to the predicate facts establishing probable cause for the per-
son(s) named in the order.8 32 Since the purpose of particularity is to
limit surveillance to the extent possible, the description should be no
broader than permitted by the underlying probable cause predicate.8 33
Accordingly, if probable cause has been established that Drug Dealers A
and B will be discussing cocaine transaction X' on a certain phone, the
description should reflect this specificity. Thus, for example, of the fol-
lowing sample descriptions, only the fourth would suffice: (1) conversa-
tions involving narcotics; (2) conversations between Drug Dealers A and
B involving narcotics; (3) conversations between Drug Dealers A and B
involving cocaine; (4) conversations between Drug Dealers A and B in-
volving cocaine transaction X.
Description (1) is obviously inadequate, since it is not limited to the
specific persons or specific crime for which probable cause has been es-
tablished. Description (2) is not sufficiently specific as to crime; the
probable cause was for cocaine transaction X, not narcotics generally.8 34
Similarly, description (3) is deficient as to crime; the probable cause was
for cocaine transaction X, not cocaine generally.835 Admittedly, had the
probable cause been more general in nature so that, for example, con-
versations related to narcotics transaction A', rather than cocaine trans-
action X, were anticipated, the description could have been broadened
accordingly. Similarly, if there was probable cause for a continuing se-
ries of cocaine transactions, there would have been no need to limit the
at 101; NAT'L COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, LAw ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
CONFERENCE 35 (1976).
830 Set United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
971 (1976); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 780-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d at 121-22; see a/so NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at
65. For a sample of a well drafted application, see NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 446.
831 See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
832 See id.
833 See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 781.
834 For example, in a conventional search, if police have probable cause to believe stolen
televisions will be found on defendant's property, the warrant should specify "stolen televi-
sion" rather than "stolen property generally." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.6(c). The
admissibility of any other items would then turn upon plain view principles. See infia notes
868-70 and accompanying text.
835 Cf. United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 273-77 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975) (surveillance order for criminal activity of Della Villa does not cover activity of
one Della Cava).
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authorization to transaction X. s 36 But, this does not change the need for
requiring particularity of conversation to correspond with specificity of
probable cause. If probable cause exists only for cocaine transaction X",
conversations concerning heroin, or, for that matter, cocaine transaction
Y, transcend the scope of the probable cause predicate. Therefore, they
must be viewed as distinct offenses not covered by the eavesdropping
order. This is not to suggest that conversations pertaining to other
crimes are not subject to interception. They very well may be, but their
subsequent admissibility would then depend upon proper application of
constitutional and statutory plain view principles.8 3 7
Thus far, courts have failed to address the particularity require-
ment in this manner. Rather, they have approved generalized descrip-
tions, despite relatively specific probable cause predicates. 8 38 Thus, the
836 Concededly, it is usually not difficult to draft a valid description which is nevertheless
quite broad.
837 See infia notes 839-90 and accompanying text.
838 See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613,620 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935
(1980) (probable cause existed for stolen diamonds, but order referenced stolen property gen-
erally); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 439-40 (8th Cir. 1976) (description of conversa-
tions regarding mail fraud held to cover conversations related to different mail fraud scheme).
See generally United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1138-39 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 905 (1977) (surveillance warrant liberally construed to cover seizure of conversations
regarding future securities thefts). Note that surveillance orders for racketeering cases under
the federal RICO statute, see infra notes 1011-13 and accompanying text, must be carefully
scrutinized because the generic racketeering charge may be based upon any of numerous
predicate crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1976); see United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp.
at 387 n.45 (recognizing that order must be specifically linked to particular RICO predicate
offense). See generall United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). An-
other occasional problem has been the tendency of some courts to save orders with deficient
descriptions by referring to the affidavit and application. However, unless the order incorpo-
rates by reference the other papers, this approach is inappropriate since only the order defines
the limits of what may properly be seized. See Hudson v. State, 368 So. 2d 899, 903 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (description merely referenced "voice communications"). See generally United
States v. Maninello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); J. CARR, supra note 18,
§ 4.05(3) (c).
The problem described in the text is particularly well illustrated by the Dorfman case,
albeit in a somewhat different context. There the district court found an extension applica-
tion defective for failure to include an explanation required by § 2518(1)() "of results. . . to
date, or an explanation of failure to obtain results." 542 F. Supp. at 374. The court properly
recognized that this aspect of the application was consequently lacking probable cause, but it
declined to suppress because there were other allegations in the supporting affidavits which
established probable cause as to other illegality:
However, the failure of the government to justify continued interception on March 1
based on the Bingo Palace, Slots-A-Fun and Horseshore allegations does not vitiate the
March 1 order entered by Chief Judge Parsons, because those were not the only allega-
tions in the application. In his affidavit, Wacks also alleged that the FBI had intercepted
conversations pursuant to the January 29 wiretap order which "concern the promotion
and management of hidden and unlawful financial interests in the Aladdin hotel-casino
and possibly other casinos located in Las Vegas, Nevada."
Id. at 375. Such analysis, however, fails to consider that, unless the resulting warrant was
limited to authorizing the seizure of conversations for which probable cause existed, the ulti-
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judiciary has often circumvented constitutional and statutory proce-
dures for handling the interception of crimes not originally within the
proper scope of the warrant.
E. PLAIN VIEW SEIZURES
Despite their concern for limiting the scope of electronic surveil-
lance, Title III's drafters realized that conversations pertinent to crimes
not specified in the warrant would inevitably be overheard; the minimi-
zation process was inherently imperfect, 39 and many criminals, espe-
cially those associated with organized crime, tended to diversify their
activities.8 40 Thus, section 2517(5) was designed to handle evidence of
new crimes.
In effect, section 2517(5) establishes a statutory plain view proce-
dure. At the time it was drafted, however, plain view was not yet a
firmly established constitutional doctrine.8 4 1 If anything, plain view
seizures stemming from search warrant executions had been constitu-
tionally suspect since Marron v. United States,842 in which the Supreme
Court interpreted the fourth amendment's particularity requirement as
precluding plain view seizures. Accordingly, officers executing a search
warrant could seize only those items particularized in the order. Marron,
however, was a 1927 decision, and its continued validity had been cast
into doubt by a series of decisions sustaining plain view seizures in the
context of valid warrantless searches.843 Nevertheless, in order to be cer-
tain of conforming to the Constitution, Congress imposed a retroactive
amendment requirement upon plain view interceptions. 844 This re-
quirement was derived by analogy to regular search warrant proce-
dure.8 45 Under prevailing 1968 practice, officers who came upon an
mate seizure might be impermissibly broad. Hence, although the Dorfman facts are somewhat
unclear, since the remainder of the court's opinion indicates that probable cause was limited
to one or two casinos, the resulting description should have conformed in kind. Id. at 375-76.
Seizure of evidence pertaining to undescribed illegality would then have been subjected to a
plain view analysis. See infia notes 839-90 and accompanying text. Yet, the potential over-
breadth of the description in the eavesdropping warrant was never addressed. See also Dorf-
man, 542 F. Supp. at 381-82 (same type of analysis repeated by court in another context).
839 See supra notes 328-30 & 610 and accompanying text.
840 Callahan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1960) (conspiracies usually involve di-
verse crimes); NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 97; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81 at 31-44.
See general/y 118 CONG. REc. 10, 468 (1972) (statement of Senator McClellan).
841 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 142-44.
842 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196-98 (1927).
843 ABA STANDARDS, upra note 81, at 142-44; W. LAFAVE,supra note 60, at 163-67 (1978);
see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235-36 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
238-40 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1947); United States v. Eisner,
297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962).
844 Blakey & Hancock, supra note 378, at 670-71.
845 Id.
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item in plain view while executing a search warrant could place it under
guard until another warrant had been obtained authorizing seizure.
8 46
Therefore, Congress reasoned, evidence of other crimes could be over-
heard so long as another warrant was subsequently issued approving the
interception. 847 Of course, in contrast to regular searches, plain view
evidence generated by electronic surveillance necessarily would be
seized before the warrant could be obtained. This distinction was
deemed de minimis, however, when admissibility was conditioned upon a
judicial determination retroactively sanctioning the plain view seizure.
Accordingly, section 2517(5) provides, in pertinent part:
When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in inter-
cepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized herein, in-
tercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof,
and evidence derived therefrom [may be admissible] when authorized or
approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on
subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be
made as soon as practicable.8 48
The legislative history indicates that judicial approval under sec-
tion 2517(5) requires "a showing that the original order was lawfully
obtained, that it was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge
search, and that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted
during the course of a lawfully executed order. '8 49 While section
2517(5) has been criticized as providing undue incentive for broad sur-
veillance,8 50 the provision seems to be a reasonable accommodation of
constitutional principles to the realities of electronic searches.8 5 ' More-
846 Id.
847 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2189. Since there is no policy reason for
restricting otherwise proper retroactive amendments to those crimes originally designated by
statute, Title III does not purport to do so. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11I, at 2189.
Nevertheless, a few states have erroneously interpreted their statutes to restrict retroactive
amendments to designated crimes. See J. CARR, supra note 18, § 5.09(3)(a), at 275.
848 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1976).
849 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I 11, at 2189.
850 J. CARR,supra note 18, §§ 5.09(1)-5.09(3), at 272-77; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 465-66;
Note, Subsequent Use of Electronic Surveillance Interceptions and the Plain View Doctn'ne, 9 MIcH. J.L.
REFORM 529, 550 (1976). For this reason, some state statutes have imposed further limita-
tions or outright prohibitions against the use of such evidence. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
15-102(16) (Supp. 1978) (conversations seized in plain view may only be used if pertinent to a
felony); NEv. REV. STAT. § 179.465(4) (1979) (conversations seized in plain view may only be
used derivatively); VA. CODE § 19.2-67(5) (1975) (plain view seizures may not be disclosed).
851 The following remarks are worth noting:
The reason then for the seriousness of the problem here arises not from the fact that the
particular conversations were not specifically described and given specific prior authori-
zation, but rather from the unmanageability generally of electronic surveillance. The
area is peculiarly sensitive due to its effort to probe the thoughts of the man who is the
object of the search. Once the listening commences it becomes impossible to turn it off
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over, when the Supreme Court later gave plain view seizures broad
fourth amendment approval in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,8 52 it became
apparent that a formal retroactive amendment, as required by section
2517(5), was not constitutionally necessary. 53 Thus, the demands of
section 2517(5) actually exceeded those of the fourth amendment. Per-
haps for this reason, courts soon declined to enforce the provision
strictly, as statutory language was often ignored and plain view princi-
ples disregarded.
Ironically, some jurisdictions have applied section 2517(5) too
strictly-and inappropriateoy-by insisting upon retroactive amendments
even when the words of a conversation were pertinent to both the crime
specified by warrant and some other offense. 854 Obviously, under such
circumstances section 2517(5) was intended to be inoperative, as the per-
tinency of those words to the specified crime is also dispositive of the
subterfuge search issue.855 Most courts, however, have ruled inappropri-
when a subject other than one which is authorized is overheard. It would be the height
of unreasonableness to distinguish between information specifically authorized and that
which is unanticipated and which develops in the course of an authorized search such as
that involved here. It would be irrational to hold that officers authorized to listen to
conversations about drug traffic, upon learning that a bank robbery is to occur, must at
once close down the project and not use the information to prevent the robbery since the
information is tainted. It would be demoralizing to allow the bank to be robbed while
the investigators stood by helpless to prevent the occurrence. Harder cases can be
imagined. For example, in electronic surveillance of organized criminals involved in
gambling, information might be intercepted disclosing a conspiracy to commit murder.
Surely the officials must be empowered to use this information notwithstanding the lack
of specific prior authorization.
As we view it, Congress was seeking to deal realistically with highly complex problems in
accordance with the demands of the Constitution. . . . Congress has dealt with the
problem about as well as could have been expected considering the nature and character
of the subject matter ....
United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
See United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977); People v. DiStefano, 38 N.Y.2d 640, 648, 345 N.E.2d 548, 552-53, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9-
10 (1976). Despite dicta in Katz to the contrary, 389 U.S. at 355-56, the Supreme Court has
never held retroactive approval unconstitutional in the context of plain view. Nor is there
anything per se unreasonable about such an approach, provided that a sufficiently high stan-
dard is applied in evaluating nonspecified interceptions.
852 403 U.S. 443, 465-67 (1971).
853 Note, supra note 258, at 129 n.183.
854 United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 703-07 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Brodson,
528 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit later expressed some reservations
about such a rigid approach. See United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (2d
Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, Masciarelli adhered to Marion, and some other jurisdictions have
followed suit. See State v. Kuchinsky, 3 Kan. App. 2d 224, 228-29, 592 P.2d 144, 148 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1979); State v. Mayes, 284 Md. 625, 635-37, 399 A.2d 597, 605-06. Regardless of
whether the Brodson-Marion analysis is valid, the dismissal sanction imposed in Brodson for this
purported violation was not authorized by statute. See United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp.
698, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The only appropriate remedy is exclusion of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1976).
855 See C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 249. Obviously, no general fishing expedition is
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ately in the other extreme. For example, although section 2517(5) re-
quires applications for retroactive amendments to be filed "as soon as
practicable, '856 delays of several months have often been tolerated. 857
While practicability should be flexibly interpreted to provide for numer-
ous valid reasons possibly occasioning delayed applications,8 58 present
practice is so loose that the statutory language is actually being disre-
garded. 59 Certainly, once there is probable cause to believe the words
of a conversation relate to a new crime (and not to the crime specified in
the order), timely amendment normally should follow. 860
Moreover, some courts have held that, so long as a new crime was
mentioned in either a progress report or a request for an extension of
surveillance, formal application for retroactive amendment is unneces-
involved when the same words pertain to more than one crime. This situation is analogous to
police executing a search warrant for a stolen gun, discovering the gun, and immediately
realizing that it was used in a recent homicide. Note also that since inadvertency is appar-
ently a prerequisite to admissibility under § 2517(5), see supra note 849 and infra notes 876-77
and accompanying text, this condition often could not be met since the basic conversation
pertinent to a crime specified in the warrant was, in fact, anticipated. United States v.
Marion, 535 F.2d at 712 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Several
jurisdictions have rejected the Brodson-Marion approach. See United States v. Campagnuolo,
556 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rabstein, 554 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 439-40 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Moore,
513 F.2d 485, 501-02 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated without opinion, 556 F.2d 77 (1977). See generally
United States v. Sedovic, 679 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1982).
856 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1976).
857 See United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d 1209, 1211-13 (5th Cir. 1977) (eight
month delay); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1976) (seven month
delay); United States v. Ratenni, 480 F.2d 195, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1973) (five month delay);
United States v. Pine, 473 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Md. 1978) (two month delay); United States
v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (three month delay); United States v. Denisio,
360 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Md. 1973) (seven month delay). A few cases have suppressed for
failure to file timely applications. See State v. Mayes, 284 Md. at 637, 399 A.2d at 604 (one
year delay); People v. O'Meara, 70 A.D.2d 890, 891, 417 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 990, 420 N.E. 2d 85, 438 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1981) (18 day delay).
858 Note, supra note 258, at 131-34. See generallv United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d
at 1214-15. For example, monitoring agents initially may not realize a conversation is rele-
vant to another crime. This may be a particular problem when the discussion is ambiguous
or relates to a cross-jurisdictional offense. Moreover, even when the other crime is obviously
pertinent, prosecutors may initially decide that it is not worth pursuing. Strict application of
§ 2517(5) precludes subsequent reversal of prosecutorial discretion. Admittedly, prosecutors
could preserve their options by filing an amendment, but often this will not be done because
the thrust of an investigation is pointing in some other direction. Of these obstacles, the most
difficult concerns ambiguous conversations. For this reason, there should be no need to file a
retroactive amendment until probable cause exists to believe that the conversation was crimi-
nal in nature. See United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. at 715-16; see also infra note 864.
859 Perhaps as a consequence, the Justice Department's procedural manual treats retroac-
tive amendments in a superficial and oblique manner. This manual merely notes that such
amendments are required before presentation of the evidence to the grand jury, rather than
as soon as practicable. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL title 9, supra note 603, at 32,
39 (1979).
860 See supra note 858.
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sary.8 61 These cases assume that, if electronic surveillance is allowed to
continue under such circumstances, retroactive approval for the new
crime has been granted implicitly.8 62 This assumption, however, is often
without foundation. Judges reviewing progress reports and applica-
tions-documents which are often both lengthy and complex-will not
necessarily perceive new crimes that have been intercepted. Further-
more, a passing reference in a progress report or extension application
does not provide an appropriate context for formal determination of
whether the interception complied with all plain view requirements. 8 63
Finally, this concept of implicit adjudication squarely ignores statutory
language requiring both a formal application and an explicit judicial
ruling.
8 6 4
On occasion, the judiciary has suggested that suppression is not an
available remedy for section 2517(5) violations.8 65 These decisions ar-
gue that, since exclusion is available under section 2518(10)(a) only for
interception violations, suppression is inappropriate because late filing,
or a failure to file altogether, is a post-interception violation. 66 This
reading, however, ignores language in section 2517(5) which directly es-
tablishes an evidentiary prerequisite to admissibility which is independ-
ent of Title III's exclusionary rule; no evidence of other crimes may be
disclosed in a judicial proceeding unless a timely retroactive amendment
has been filed and approved.867
861 See United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d at 1069; United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d
at 187; United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d at 703-08; United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at
782-83; State v. Murphy, 148 N.J. Super. 542, 549 (1977). But see State v. Kuchinsky, 3 Kan.
App. at 230, 592 P.2d at 149.
862 See supra note 861.
863 See J. CARR, supra note 18, § 509(2), at 274; Note, supra note 258, at 134-37.
864 See J. CARR, supra note 18, at 80 (Supp. 1982). It has been suggested that requiring an
amendment as soon as practicable serves no important purpose so long as judicial approval is
received some time before use at trial. See A Bill to Amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968: Hearings on S 1717 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal justice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judici , 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980) (statement of Clifford Fishman, Associate Professor of
Law, Catholic University of America). Legislation to effect this change has been proposed.
See infra note 931 and accompanying text. However, as part of the process of maintaining
close judicial supervision, the present language is preferable, see J. CARR, supra note 18,
§ 5.09(3), at 276, provided that the requirement is not read to attach until there is probable
cause to believe that the intercepted conversation pertained to criminal activity. See supra
note 858. Moreover, the practicability standard should not be applied without giving due
consideration to unusual investigative circumstances that may have precluded prompt
amendment. These factors should all be considered during the course of any legislative
reform.
865 See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 855; Cox v. McNeal, 577 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979).
866 See supra note 865.
867 See supra text accompanying note 848. While the legislative history indicates that
§ 2517 "must, of course, be read in light of section 2518," LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
111, at 2188, such a reading of § 2518 does not necessarily preclude some of the language
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Even when retroactive amendments have been filed, they often
have not been carefully analyzed. For example, in sustaining these in-
terceptions, judges have rarely bothered to consider explicitly each con-
stitutional and statutory component of a valid plain view seizure. In
Coolidge v. New Hampshire ,868 the Supreme Court conditioned plain view
seizures upon compliance with three conditions: (1) initial valid intru-
sion; (2) immediate recognition of the item's incriminating nature; and
(3) inadvertent discovery. 869 Implicit was a fourth requirement-that of
good faith.8 70 Since each of these factors effects an important limitation
against improper expansion of electronic eavesdropping, each should be
explicitly evaluated under the following type of analysis:
(1) Was the initial intrusion valid? Law enforcement obviously
should not be allowed to benefit from a plain view seizure unless the
discovery was made during the course of a lawful search. 871 In the con-
text of electronic surveillance, an initial valid intrusion would require a
properly issued eavesdropping order and compliance with the minimiza-
tion requirement. Thus, the legality of the seizure should not be sus-
tained if the conversation occurred while monitors were not properly
minimizing. Under such circumstances, the initial intrusion would not
be valid because the officers were exceeding the authorized scope of sur-
veillance. The effect of this limitation is exemplified below by the "im-
mediately apparent" requirement.
(2) Was the conversation's incriminating character "immediately
apparent"? Coolidge warned that a plain view seizure "is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a gen-
eral exploratory search from one object to another until something in-
criminating at last emerges. '8 72 Most courts have interpreted this
contained in § 2517 from retaining independent significance. This does not mean, however,
as one court has suggested, that compliance with § 2517(5) automatically shields the matter
from further judicial review. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 401. The lawfulness
of any interception is still independently subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with
statutory and constitutional requirements.
868 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
869 Id. at 466-69. Note, however, that only a plurality of the Court recognized the inadver-
tency requirement. Its continued validity has been questioned. See Texas v. Brown, 33 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3005 (1983).
870 Justice Stewart's plurality opinion suggested that the plain view principle would not be
used to sustain the seizure of items not specified in a warrant during a "planned warrantless
seizure." Id. at 469-70 n.26. The government's pre-search knowledge of these items would
suggest bad faith. See also United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 983 (1973); United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (M.D. Fla. 1971);
W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11(e) (Supp. 1982); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 70, 100-24 (1982).
871 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466-67.
872 Id. at 466. The Court has interpreted "immediately apparent" to mean probable cause
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limitation as allowing an initial limited intrusion if an object appears
suspicious. For example, cursory examination of suspected stolen prop-
erty for brand name or serial number is routinely permitted.8 73 In the
context of electronic surveillance, this concept could be applied to con-
versations that clearly do not pertain to the specified crime, but are am-
biguous in other respects.8 74 Under such circumstances, officers should
be allowed a limited intrusion-perhaps of two minutes-to assess the
conversation's incriminating nature. If its criminality is not then appar-
ent, the interception must terminate (subject, of course, to spot monitor-
ing). Should the conversation's incriminating character become
apparent only after the agents improperly exceeded their permissible
limited intrusion, the seizure must nevertheless be suppressed.8 75
(3) Was the conversation's discovery inadvertent? This factor is re-
quired by a plurality of the Justices in Coolidge because where an item's
discovery is advertent, there is no reason why a search warrant could not
have been obtained. 876 Even in conventional searches, however, police
often hope, or perhaps even expect, to discover evidence of other
crimes.8 77 This is especially true in electronic searches.87 8 Since subjec-
tive considerations alone are not sufficient to attain a warrant, however,
to believe that the pertinent item is criminal in nature. Texas v. Brown, 33 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3001, 3004 (1983).
873 See W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11(c) (Supp. 1982).
874 See generaly supra notes 611-12 and accompanying text.
875 C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 262-63. The question then becomes whether the entire
conversation must be suppressed, or just that portion improperly seized after the first two
minutes. This issue should turn on the question of good faith. Assuming good faith, the first
two minutes should not be suppressed. Cf. supra notes 744-49 and accompanying text.
876 The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement . . . is that a plain-view
seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) seizure into a "general"
one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is
great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The
requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none
which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as
'per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent circumstances."
If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular
object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation
of the express constitutional requirement of "Warrants. . .particularly describing...
[the] things to be seized .. .[T]o extend the scope of such intrusion to the seizure of
objects-not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police know
in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the face of the
basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 469-71.
877 See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11, at 179, § 5.2, at 285-86 n.107 ("it would be an
odd rule that there is a 'pretext' situation whenever the police anticipate or even contemplate
the possibility of finding evidence of a crime unrelated to that for which the arrest is made").
878 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 143; COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 395-96;
see United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 784; People v. DiStefano, 38 N.Y.2d at 648, 345
N.E.2d at 552-53, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10 (1976). Some have suggested that, for this reason,
plain view seizures should not be allowed. J. CARR, supra note 18, § 5.09(1), at 272; C. FISH-
MAN, supra note 438, at 84, 262; Note, supra note 850, at 551. This view, however, overlooks
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the policy expressed in Coolidge is of valid concern only where objective
probable cause exists for the unspecified item. Therefore, inadvertency
traditionally has been defined in objective terms as the absence of prob-
able cause.8 79
The cases, however, have typically failed to consider this factor.880
Consequently, on numerous occasions interceptions have been approved
which clearly were objectively advertent in character. 88 ' For example,
although a retroactive amendment may be appropriate for retrospec-
tively legitimizing a "new crime" conversation (or even a brief series of
such conversations) for which probable cause was originally lacking,
eventually the continued interception of conversations pertaining to this
new crime is no longer inadvertent. Rather, at some point there is prob-
able cause to expect their occurrence. Since a retroactive amendment
would no longer be available under such circumstances,8 82 the govern-
ment must seek a court authorization prospectively sanctioning the in-
terception of conversations related to the new crime. In effect, a fresh
application must be filed and an expanded court order issued.88 3 Al-
though the statute does not explicitly prescribe such prospective amend-
ments, the concept is implied by section 2517(5)'s inadvertency
requirement, and may be constitutionally necessary.8 84 As yet, however,
the fact that inadvertency is usually defined objectively rather than in terms of subjective
expectations. See infra note 879 and accompanying text.
879 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11, at 179-80, 285. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d
1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. Pepe, 176 Conn. 75, 79-80, 405 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1877, -, 409 N.E.2d 719, 727 (Mass.
1980). If there is no probable cause to believe something will be found, its occurrence is
deemed inadvertent. Professor LaFave suggests that the inadvertency factor serves no pur-
pose not already achieved by the good faith and initial valid intrusion components of plain
view. W. LAFAVE, sUpra, at 181-84. This may explain why some courts have given the inad-
vertency rule relatively narrow scope. See United States v. Delegado, 615 F.2d 294, 296-97
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980) (requirement does not apply to contraband); W.
LAFAVE, supra, at 182.
880 See infra note 890. Thus far, only one case has addressed this issue with any degree of
sophistication. See People v. DiStefano, 38 N.Y.2d at 647-50, 345 N.E.2d 548, 552-54, 382
N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-10 (1978).
881 United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d at 184; United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 853;
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 43-46 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Tortorello, 480
F.2d at 781-83; United States v. Ratteni, 480 F.2d at 198-99; United States v. Denisio, 360 F.
Supp. at 715-16; People v. Ruffino, 62 Misc. 2d 653, 660, 309 N.Y.S.2d 805, 812 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970);see Note, supra note 258, at 129-30. In one case, United States v. Pine, 473 F. Supp.
349 (D. Md. 1978), the court addressed the issue, but erroneously concluded that inadver-
tency is to be gauged exclusively from the time the warrant was obtained. Id. at 357-58. In
the context of long term surveillance, such an approach is unconstitutional. If there is time
to obtain an amendment, the fourth amendment requires that this be done rather than al-
lowing interception at the monitor's discretion.
882 See C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 243, 260-63.
883 Id.
884 Note, supra note 258, at 127 n.124; see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 4.11, at 178-83.
Katz implies that a prospective amendment would be necessary because interception of new
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few courts have considered whether a prospective amendment should
have been obtained,8 5 and none have required one. 86 Since such
amendments raise procedural and substantive issues of enormous com-
plexity,8 7 by failing to address the inadvertency requirement with great
care, the courts have defined these issues out of existence.
(4) Was the interception made in good faith? By imposing a good
faith requirement, Title III effectively established an important limita-
tion which has survived Scott. While Scott indicated that subjective in-
tent was not a factor in assessing possible minimization violations, good
faith nevertheless remains a statutory prerequisite to expansive plain
view seizures. 8 8 Thus far, courts have recognized that plain view inter-
ceptions must be grounded in good faith,889 but they have never found
any such seizure to have been made in bad faith.
crimes is otherwise left to the officer's discretion. 389 U.S. at 358; see also supra note 869 and
accompanying text.
885 C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 244; see United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d at 186-88;
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d at 42; United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 782-84.
Some courts have discussed amendments in terms that suggest confusion between retroactive
and prospective principles. See J. CARR, supra note 18, § 5.09(2), at 273; People v. Di Lo-
renzo, 69 Misc. 2d 645, 651, 330 N.Y.S.2d 720, 727 (Rockland Co. Ct. 1971).
886 C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 243-44. Professor Fishman refers to one recent case
which he indicates was concerned with prospective amendments. Id. at 104 (Supp. 1981).
Close analysis of that decision, however, suggests that it actually may have been concerned
with retroactive amendments. See People v. O'Meara, 70 A.D. 2d at 891, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
887 For example, in a federal surveillance, must the Attorney General authorize the pro-
spective amendment? If so, serious timing problems may be encountered. See supra notes 792-
94 and accompanying text. To circumvent these problems, may prosecutors rely upon Title
III's emergency provisions? Section 2518(7) seems to preclude this possibilty in cases not
involving national security or organized crime matters. See supra notes 298-99 and accompa-
nying text. If there is time to obtain an amendment, may one be issued if the new crime is not
an offense designated by statute? 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). This could pose particular
problems in federal investigations in non-Title III states when, for example, the new crime is a
contemplated state homicide. Finally, prosecutors potentially face an intractable dilemma: if
a prospective amendment is obtained, defense counsel will argue it was issued without prob-
able cause, but if a retroactive amendment (or no amendment at all) is filed, defense counsel
will assert that there was probable cause to anticipate the resulting seizure, and, therefore, the
interception was not inadvertent. See Note, supra note 258, at 127 n. 174; cf. 2 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 60, at 181, 450-57. The only solution to this dilemma is to apply the probable
cause concept flexibly in the context of prospective amendments. At least for purposes of
judicial review, perhaps a reduced standard of probable cause should be applied. The
Supreme Court has often indicated that such flexibility may be appropriate. See Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 (1981); United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 322-23(1972) (reduced probable cause standard may be compatible with fourth
amendment). See generally Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable
Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763; Greenberg, Drug Carrier Profiles; Mendenhall and Reid- Analyzing
Police Intrusions on Less Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REy. 49 (1981). These factors
should all be considered in the context of a statutory amendment explicitly requiring a pro-
spective amendment once there is probable cause to believe a new offense will be overheard.
888 See supra notes 849 & 870 and accompanying text.
889 See United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1975).
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As yet, no court has examined these four issues in an explicit and
comprehensive fashion.8 90 If the constitutional and statutory protec-
tions against improper expansions of surveillance are to regain their vi-
tality, the judiciary must begin to enforce them in a more conscientious
manner.
F. SEALING
Section 2518(8) (a) mandates that "fzilmmedialeoy upon . . . expira-
tion . . . of the order, or extensions thereof," all tapes must be delivered
to the issuing judge and "sealed under his directions." 89 1 This provision
is important because it ensures the integrity of all recordings.8 92 Thus,
section 2518(8)(a) provides that compliance with this requirement is a
prerequisite to admissibility: "[t]he presence of the seal provided for by
this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof,
shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any
wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom [in any judi-
cial proceeding]. '8 93
Although the mechanics of compliance are quite simple, requiring
only immediate delivery894 and secure attachment of an appropriately
identified piece of tape,895 the government has often failed to fulfill this
obligation. In almost all the reported cases, a seal was properly secured,
but timely delivery had not been effected. 896 Nevertheless, despite the
890 In fact, most cases do not even discuss the plain view concept. See United States v.
Rotundo, 554 F.2d 712, 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); United States v.
Johnson, 539 F.2d at 187-88; United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 440-42 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 860-62; United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 783;
United States v. Ratteni, 480 F.2d at 198; United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 817-
23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 715-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715, 719-20 (D.Md. 1973). Other cases have mentioned plain
view but failed to undertake a refined analysis. See United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 446-
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1302-03
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1973).
891 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(1) (1976).
892 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2193.
893 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976). The full text of § 2518(8)(a) refers to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2517(3) (1976), which governs admissibility in any judicial proceeding.
894 Section 2518(8)(a) applies to the timing of delivery', as well as to the presence of a seal.
Otherwise, delivery could be delayed until trial, thereby providing maximum opportunity to
falsify. See United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1976); Note,Judicial Sealing of
Tape Recordings Under Title III-A Needfor Clarifkation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 94 (1977).
Although courts could have easily avoided the impact of § 2518(8) (a) by holding that it does
not apply to the timing of delivery, thus far they have declined to do so.
895 See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: Two VIEWS, supra note 218, at 35-36.
896 In two cases, courts have confronted the question of whether a broken seal requires
suppression of the tapes. United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1975); Nye
v. State, 49 Md. App. 111, 122, 430 A.2d 867, 874 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). The Lawson
court admitted the tapes absent an allegation of either tampering or intentional governmen-
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clear command of section 2518(8) (a), most courts have declined to con-
dition admissibility upon compliance with sealing requirements.8 9 7 Typ-
ically, suppression has been avoided by three lines by analysis: (1) the
delay has been satisfactorily explained; (2) absent evidence of alteration,
no one has been prejudiced; and (3) since section 2518(10) (a) provides a
procedural means for enforcing Title III's exclusionary sanction only in
cases involving interception violations, suppression is not available for
sealing errors which occur post-interception. The first of these grounds,
however, has been misapplied, and the other two are fundamentally
misconceived.
Although the courts have correctly noted that a satisfactory expla-
nation will excuse delayed delivery, they have been far too forgiving in
accepting explanations as satisfactory.8 98  Delays of more than a week
have routinely been tolerated by accepting a variety of excuses which
may charitably be characterized as "administrative delay."8 99 Typi-
cally, the government has maintained that delay was occasioned by the
tal breaking of seals. After noting that the issue had not been raised at trial, the A.e court, in
dicta, concluded that a broken seal would not be a barrier to admissibility. Both cases are
wrongly decided because they ignore the statutory language of § 2518(8)(a). See supra text
accompanying note 893.
897 See United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1980) (accepting govern-
ment's explanation that delays of three to eight days were necessary to facilitate duplication
and processing of tapes prior to sealing); United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314-15 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980) (accepting government's explanation that, even
though duplicate tapes had been prepared, a 29 day delay was necessary because of possibil-
ity that duplicate tapes would be defective; United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 472-73
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) (delays of 9, 26, and 38 days deemed necessary
for preparation of transcripts); United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (absent showing of prejudice, two week delay does not re-
quire suppression); United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d at 564-65 (absent attack on integrity of
tape, suppression not required for 57 day delay); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975) (accepting excuse that tapes were in the FBI evi-
dence room for seven days and that another seven days were necessary to prepare a warrant);
United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 481-84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975)
(suppression not required for 45 day delay as trial court substantiated integrity of tapes);
United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1977) (accepting explanation that 42 day delay resulted, inter alia, from hospitalization of
prosecutor and subsequent reassignment of the case). But see United States v. Gigante, 538
F.2d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1976) (delays of eight to twelve months warrant suppression).
Some state courts have strictly construed the immediate delivery requirement. State v.
Cerbo, 78 NJ. 595, 397 A.2d 671 (1979) (33 day delay for purpose of preparing composites of
relevant conversations warranted suppression); People v. DeMartino, 71 A.D.2d 477, 481 n.2,
422 N.Y.S.2d 949,953 n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting that "a minimal delay of one or two
days in sealing might under appropriate circumstances be permissible .... ). In light of the
practical limitations on prosecutorial manpower, the New York approach is inordinately se-
vere. A more reasonable standard would permit maximum delays of 72 hours. See generally
infra note 916.
898 Note, supra note 894, at 98.
899 See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 474.
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need to retain all original recordings so that duplicates could be made,
transcripts typed, and pertinent legal documents processed. 90 0 However
plausible these explanations may initially appear, in reality they are un-
convincing. For example, duplicate tapes can be prepared in a matter
of minutes using high speed technology.9°0 These duplicates then can
be used to prepare transcripts and other legal documents. 90 2 Should a
portion of the duplicate be somewhat unclear, a court order could be
obtained directing the original to be unsealed. 90 3 For some reason, how-
ever, courts have chosen to ignore this state of the art; indeed, on occa-
sion, delay has been sanctioned even when a duplicate orzzzal was
readily available. 90 4 Thus, while it is certainly possible to conceive of
appropriate explanations for delayed delivery, 90 5 those sanctioned thus
far too often have not been satisfactory.
Even when the courts have not endorsed the government's explana-
tion, however, most have declined to suppress the recordings when there
has been no evidence of tampering.9 6 Their rationale stems from lan-
guage in Chavez suggesting that even central violations do not require
900 See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1314-15 (despite the existence of duplicates,
original tapes retained during preparation of warrants, indictment, and transcripts); United
States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 472 (transcription of tapes); United States v. Caruso, 415 F.
Supp. at 850 (delay resulting from duplication of tapes and illness of prosecutor); see also
United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d at 840 (14 day delay--seven days in FBI evidence room,
seven days in preparation of warrant). See generally United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d at 43
(delays of three to eight days necessary to transport tapes).
901 Field interview with technical personnel from New York State Organized Crime Task
Force (June 30, 1982); see United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 486-87 (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting).
902 See United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 472.
903 United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1315; People v. Washington, 46 N.Y.2d 116, 125,
385 N.E.2d 593, 597, 412 N.Y.S.2d 854, 859 (1978).
904 United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1310; see United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 486-
87 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
905 See United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979) (unforeseen manpower problems); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. at 950 (break-
downs in equipment or sudden illness). However, even unusual circumstances normally
should not excuse delays of more than three days. See supra note 897.
906 Some courts have considered the absence of evidence of tampering to be a decisive
factor. See United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d at 780; United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d at
564; United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 484. Others have considered the absence of evi-
dence of tampering as providing, to some extent, a satisfactory explanation for delayed deliv-
ery. See United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d at 42; United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 473;
United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d at 840. This approach, however, directly disregards the
statutory language because the absence of evidence of tampering plainly does not constitute a
satisfactory explanation for delay. Nevertheless, only a small minority has held that a lack of
tampering does not ipsofacto excuse a delay in sealing. See United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d
at 505-06. Some courts permitting delay, however, have suggested that intentional miscon-
duct resulting in sealing delays would warrant exclusion of the tapes. See United States v.
McGrath, 622 F.2d at 43; United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1315.
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suppression if the provision's underlying purpose has been met. 90 7 This
analysis, however, reads an exception into section 2518(8) (a) which fun-
damentally misconstrues the objective sought to be achieved by the seal-
ing rule. Prior to Title III, frequent allegations had been made that
electronic surveillance tape recordings were susceptible to alteration. 90 8
The sealing requirement was adopted in response to this concern, but it
served another purpose as well: since authentication is always a prereq-
uisite to admissibility,90 9 the sealing procedure, in effect, helped the
prosecution establish prima facie that the recording was accurate. With-
out a seal, the government would otherwise face the difficult prospect of
proving a negative-that the tape had not been altered.910 Since the
prosecution, therefore, derives an important advantage from this proce-
dure, the defense should likewise benefit when the seal has not been
properly obtained. 91' Given current technology, proof of alteration is
extremely difficult. 912 Hence, the presence of a seal may be a better
indicator of reliability than proof offered at a lengthy authenticity hear-
ing.913 Consequently, it makes little sense (and is basically unfair) to
require the defense to provide evidence of tampering when the issue
probably would never have arisen had a seal been timely secured. 914
While, in fact, there have been few, if any, serious allegations of altera-
tions, 915 the courts' present approach engenders an unacceptable irony:
delayed sealing will be tolerated so long as there is no evidence of tam-
pering, but the greater the delay, the more opportunity a skillful forger
907 See United States v. Caggiano, 667 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Diana, 605 F.2d at 1314; United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d at 564; United States v. Falcone,
505 F.2d at 483-84; cf. People v. Nieves, 92 Ill. 2d 452, 442 N.E.2d 228 (1982) (applying this
analysis to state statute).
908 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
909 See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE 534 (2d ed. 1972).
910 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 131.
911 See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1317-18 (Hall, J., dissenting).
912 Id. at 1318; United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 488 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); see NWC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 131; COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 322, at 216 (The Authentication
of Magnetic Tapes: Current Problems and Possible Solutions). An interview with Professor Mark
Weiss, coauthor of the Wiretapping Commission study, established that the state of the art for
detecting tampering has not advanced beyond that set forth in his 1976 report. Telephone
interview with Professor Mark Weiss (Nov. 29, 1982).
913 The dissent in United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1318 (Hall, J., dissenting), noted
that compliance with the sealing requirement would avoid "a time-consuming, expensive,
and entirely collateral 'battle of the experts' on the tampering issue." See United States v.
Falcone, 505 F.2d at 488 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
914 Nevertheless, most courts place the burden of going forward on the defendant. Compare
United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d at 780 and United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d at 840 with
United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 473. Indeed, Diadone and Sklaroff may also have placed
the burden of persuasion on the defendant. United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 473.
915 See infra note 944 and accompanying text.
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has to effect an undetectable alteration. 9 16
Finally, the suggestion that sealing violations may not occasion sup-
pression under section 2518(10) (a) because they occur after the intercep-
tion 9 17 fundamentally misconceives Title III's overall design. True,
section 2518(10) (a) is concerned only with interception violations but, as
a few courts have recognized, the sealing rule in section 2518(8)(a) con-
tains its own evidentiary preclusion; 9 18 compliance is a prerequisite to
admissibility. Therefore, the limitations of section 2518(10)(a) are not
pertinent to sealing violations. 9 19 Indeed, any other view would make
the evidentiary sanction set forth in section 2518(8)(a) meaningless. 92 0
Given the heavy monetary and manpower costs which are inherent
to effective electronic surveillance, 92 1 there is considerable temptation to
ignore sealing violations. 922 One commentator has decried that "[o]f all
the ways for law enforcement officials to lose a significant case, this is
perhaps the most ridiculous ever conceived. ' 923 Perhaps so, but since
compliance requires minimal effort and serves an important policy in-
terest, it is not for the courts to question congressional wisdom in enact-
ing this provision. 924 In this respect, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
916 See Note, supra note 894, at 94. To some extent, there is a statutory gap which indepen-
dently permits this result since delivery is not required until the authorizing order, or exten-
sions thereof, have expired. Thus, an opportunity to forge exists during the time between
recording and expiration of the order or extension. See United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d at
1276 n. 15. This is clearly a statutory interstice, but it does not excuse noncompliance. More-
over, Congress should consider amending Title III to require monitoring officers to attach a
seal on each tape within 24 hours of completion. Since seals are rarely secured in the presence
of a supervising judge, the current obligation to effect the seal pursuant to his direction should
be abolished. This would eliminate a major cause of bureaucratic delay: delivery of the tapes
to court. A statutory requirement of courthouse delivery within 72 hours should be sufficient
protection against abuse since, indeed, many judges do not require courthouse delivery at all.
Failure to comply with this requirement, however, should not automatically result in suppres-
sion. Rather, admissibility should then be conditioned upon clear and convincing proof by
the prosecution that the tapes have not been altered.
917 See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 483. See generally Commonwealth v. Vitello,
367 Mass. 224, 277-78, 327 N.E.2d 819, 848-50 (1975).
918 See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1312; United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d at 506;
United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 488 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
919 Note, for example, that the legislative history states that § 2517 is modified by
§ 2518(10)(a), but there is no similar statement that § 2518(8)(a) is modified by § 2518(10)(a).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,supra note 111, at 2188, 2194; see Note,supra note 894, at 104; see also
supra note 867. But see United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d at 473 n.7.
920 See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 485-86 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Note, supra
note 894, at 93.
921 See infia notes 957-75 and accompanying text.
922 This is particularly so because the evidence gathered by electronic surveillance is often
pivotal to the prosecution's case. See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at 1318 (Hall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 488 (Rosenn, j., dissenting).
923 C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, at 286 n.19.
924 One court has reasoned that other Title III restrictions would be meaningless if the
tapes were inaccurate. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d at 505. While this may overstate
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the celebrated "Snail Darter" case should be dispositive:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course
consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of
interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and
its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We
do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of
veto ....
[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers
is too fundamental for us to preempt congressional action by judicially
decreeing what accords with "common sense and the public weal."' 925
In the context of sealing, however, as with other aspects of Title 111,926
this principle has essentially been ignored.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INACTION
While Title III has been amended in a few respects since its pas-
sage, none of these measures are related to the major issues discussed by
this Article. 927 Recently, the statute has received attention, primarily
during the course of the overall congressional effort to revamp the fed-
eral criminal code.928 For the most part, however, the proposed revi-
sions likewise are not responsive to post-Title III judicial developments.
This is not to suggest that they would not effect any improvement, since
clearly some of the changes would be for the better. For example, Sen-
ate Bill 1630, which was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on
January 25, 1982, would have defined the term "intercept" broadly to
the case, there is still cause for concern, especially since the sealing rule may embody a consti-
tutional requirement. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977); see also
Blakey & Hancock, supra note 378, at 677 n.46.
If suppression is mandated, a final question is whether monitors who intercepted the
conversation may testify to what they heard. Since such evidence was obtained prior to the
time that sealing should have been effected, it is not improper derivative evidence, and, there-
fore, is arguably not subject to suppression within the meaning of§ 2518(8)(a). Cf. People v.
Weiss, 48 N.Y.2d 988, 988, 401 N.E.2d 901, 901, 425 N.Y.S.2d 543, 543 (1980) (sealing viola-
tion does not mandate suppression of warrant obtained before sealing was required to have
been effected); People v. Versace, 73 A.D.2d 304, 308, 426 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980). Ironically, this analysis would allow less accurate evidence in the form of an agent's
recollection to be introduced over the more reliable evidence which had been excluded. Nev-
ertheless, this is a fact of life under traditional exclusionary rule principles.
925 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978), quoted in United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d at
1319 (Hall, J., dissenting).
926 See supra notes 703-10 and accompanying text.
927 See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 314(h), 92 Stat. 2549, 2677; Act of Oct.
25, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201 (a)-(h), 92 Stat. 1783, 1796-98; Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L.
No. 91-644, § 16, 84 Stat. 1881, 1891; Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 810,
902(a)-(b), 1103, 84 Stat. 922, 940, 947, 959; Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
§ 211 (a)-(c), 84 Stat. 473, 654.
928 See S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3101-3109 (1982); REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE
REFORM, supra note 445, at 1075-91; S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1982); S. REP.
No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
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include either listening or recording,929 would have expanded authoriza-
tion for warrantless emergency surveillance to embrace situations in-
volving risk of death,930  would have eliminated explicitly any
requirement of a retroactive amendment for conversations which relate
both to a named and unnamed offense,93 ' and would have required ex-
press court authorization for any covert entries necessary to install
bugs. 932 Ultimately, however, Senate Bill 1630 simply, and uncritically,
purported to continue existing law.9 3 3
Senate Bill 1630 is indicative of overall congressional satisfaction
with Title III. In all likelihood, however, Congress has not recognized
that, as applied, the legislation is not the same as the statute that was
passed in 1968. 934 Consequently, no effort has been made to rectify the
deviations generated by post-Title III judicial decisions935 -much less to
consider comprehensive reform.
In 1976, the National Wiretapping Commission, while expressing
overall satisfaction with the operation of Title III, recommended that
the statute be amended in several important respects. 936 Yet, although
the Commission was established by Congress to evaluate Title III's effec-
929 S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3109(c), (f) (1982); see REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE
REFORM,supra note 445, at 1077 n.20. For a discussion of this problem, see supra notes 604-07
& 609 and accompanying text.
930 S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3105(b)(2)(a) (1982); see REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE
REFORM, supra note 445, at 1085-86. The proposal, however, fails to require prior oral notifi-
cation of an emergency judge before commencement of such surveillance. See supra note 300.
931 S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3105(a) (1982). For a discussion of this problem, see
supra notes 855-60 and accompanying text. The proposal would also postpone the amend-
ment requirement until the surveillance information is offered into evidence. Compare with
supra note 864.
932 S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3102(b), 3103(5) (1982). For a discussion of this matter,
see supra notes 672-7 10 and accompanying text. Congress did address the desirability of such
a requirement at length. See REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE REFORM, supra note 445, at 1081-
83; S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6, 12-16 (1982); S. REP. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-6, 11-13 (1980).
933 See REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE REFORM, supra note 445 at 1075, 1077.
934 See id. The Scott decision was clearly brought to Congress' attention by Professor Fish-
man-but to no avail. See Wiretapping Amendments.- Hearings on S 1717 before the Subcomm. on
Criminal]justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980) (statement of
Professor Clifford S. Fishman).
935 On the contrary, without any analysis, Congress has implicitly endorsed the Supreme
Court's decision in Kahn, REPORT ON CRIMINAL CODE REFORM, supra note 445, at 1080, and
explicitly endorsed the result in Donovan. Id. at 1080-8 1. For an analysis of these cases, see
supra notes 513-94.
936 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10, 18, 26-29. In essence, recommendations were
made in the following areas: (1) expansion of the number of designated crimes; (2) expansion
of the number of officials authorized to approve surveillance applications; (3) refinement of
the standards under which extension may be available; (4) refinement of the exhaustion re-
quirement; (5) requirement of express authorization for covert entries; (6) requirement of oral
notification as a prerequisite to emergency surveillance; (7) refinement of the notice require-
ment; and (8) clarification of the law concerning pen registers and bumper beepers. See supra
[Vol. 74
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tiveness, 93 7 virtually no attention has been given to its proposals for leg-
islative action. Some of these proposals related to considerations raised
by this Article, while in other respects both the Commission and this
Article addressed different concerns.9 3 8 It should now be apparent that
electronic surveillance is an area deserving further legislative review.
Once such review has been initiated, the statute should be modified to
conform to its original design, as well as refined to reflect the lessons
learned from its application.9 3
9
VII. EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT: THE IRONY OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
This Article has demonstrated that, notwithstanding original legis-
lative intentions, Title III has frequently not been strictly enforced. Nor
has Congress initiated serious effort to correct this trend. Thus, it is ap-
propriate to consider whether, as a consequence, 1984 has come upon
us.9"4 As yet, however, the historical record demonstrates that the
Orwellian fears of electronic surveillance critics have not been realized.
To a degree, technical limitations may have prevented this occur-
rence,941 but Title III has also had an impact. While the court order
system has worked imperfectly, resort to illegal, warrantless eavesdrop-
ping apparently has been sharply curtailed.9 42 Indeed, law enforcement
has often exhibited appropriate restraint in terminating surveillances
notes 300, 335 & 787 and accompanying text. A detailed discussion of these proposals is
beyond the scope of this Article.
937 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at xiii, 230-31.
938 See supra note 936 and infra note 939.
939 This Article has not attempted to address every aspect of electronic surveillance consid-
ered by the National Wiretapping Commission. Nevertheless, within the context of the issues
raised by this Article proposals for reform, when appropriate, have been made. See supra notes
300 (emergency searches), 607 (definition of the term "intercept"), 748 (minimization), 786-
87 (the exhaustion requirement; statement of objectives), 819 (progress reports), 864 (retroac-
tive amendments), 887 (prospective amendments) & 916 (sealing).
940 For a discussion of Orwellian concerns, seesupra notes 1-2, 68, 72, 81, 144-46 & 190 and
accompanying text.
941 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 88-89; Van Dewerker, supra note 81, at 141; see supra
note 81.
942 The National Wiretapping Commission found that, notwithstanding early law enforce-
ment difficulties in meeting Title III standards, electronic surveillance had not been used for
any corrupt purpose, and that most investigative authorities have made diligent efforts to
comply with Title III requirements. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 19. The Commission did,
however, note occasional instances of illegal warrantless eavesdropping. Id. at 20. Evidence
was presented to the Commission demonstrating that Title III still served an important pur-
pose in such instances by providing criminal sanctions. See NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note
598, at 268 (illegal taps by Robert Leuci, the notorious "Prince of the City," and a New York
Police narcotics unit). In addition, the Commission found that Title III had effectively re-
duced illegal surveillance by private parties. NWC REPORT, supra, at 22.
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which appeared to be unproductive. 943 Similarly, there has been no sig-
nificant evidence of recordings being doctored.944 On the contrary, elec-
tronic surveillance has occasionally exonerated persons suspected of
wrongdoing. 945 Most remarkable, however, available statistics actually
suggest that Title III has been underutilized. The statute, of course, was
enacted as a compromise measure designed to provide an effective, and
constitutional, investigative tool for organized crime control. 946 Never-
theless, Title III's extraordinary potential has not been realized: since its
enactment, annual court authorized interceptions have ranged from a
high of 864 in 1973 to a low of 553 in 1979.9 4 7 The number has not
exceeded 600 since 1977.948 Moreover, most intercepts do not last more
than twenty days.9 49 Given the magnitude of organized crime in this
943 See, e.g., NXC HEARINGS,supra note 166, at 43 (statement of Henry Peterson, Assistant
Attorney General). For example, the Commission noted that, on occasion, close prosecutorial
supervision served to "'trigger... prompt termination of nonproductive surveillance." NWC
REPORT, supra note 1. at 91: see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2267 (curtail-
ment of unproductive operations would be the natural result of cost-benefit management).
944 NWC REPORT, supra note 1. at 131 ("Responses to Commission questionnaires by
judges and defense attorneys indicated no cases in which allegations of tampering had either
been substantial or proven"). Tampering is unlikely because of both close prosecutorial su-
pervision and the absence of any motive to risk suppression and other sanctions by attempting
to falsify. See id. Admittedly. proof of alteration is difficult. See supra note 912. Nevertheless,
a leading expert in this field has expressed awareness of a handful of cases in which examina-
tion of the tape indicated that it had been produced in a manner inconsistent with the version
originally given by law enforcement personnel. Telephone interview with Professor Mark
Weiss (Nov. 19. 1982). Significantly, in one of these cases, the expert was asked to examine
the tape by the prosecuting attorney, who subsequently decided not to use it. Id. Seegenerally
supra note 912.
945 Se, NWC STAFF STUDIES. supra note 598, at 57.
946 See supra notes 179-219 and accompanying text.
947 ADsIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1981 REPORT ON APPLICATIONS
FOR ORDERs AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL CONs-
MUNICATIONS 16 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT]. Figures for
1982 were comparable: 130 federal and 448 state surveillance orders were authorized. 1982
REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION
OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 18 (1983). The 130 federal orders represent the most
such surveillances since 1973. Id. See generally, Krajick, Electronic Surveillance A4faes a Comeback,
POLICE MAGAZINE. Mar. 1983, at 8 (reporting, erroneously however, that the issuance of
federal electronic surveillance warrants increased more than 100% from 1981 to 1982). These
numbers do not cover consensual taps, which are not governed by Title III. Consensual sur-
veillance is a common investigative technique. Such monitorings, however, are often unavail-
able in major organized crime investigations because of the absence of any significant party
willing to consent to interception. NWC REPORT, supra note 1. at 114. Nor do these numbers
include wiretaps authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. From
1979 to 1981. such orders rose from 207 to 433. Further information is classified. S. REP. No.
280. 97th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2 (1981); S. REP. No. 1466, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980); Letter
from Attorney General William F. Smith to Speaker Thomas O'Neill (Apr. 15, 1982) (report-
ing FISA wiretap applications and authorizations).
948 See supra note 947 and accompanying text.
949 NWC REPORT, supra note 1. at 12-13; see WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note
947, at 16. But see NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 181(duration of state taps).
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country,950 these statistics are conspicuously low.95 1
950 If anything, the organized crime problem has worsened in recent years. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 7-15 (1976); Interna-
tional Narcotics Trafftking: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on GovernmentalAfairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 219-52 (1981) (statement of Robert Fiske,
former U.S. Attorney); Organized Crime and Use of Violence: Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pts. 1, 2 (1980).
In 1968, the Department of Justice estimated that the La Cosa Nostra (LCN), otherwise
known as the mafia, had 5,000 members. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2275.
Recent estimates place present membership at approximately 2,000. Telephone Interview
with Sean McWeeney, Chief in Charge of Organized Crime, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Dec. 2, 1982). This decline, however, cannot be fully attributed to successful prosecutions.
For example, since 1970, the Department of Justice has convicted only 556 LCN members.
Letter to author from Alfred N. King, Executive Assistant to the Chief, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (Nov. 24, 1982); see also inj/a
notes 951, 1008. But see generaly Pieniak, Cosa Nostra Feeling Heat on all Sides, THE TENNEs-
SEAN, Aug. 8, 1982, at 1, 14. Even recognizing that state authorities have effected convictions,
the overall decline is more appropriately attributable to improved intelligence information.
Moreover, these numbers do not include other organized crime groups. See, e.g., BA'rEL
HUMAN AFFAIRS RESEARCH CENTER, THE CONTAINMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME, A RE-
PORT TO THE ARIZONA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 12-16 (1982). See generally F. IANNI, BLACK
MAFIA: ETHNIC SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME (1974). Consider the following
commentary:
In 1980, 132 traditional-organized crime members or associates were convicted or await-
ing trial. In 1981, the number increased to 185. Id. Yet, the blunt fact is that even if
these criminal convictions permanently disabled each defendant, and no new members
joined, it would take more than a quarter of a century to incarcerate and thus end the
criminal careers of each member of these organized crime groups.
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context.- Refections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 237, 300 n.168 (1982).
951 Some states with severe organized crime problems such as Ohio and Illinois, have no
eavesdropping statute. See Press & Shannon, How the Mob Reall Works, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5,
1981, at 34. States that do have a statute have often underutilized it. Pennsylvania, for exam-
pie, has a massive organized crime problem, PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMM'N, 1980 REPORT:
A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME vi-vii, X (1981), but conducted only 13 taps in 1981. WIRE-
TAP APPLICATIONS REPORT,supra note 947, at 7. Prior to 1981, Pennsylvania had never used
its statute.
Recently, however, the Department of Justice has achieved notable success in the prose-
cution of organized crime cases. Specifically, FBI Director Webster has made the following
observations before a congressional appropriations committee:
Turning to our Organized Crime Program, I am pleased to report to you, Mr.
Chairman, that during calendar year 1981, 14 recognized leaders of the 25 traditional
Organized Crime "Families" were indicted or convicted. Included in this unprecedented
statistic are the "Bosses" of the New Orleans Organized Crime "Family"; the Colombo
and Genovese "Families" of New York; and the Buffalino "Family" of Pennsylvania.
who have all been convicted. Indicted were the "Bosses" of the Organized Crime "Fami-
lies" in Boston, Cleveland, Tampa, and Chicago. With regard to the Bonanno "Family"
in New York and the Organized Crime "Families" in Kansas City and Milwaukee, not
only have the "Bosses" been indicted, but also the ruling hierarchies of these "families."
Departments of Commerce, Justice & State, theJudiciagy, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1050-51
(1982) (statement of FBI Director Webster). Significantly, five of these major prosecutions
made extensive use of nonconsensual electronic surveillance. Letter from Alfred N. King,
Executive Assistant to the Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States
Dep't of Justice, to Michael Goldsmith (March 8, 1983).
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Initially, underutilization simply reflected the Johnson Adminstra-
tion's reluctance to use electronic surveillance. 952 In some respects, this
reluctance may have been tragic. For example, there is substantial evi-
dence indicating that the death of Martin Luther King could have been
effectively investigated-and a conspiracy uncovered-through the use
of electronic surveillance. 953 This is especially ironic since King's mur-
der may have influenced the passage of Title 111.9 54 However, the De-
partment of Justice, which had subjected King to continuous
eavesdropping from 1963 to 1966,955 maintained in 1968 that electronic
surveillance was neither morally acceptable nor investigatively neces-
sary.956 After the Johnson Administration, however, succeeding Attor-
neys General seemed to favor the use of electronic surveillance. Thus,
other factors must explain the relatively infrequent resort to Title III.
To a great extent, underutilization should probably be attributed
to various problems inherent to the eavesdropping process. In this re-
spect, financial and manpower constraints are the most obvious fac-
tors.9 5 7  Electronic surveillance is expensive; the average cost per
952 See supra notes 195-96 & 210 and accompanying text.
953 SELECT COMM. ON ASSASSINATIONS, FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1828, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. pt. 2, at 453 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ASSASSINATIONS REPORT]. Although mur-
der is a history crime involving a previous event, and therefore is traditionally difficult to
investigate with electronic surveillance, NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 150 (people rarely
discuss completed crimes), King's assassination may have involved continuing criminal con-
spiracies of varying degrees. ASSASSINATIONS REPORT, supra, at 449-53. In 1979, Professor
G. Robert Blakey, former chief counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
decried the Department's failure to use electronic surveillance in this case:
It is my considered judgment after reviewing the 1968 investigation and reinvestigating
the matter in 1978 that the imaginative use of surveillance in 1968 could have brought
James Earl Ray's still free co-conspirators to book. If I'm right, the price we paid for not
using surveillance in 1968 was surely too high, too high a price to ask any free society to
suffer.
Blakey, The Case for 14relaps, THE NATION, Dec. 22, 1979, at 642.
954 See ASSASSINATIONS REPORT, supra note 953 at 436-37.
955 See CHURCH COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 185, at 81-183 (case study of Martin
Luthur King).
956 See NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 1008-30 (statement of former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark); see also supra notes 195-201 & 210 and accompanying text.
957 For example, the Wiretapping Commission observed:
An important factor in deciding whether to authorize a surveillance application is
the impact of the planned surveillance on available resources. The Drug Enforcement
Administration's manual specifies the impact on other investigations as one of the crite-
ria to be considered, and several witnesses testified before the Commission that the cost
of the surveillance is a primary consideration.
According to an FBI spokesman, the most important discovery made by the Bureau
about electronic surveillance was that it was very expensive and required a great expen-
diture of manpower. The Bureau estimated that it had spent approximately $6.4 million
on manpower and resources carrying out court-authorized surveillance between 1968
and 1974. Although this figure represents less than one percent of the FBI's expenditures
during this period, the Bureau spokesman said, with reference to Title III surveillance,
"They are manpower killers, no question."
The cost of conducting a court-ordered surveillance has been frequently cited as the
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intercept in 1981 was $21,686.958 Electronic surveillance is also labor
intensive. Despite suggestions that eavesdropping is the "lazy man's"
way to law enforcement, 959 the opposite is true. A heavy commitment
of personnel is often necessary for each phase of the process: securing
authorization for the application, preparation of court documents,9 60 lo-
cating a surveillance plant,961 installation of the intercept,962 monitoring
primary disadvantage of using eavesdropping. As summarized by former United States
Attorney James R. Thompson of Chicago, electronic surveillance is "expensive; it is time-
consuming. It is a lot of hassle to engage in electronic surveillance, even consensual
overhears. We really only use it when we think it is likely to be productive of the truth in
an unclear area." These costs, especially when the amount of money spent for each
conviction is calculated, have been a primary cause for criticism by persons opposed to
Title III.
In addition to the direct expense of the salaries of monitoring officers, which have
been roughly calculated to amount to $26,000 for a month-long, full-time surveillance,
other costs should be considered. Among these are the costs of manpower required to
check leads and conduct coordinated physical surveillance. Analysis of tapes can be a
very time-consuming task, as can the preparation of transcripts. There are also non-
monetary effects, such as the demands made on officers by the conditions in which many
surveillances are conducted. The boredom of monitoring also takes its toll, as does the
impact upon the officer's home life. This can be especially severe during a narcotics
surveillance, which cannot be conducted during regular business hours, as can most gam-
bling taps. In sum, execution of court-ordered electronic searches generally was not de-
scribed by knowledgeable witnesses as lazy man's law enforcement.
The high costs of execution of a surveillance order serves as a strong deterrent to
frequent and lengthy eavesdropping. As stated by the Chief Counsel to New York's
Special Corruption Prosecutor, prior to Title III "the enormous manpower demands
which are made by present day wiretaps did not exist, and therefore tapping was re-
sorted to much more frequently." Defense counsel concur in the view, as expressed by a
participant at the Law Enforcement Effectiveness Conference, that cost is a natural de-
terrent to a law enforcement agency's using electronic surveillance.
NWC REPORT, supra note I, at 57-58 (footnotes omitted); see also NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra
note 598, at 111 (New Jersey reports tap requests may be rejected at field level if target is not
sufficiently important to justify expense). For example, in 1974 a Drug Enforcement Agency
administrator estimated average electronic surveillance costs for his agency as follows: aver-
age length of wiretap-18 1/2 days; time involved in obtaining probable cause and operating
tap-3,090 agent hours, six to ten agents to monitor tap at listening post; total average cost-
S12,384. This estimate did not consider the costs in followup investigations or suppression
hearings. NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 82.
958 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 12; see supra note 957. For a
description of the particularly high costs associated with installing and maintaining a bug, see
S. REP. No. 319, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1982).
959 Observers have commented that the effect of wiretapping on law enforcement is to
make the police lazy and inefficient. See, e.g., 32 F.R.D. 114, 119 (1962) (Statement of Mr. S.
Dash of the Pa. Bar); NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note 598, at 328; see also supra note 194.
960 See, e.g., NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note 598 at 127-69 (example of the voluminous
paperwork involved in a wiretap); see aso supra note 957.
961 Telephone companies are often reluctant to provide leased lines to a centralized law
enforcement location. See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, 86-88. Consequently, law en-
forcement authorities must locate a safe and unobtrusive surveillance plant in the target's
neighborhood. This can often pose problems "in tightly cohesive ethnically homogenous
neighborhoods." Id. at 86.
962 This is an acute problem with bugs. Surreptitious entry is a difficult and dangerous
process. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 86. Moreover, reentry is often required to adjust or
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and recording conversations,963 maintaining concurrent visual surveil-
lance of the target, 964 identifying voices, 965 typing transcripts, 966 filing
progress reports, 967 providing inventory notice,968 litigating suppression
issues, 96 9 and preparation for trial.970 Not surprisingly, law enforcement
officials often view electronic surveillance as impractical. 97' Moreover,
when bugs are concerned, the danger factor must also be considered. 972
These concerns, combined with procedural complexities engendered by
remove the device. Ifiretap Amendments: Hearings on S. 1717 before the Senate Comm. on thejudci-
ary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-17 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S 1717]. Investigations
have often failed because the premises were too well guarded. See, e.g., NWC STAFF STUDIES,
supra note 598, at 396. A classic example of the difficulties occasioned in attempting to install
a bug was given to the National Wiretapping Commission by a New York City detective who
had tried to bug a room at the Delmonico Hotel. Caught in the act by the targets, the detec-
tive engaged in a tug- of-war with his would be captors in an attempt to keep the door to their
room from opening. Eventually, the detective fled the scene, but 56 police cars responded to
the hotel's burglary report. Ultimately. the surveillance detectives, pretending to be investi-
gating the burglary. reentered the targets' room and installed the bug. NWC HEARINGS,
supra note 166, at 431-32 (statement of Sgt. Robert Nicholson, N.Y.P.D.).
963 For a detailed discussion of the procedures involved, see United States v. Bynum, 360 F.
Supp. 400, 411-13 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417
U.S. 903 (1974). Extremely uncomfortable surroundings and long inconvenient hours are the
standard fare of many operations. See,e.g., NWC HEARINGS, Supra note 166, at 188-89 (state-
ment of B. Modesitt, former Customs agent); id. at 420 (statement of Sgt. Robert Nicholson,
N.Y.P.D.). Such observers do not speak simply of the pressures on the individual of the typi-
cal late-night, early-morning shifts alone, but also of the unfortunate concomitant effects on
one's family. See also supra note 957.
964 Electronic surveillance is most effective when it supplements, rather than replaces,
other investigative methods. Moreover, concurrent visual surveillance is necessary to keep
apprised of recent developments regarding the target. NWC REPORT, supra note 1. at 91-92;
see supra note 957.
965 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 131-32; C. FISHMAN, supra note 438, §§ 149, 311.
The state may have to incur substantial costs simply to identify unknown speakers. For in-
stance, in the Tantillo case (proper appellate designation is United States v. James, 494 F.2d
1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974)), identification of unknown conversants
would have taken an estimated two years. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 131.
966 NWC REPORT.supra note 1. at 131; see supra note 957;cf. R. GREENE, supra note 613, at
253-54, 279 (describing logistical difficulties in Abscam).
967 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-97.
968 Donovan requires categories of intercepted parties to be furnished to the supervising
judge. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 428-32 (1977). For a general outline of notice
requirements, see NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-02.
969 Most cases obviously turn on the suppression question. See NWC REPORT, supra note 1,
at 129. "'Preparing for the suppression hearing requires an exhaustive analysis of the applica-
tion and affidavits, court order, periodic reports, sealing order, inventory, and prior applica-
tions." Id.
970 See C. FISHMAN, supra note 438. §§ 318, 319, 321; see also supra notes 965-66 and accom-
panying text.
971 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 146-47; see also supra note 957 and accompanying
text. For this reason, surveillance is often rejected.
972 Hearings on S. 1717, supra note 962, at 4; see supra note 962 and accompanying text
(Delmonico Hotel example).
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Title III, often discourage the use of electronic surveillance. 97:3
Perhaps for these reasons, electronic surveillance has been only a
qualified success. Although the National Wiretapping Commission
found that "electronic surveillance under Title III has effectively as-
sisted law enforcement in investigations of organized-crime type of-
fenses,"' 974 several of which resulted in conviction of major crime
chieftains, 975 there was no suggestion that organized crime has been
"eradicated" nationally.9 76 To some extent, the qualified nature of this
success may also be attributable to law enforcement targeting strate-
gies.97 7 Eradication of organized crime may not be possible,978 but it is
973 See, e.g., NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 137. Some law enforcement officials found
Title III so complex and procedurally arduous that electronic surveillance was thereby dis-
couraged. For instance, from 1972 to 1974 the DEA experienced , decline in electronic eaves-
dropping which, at least in part, could be blamed on the administrative delays and costs
attendant to wiretap applications. To correct the decline, the DEA instituted a technical
operations field program to expedite Title III compliance. NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166.
at 82 (statement of John Bartels, DEA Administrator).
The various state statutes can further complicate the process. For an example of the
complex and exhausting procedure and paperwork often required by these laws, see the appli-
cation and affidavit for the tap in a New York rackets investigation, reprinted in NWC HEAR-
INGS, supra, at 446-52. The question of whether the complexity of electronic surveillance
requirements is effecting reduced eavesdropping elicited differing opinions within New York
law enforcement ranks. One office asserted that the new statute had inhibited wiretapping by
making it a more difficult tool to use. NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note 598, at 207 (state-
ment of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Corruption, New York). Another agency had a
different explanation: although taps had decreased, this was not necessarily due to the com-
plexity of Title III. The real problem lay in the high turnover rate that had become com-
monplace in the prosecutor's office, leaving a shortage of attorneys with substantial Title III
experience. NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra, at 304 (statement of the Office of the District Attor-
ney of New York County). This may suggest that electronic surveillance is best operated by a
career staff, specializing in wiretapping law.
Some critics maintain that wiretapping costs are an unnecessary drain on public re-
sources because the crimes investigated are often trivial. While to some extent this is a fair
criticism, see infra notes 979-87 and accompanying text, a cost-benefit analysis is considered by
virtually any competent investigative unit before undertaking electronic eavesdropping.
NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 55-61. Some law enforcement agencies have literally ex-
hausted all funds while conducting wiretaps and, thus, are acutely aware of their limited
resources. See,e.g., NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra, at 445. Frequently, the substantial economic
and manpower costs of electronic surveillance ultimately inhibit its use. See supra note 957.
974 NWC Report, supra note 1, at 4; see infia note 976.
975 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 139.
976 J. CARR, supra note 18, § 2.01. In a concurring opinion, however, Commissioner Blakey
gave several concrete examples demonstrating the successful use of electronic surveillance in
organized crime cases. NWC REPORT, supra note I, at 198-200; see supra note 974-75 and
accompanying text.
977 The Department of Justice has recently been criticized for its lack of overall planning
in the organized crime area. See REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAl. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, STRONGER FEDERAL EFFORT NEEDED IN FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED
CRIME 24-25 (1981); REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING--FEDERAL STRIKE FORCES NOT GETrING
THE JOB DONE 9-10 (1979). See generally RACKETS BUREAUS, supra note 205, at 2, 11-19.
978 See NWC REPORT, supra note I, at 134-39.
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apparent that surveillance strategies previously employed will not
achieve this goal. During Title III's early years, eavesdropping was
heavily concentrated on gambling investigations: from 1968 to 1974,
fifty-four percent of the surveillances concentrated upon this subject., 79
This emphasis was justified by the traditional argument that gambling
constituted the "lifeblood of organized crime" because it generated in-
come for other illicit activities.9 80 The modern validity of this conven-
tional wisdom is questionable; 98 1 at least federally, however, there may
also have been a political side to this orientation, since the Nixon Ad-
ministration apparently viewed gambling prosecutions as an easy way to
demonstrate that progress was being made against organized crime.98 2
The Wiretapping Commission observed, however, that while gambling
surveillance had both achieved some dramatic accomplishments and ef-
fected considerable disruption upon gambling enterprises, 983 many of
these investigations had been confined to low level gambling opera-
979 Id. at 267 (table F-3).
980 Id. at 142-45. For years, law enforcement officials have presumed. rightly or wrongly,
that gambling was the principal source of revenue for organized crime. For example, during
the wiretap hearings, at least three prominent witnesses testified to the primacy of gambling
as a source of revenue for organized crime. NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 7 (statement
of Henry Peterson, Assistant Attorney General) (explaining that the high percentage of gam-
bling intercepts reflects gambling as the largest single source of revenue for organized crime);
id. at 867 (statement of John Barron, FBI supervisor) ("gambling and extortion .. .have
been the backbone and mainstay of organized criminal activities"); id. at 902 (statement of
Edward T. Joyce, Department of Justice) (organized crime "needs the bankroll from the
gambling in order to buy the narcotics").
981 See, e.g., NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 902 (statement of Prof. Blakey); Blakey,
supra note 950, at 301 n. 169. The main attack has been on the idea that the organized crime
groups that engage in gambling use it to finance their operations in narcotics. In reality,
gambling is conducted by a myriad of small and large organizations, many of whom are
independent or not substantially involved in other illegal activites. Indeed, the Commission
on the Review of the National Policy Towards Gambling specifically rejected the notion that
"all illegal gambling provides revenues for other illegal activities." GAMBLING IN AMERICA,
supra note 111, at 170-71. Likewise, in a study of illegal gambling in New York City, re-
searchers found that gambling had a narrow "profit" margin; bookmakers often went broke,
seldom financed anything but gambling operations, and most had only loose ties to major
organized crime outfits. The researchers rejected the "lifeline theory" that gambling was
organized crime's lifeblood. Ultimately, they characterized gambling as a "fragmented mar-
ket." Reuter & Rubinstein, Fact, Fang & Organired Crime, 53 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 45, 46-65
(1978); see also THE TASK FORCE ON LEGALIZED GAMBLING, FUND FOR THE CITY OF NEW
YORK AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, EASY MONEY 10-t1 (1974). If anything, there
is some basis for concluding that gambling investigations actually promote organized crime
because the increased operational expenses occasioned as a result of law enforcement disrup-
tions force the bookmaker to turn to organized crime loansharks. Goldstock, Letting the Loan
Shark Off the Hook, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1977, at 67: see Goldstock & Coenan, Controlling the
Contemporaiy Loanshark: The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of W itness Fear, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 127, 134-37, 156 (1980).
982 See generally GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 12-14; Blakey & Kurland, The
Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 977 n.236 (1978).
983 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 142-45.
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tions.984 The Commission did note a developing trend towards more
selectivity in targeting gambling defendants,98 5 but it was nevertheless
apparent that gambling investigations would not quell organized crime;
neither the public nor the courts responded enthusiastically to such
prosecutions, and prison terms rarely resulted.98 6 Since the Commis-
sion's report, the number of gambling surveillances has decreased con-
siderably. Nevertheless, more than twenty-five percent of all intercepts
are still authorized for this purpose.9 7
The other major area of eavesdropping concentration has been nar-
cotics. From 1968 to 1974, 24.7% of all surveillance orders were for this
category of crime.9 8 In contrast to gambling, the results in this context
were impressive. The Wiretapping Commission noted numerous in-
stances in which entire narcotics operations had been eliminated
through penetration by electronic surveillance.98 9 Moreover, conviction
in this context often led to lengthy incarceration. 99° Although the Com-
mission noted that electronic surveillance of narcotics networks is signifi-
cantly more difficult than eavesdropping upon gambling
organizations,9 91 the recommendation nevertheless was made that elec-
tronic surveillance be used more extensively in narcotics investigations
984 Id. at 145.
985 Id. at 6-7, 143-44.
986 Id. at 143-45; H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 216, at 19.
987 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 8 (table 3).
988 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 267 (table F-3).
989 Id. at 145-48.
990 Id. at 146. Over one-half of the offenders were sentenced to more than one year and
29% received five years or more.
991 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 145-46. Gambling establishments typically operate
through phones with gamblers calling in their bets during regular hours. Moreover, almost
all of the calls are clearly gambling related. Id. at 151. Consequently, the Wiretapping Com-
mission observed:
Bookmaking operations are also thought to be uniquely susceptible to electronic
surveillance: "No bookmaker of any consequence can operate without his telephone net-
work, and, by and large, Title III. . . effectively cuts into these networks." Dependence
on the telephone as a business instrument was acknowledged by one major bookmaker,
• . . who stated, "You can't work without a telephone. . . . Federal wiretaps are going
to put us all out of business."
For these reasons, "gambling is the Federal offense most susceptible to Title III cov-
erage and the one most devastated by it." These factors have caused electronic surveil-
lance to be used most frequently in gambling investigations, where it has been described
as "probably your most productive wire."
NWC REPORT, supra, at 142 (footnotes omitted). In contrast, major narcotics transactions
are typically very secretive. While the telephone is often used to arrange sales, dealers tend to
keep irregular hours, use the phone intermittently (or possibly use public phones), converse in
codes, and try to insulate their involvement from the street level. Hence, probable cause is
difficult to establish. Ultimately, narcotics operations often involve complex conspiracies and
lengthy taps, requiring enormous economic and manpower expenditures. See NWC REPORT,
supra, at 146, 151. The difficulties of wiretapping a suspected narcotics dealer are described
in United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 411-19 (S.D.N.Y.), ae'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
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and other crimes "of substantial significance to the public interest. '9 92
To some degree, this has been done. Narcotics surveillance now ac-
counts for more than fifty percent of all intercept orders; 993 in 1981, for
example, 318 warrants were issued for this purpose.994 Given the over-
whelming magnitude of America's narcotics distribution problem,99 5
however, even this number is far from adequate. For example, in 1981
the state of Florida had only forty-six narcotics surveillances, and the
federal government had just thirty-nine nationwide. 996 Concededly,
comparisons based upon numbers are somewhat deficient, as they do
not account for qualitative factors regarding each particular case.
99 7
Even so, the severity of the problem mandates greater use of Title III
surveillance.
Futhermore, if electronic surveillance is to be more effective, law
enforcement must utilize it more often against other crimes.998 Despite
the Wiretapping Commission's exhortation to expand into other areas,
the overall distribution has remained remarkably similar since 1974;
gambling and narcotics have switched places, but, together, they still
account for seventy-five percent of all surveillances. 999 Consequently,
other areas where organized crime is heavily involved, such as theft and
fencing, have essentially been ignored.1 0 0 But more than diversification
992 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
993 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 16. Narcotics investigations have
accounted for over 50% of taps since 1980. Id.
994 Id. No doubt, economic and manpower costs are somewhat responsible for the rela-
tively infrequent use of electronic surveillance. See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 145-48; see
also supra notes 957-58 and accompanying text. Many agents, however, still prefer more
traditional investigative techniques. See NWC REPORT, supra, at 145.
995 See THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO
THE ILLICIT MARKET FROM FOREIGN AND DOMESTIc SOURCES IN 1979 (1979) (narcotics
trafficking reportedly "generated S64 billion in retail sales in 1979, compared to S50 billion in
1978 and $48 billion in 1977'*); Federal Drug Strateg, Prospects for the 1980". Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); HOUSE SELECT
COMm. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, H.R. REP. No.
1547, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980): HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CON-
TROL. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1981, H.R. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. pts. 1, 2 (1982):
SENATE COsM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS & SENATE PERMANENT COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
ILLEGAL NARCOTICS PROFITS, S. REP. No. 887, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1980).
One commentator has noted that "[little evidence exists that current law enforcement
resource commitment and strategy are having a significant impact on drug traffic. Federal
expenditures in drug control programs amount to one billion dollars each year, yet only two
or five percent of the heroin, for example, is diverted. . . . Overall, less than 15% of all drug
traffic entering the country is intercepted." Blakey, supra note 950, at 302 n.170.
996 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 16.
997 See, e.g., NWC REPORT,supra note 1. at 140-43 (Commission notes the disruptive effect
of taps on criminal organizations, regardless of number of convictions).
998 See id. at 5-6.
999 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 16.
1000 Since 1978, less than 2% of the authorized wiretaps have been for theft and fencing. Id.
at 16. For a detailed discussion of the largely unrecognized theft and fencing problem and
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is needed. Law enforcement must also use eavesdropping more cre-
atively. For example, far greater use must be made of bugs. From 1968
to 1974, fewer than seven percent of all surveillances involved
microphone installations. 00 1 By 1981, the proportion had increased to
thirteen percent. 0 0 2 Nevertheless, the raw numbers are unimpressive.
In 1981, there were only seventy-three microphone surveillances nation-
wide. 0 03 Since there is considerable evidence that criminals are espe-
cially cautious in their telephone conversations, 1004 bugging is the best
way to pursue an investigation to the next level. Assuming continued
probable cause, this should be done after efforts with a less intrusive
wiretap have failed. 00 5 Admittedly, developing probable cause for a
bug may be more difficult than with" a wiretap, 00 6 and installation may
be an arduous and dangerous task. 0 0 7 Several recent cases demon-
strate, however, that with proper planning, these problems can often be
overcome. 100 8
the limited law enforcement response. see Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1517-23,
1611-13.
100l NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 269 (table F-5).
1002 WIRETAP APPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 947, at 14.
1003 Id.
1004 See, e.g., NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 146. Not surprisingly, those who suspect their
activities may be the subject of electronic surveillance have resorted to countermeasures.
They may refrain from phone use altogether. A more typical tactic, employed primarily by
bookies, however, is simply to change phone numbers frequently, thereby taking advantage of
the time delay inherent in the wiretap application process. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at
151-52. Defendants may stage exculpatory conversations, NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note
598, at 208 (statement of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Corruption, New York), or
resort to the use of codes or foreign languages. See supra note 612 and accompanying text. In
a case described in the wiretap hearings, one defendant used codes to indicate what outside
phones he would use. The calling party would then hang up, and dial the designated public
phone. NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 375 (statement of Joseph Phillips, Assistant Spe-
cial Prosecutor, Corruption, New York).
1005 See supra note 735 and accompanying text.
1006 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-44.
1007 See supra notes 962 & 1005 and accompanying text.
1008 See generally United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167, 1170-73 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 818 (1981): United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
961(1981): United States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.), a 'd, 633 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1980). For an excellent description of how electronic surveillance involving wiretaps and
bugs was used for seven months by federal authorities to penetrate massive organized crime
corruption on the waterfronts of New York and Florida, see 14aterfront Corruption: Hearings
before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of Governmental Afairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Waterfront Corruption]. After years of organized crime
domination, this investigation resulted in the successful prosecution of Anthony Scotto. a Vice
President of the International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.), and a " "capocicada" or
'chief' in the Carlo Gambino organized Crime family." Note, United States v. Scotto: Progression
of a Waterfront Corruption Prosecution From Investigation Through Appeal, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW.
364, 378 (1981). At the time of his conviction, Scotto was an extremely popular union figure
who was also highly regarded as a civic leader. Id. at 367-69; see id. at 384 n. 141. In fact, his
trial was prominently marked by the testimony of then New York Governor Hugh Carey,
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Creativity also involves using eavesdropping more often on a long
term basis. Both the Constitution and Title III permit lengthy surveil-
lances so long as the underlying probable cause predicate is satisfied,
and the investigation's objectives have not yet been met. 00 9 Here, it is
important to emphasize that investigative objectives can often be rede-
fined. For example, surveillance may commence based upon probable
cause to believe that narcotics related conversations, involving a small
criminal enterprise, will be intercepted. Accordingly, the investigative
objective might appropriately be the elimination of that criminal enter-
prise. However, should probable cause later develop that conversations
will be overheard regarding a much larger narcotics enterprise, the ob-
jective can be expanded accordingly to seek the elimination of that or-
ganization. 0 1°  Significantly, the federal racketeering statute
(RICO), 0 11 which has served as a model for comparable state legisla-
tion, 10 1 2 is ideally suited for investigations against large scale criminal
enterprises. Indeed, properly used, a Title III RICO investigation pro-
vides the potential for the elimination of entire organized crime fami-
lies. 10 13 Moreover, such investigations are capable of penetrating with
former New York City Mayor John Lindsay, former New York City Mayor Robert F. Wag-
ner, and AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Lane Kirkland, all of whom served as character wit-
nesses in his behalf. Id. at 378-79. For these reasons, as well as Scotto's sophisticated
precautionary measures designed to insulate him from effective investigation, it is apparent
that the case never could have been successfully prosecuted without the use of wiretaps and
bugs. See Hearings on Waterfront Corruption, supra, at 232-33 (statement of Jack Barrett, Special
Agent, FBI). In total, more than ten elected I.L.A. officials were convicted on racketeering
charges stemming from this investigation. Id. at 221 (statement of Robert Fiske, former
United States Attorney). Other examples of recent successful electronic surveillance investi-
gations are provided in the internal semi-annual reports of the Justice Department's Organ-
ized Crime Section. See Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Dep't of Justice
Semi-annual Report, Nov. 29, 1981. Presently, however, electronic surveillance is used in
only 15% of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section's investigations. Letter to author
from Alfred H. King, Executive Assistant to the Chief of the Organized Crime and Racke-
teering Section, United States Department of Justice (Nov. 24, 1982).
1009 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 111, at 2189-90.
1010 See generaly NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 98.
1011 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
1012 The states below have both "RICO" and electronic surveillance statutes. See supra note
14 for the electronic surveillance statutes. The state RICO statutes are: ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2312 to -2315 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-101 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 895-01 to -06 (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3401 to -3414 (1975 & Supp.
1982); HAWAUI REV. STAT. § 842-1-12 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-30.51 to 30.5.6 (Burns
Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1-6.2 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-1-17
(1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.715 to .735 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. § 911 (1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-15-1-11 (Supp. 1982). Kentucky and Connecticut have just passed simila statutes,
and Illinois, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin are presently considering such a law.
1013 See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts--Criminal and Civi Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14, 1023-28 (1980). RICO makes
it unlawful, inter alia, to operate an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). The term "enterprise" has been held to apply to groups and organi-
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great breadth as well as great depth.10 1 4 Not only does the investigation
move upstream against individual leaders within the organization, it
also can penetrate laterally against other enterprises involved in similar
or other crimes. While Title III prohibits intelligence surveillance, con-
versations involving nonspecified crimes may, subject to Constitutional
and statutory limitations, be intercepted and used for further investiga-
tive purposes. t0 1 5 Thus, by utilizing in effect a "spin off" approach to
electronic surveillance, 01 6 headway could be made against organized
crime. Although this approach seems to be a matter of common sense, it
has rarely been employed.101 7 Thus, perhaps the ultimate irony of elec-
zations engaged in exclusively criminal activities. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580-81 (1981). Since group members have to communicate, their conversations are poten-
tially vulnerable to electronic surveillance because RICO is a designated Title III offense. 18
U.S.C. § 2516(l)(c) (1976). Accordingly, assuming adequate probable cause, under a RICO
eavesdropping operation, surveillance could be initiated for the purpose of prosecuting an
organized crime family or any other large scale criminal enterprise engaged in RICO viola-
tions. Moreover, assuming continued probable cause to support an investigative objective of
enterprise elimination, surveillance could be maintained until such elimination has been
achieved. See Blakey, Techniques in the Investigation of Organized Crime, Thoughts on Ti-
tle III, Title IX and Title X, A Strategy for a Preemptive Strike Against Organized Crime 10-
19, 90-92 (1980) (unpublished manuscript available from author) [hereinafter cited as Pre-
emptive Strike]. While some might question the legitimacy of this goal, since RICO clearly
makes it unlawful to conduct any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, elimi-
nation of such an enterprise is a proper investigative purpose under Title III.
1014 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
1015 See id. at 126-27, 143-44.
1016 See id. at 92, 126-27, 143-44.
1017 See NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5. For a description of several investigations suc-
cessfully using this approach, see NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note 598, at 109, 179. While it
is difficult to document specific examples of failure, in at least one case which federal authori-
ties regard as exemplary of their success, United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1974); see NWC HEARINGS, supra note 166, at 56-58 (letter from Assistant Attorney General
Peterson summarizingjamer case), there was an apparent failure to pursue an excellent op-
portunity to initiate electronic surveillance laterally against major organized crime leaders
who were not part of the original enterprise under investigation. In this respect, consider the
following commentary:
In early 1969, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) cre-
ated a special task force in Washington, D.C. to focus on major drug traffickers in the
city. Fifty major violators were targeted.
The initial thrust was with undercover agents put on the streets to try to move up
the distribution network. Informants were used to supply intelligence and to make intro-
ductions.
The investigators' first major break came when one of their informants announced
that he could make a purchase of heroin from Laurence "Slippery" Jackson. one of
Washington, D.C.'s biggest drug dealers.
Following the purchases, subsequent surveillance of Jackson, his headquarters and
the apartment of his girlfriend, Mary Davis, produced little additional knowledge. The
BNDD then sought authorization for a wire interception on the Jackson headquarters.
It became operational on July 11 and with one extension, ran until August 18. It was
productive. Seventy percent of the calls related to narcotics and five percent to other
crimes.
During the 35 days of interception, 40 agents, 3 police officers, 6 attorneys and 8
clerical personnel worked on the wiretaps and accompanying surveillance. The investi-
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tronic surveillance has been law enforcement's failure to use this legally
sanctioned technique effectively.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Electronic surveillance had been a constitutional controversy since
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Olmstead. Years of debate
were climaxed by the Court's opinions in Berger and Katz, which sought
to provide an appropriate constitutional matrix for legislative reform.
Given this matrix, Congress conceived Title III as a legislative design
which would conform the law of electronic surveillance to the requisites
of constitutional doctrine. As enacted, the statute actually contained
many protections which exceeded constitutional demands. Indeed,
given recent Supreme Court decisions, virtually every level of protection
afforded by the statute transcends constitutional requirements. 0 1 8
gators found that over 100 dealers, including most of the 50 targeted violators were buy-
ing drugs from the Jackson enterprise. In addition, Jackson was found to have had at
least 2 police officers, one lawyer, and bondsmen keeping him abreast of informants,
pending raids, and outstanding arrest warrants.
There was little more that the investigators could have done to obtain their objec-
tive-the successful investigation and prosecution of the Jackson organization. But be-
cause of their myopia, the) failed to see and therefore to use the really significant
information that they were able to obtain-information that if developed could have
been the basis for the prosecution that would have had more lasting impact on organized
crime, not in just D.C., but the United States.
On July 28, Mary Davis called Jackson at his headquarters and said that *Carlos'
was at her apartment. Agents followed two males from her apartment to the National
Airport. Later identification and continuing surveillance showed that the men were Car-
mine Paladino and Bobby Verderosa, lieutenants for Harry Tantillo, a major narcotics
wholesaler and member of the New York Genovese Family.
On August 18, Paladino, Verderosa, Tantillo and Jackson were arrested in Wash-
ington, D.C. while trying to make a drug connection. Concurrent searches seized various
amounts of narcotics. Altogether, 55 were indicted and 48 were convicted including
Verderosa. Tantillo, and Jackson (Paladino and Mary Davis had died by the time of
trial). The prosecution of the Jackson organization was succcessful.
But look at what failed to be done. A connection had been established between the
Jackson enterprise and the Mob. Verderosa and Paladino were the suppliers of heroin.
They were getting it from somewhere and that implies other levels of organization. Tan-
tillo was a member of the Genovese family, and probable cause had been established
against him as the Jackson supplier. An interception had hooked into the organized
crime structure: it was the communication structure that could have been turned against
them [sic] orders should have been applied for on Tantillo and "others as yet unknown,"
to fill in the means, methods, and members involved in the narcotics enterprise at the
importation level, and focused on the larger enterprise-the Genovese Family.
Preemptive Strike, supra note 1013, at 40-44 (footnotes omitted).
1018 For example, although the statute provides otherwise, the Supreme Court has held
that, at least from a constitutional standpoint, targets do not have to be identified, see supra
notes 532-34 and accompanying text, the supression sanction does not have to extend to all
civil proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976), the suppression sanction
does not apply to grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-52
(1974), and standing may be limited to persons possessing a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. Salvucci v. United States. 448 U.S. 83, 86-95 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
138-40 (1978). See supra note 362.
ELECTRONIC SUR VEILLANCE
Ironically, although the constitutional controversy has since sub-
sided, many Title III safeguards have been eviscerated by the Supreme
Court's failure to enforce with care the statute which it had originially
engendered. Consequently, constitutional and statutory rights often
have been violated, and the law of electronic surveillance has suffered
from a lack of doctrinal consistency. So far, widespread abuse has not
prevailed, but this is somewhat attributable to the statute's underutiliza-
tion by law enforcement. Should law enforcement start to effect Title
III surveillance aggressively and imaginatively, there will be even
greater need for proper judicial controls.i0 19 If anything, given the in-
tensely intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, judicial standards of
review should be more rigorous than those applied in conventional
fourth amendment cases. That the criminal element often invoking
these protections may be deserving of our disdain should be of no conse-
quence. 0 20 For, as Justice Frankfurter wrote years ago, "[i]t is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." 10 21
1019 Rigorous judicial enforcement, of course, should commence immediately. However,
since law enforcement is relying upon the statute as it has been applied in the past, suppres-
sion should not automatically be imposed. Absent intentional misconduct, suppression
should not be mandated for purely statutory violations until some initial notice has been
given that past practices are no longer acceptable. Cf Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
39-40 (1979).
1020 But see genfera/ly NWC STAFF STUDIES, supra note 598, at 258, 386 (judges more flexible
in murder cases and high level narcotics investigations); 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 60, at 455
(constitutional rulings tend to be influenced by seriousness of crimes).
1021 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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